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Foreword
Anthony Forster*
I am delighted to support the publication of the third vol-
ume in the University of Essex Inclusivity Reader series, which 
focuses on the important topics of health and wellbeing. 
The University’s mission is to deliver excellence in educa-
tion and research, putting student success at the heart of every-
thing we do – and supporting students to enable them to succeed 
irrespective of background.  We know that creating a healthy and 
inclusive environment is key to enabling our students to fulfil 
their potential as individuals, to be active participants in their 
own educational experiences and to enjoy the transformational 
opportunities available to them at our University.  This approach 
is equally important in supporting our staff, both directly and in 
enabling others to be the best they can be.
The focus of the Essex approach is to create an enabling en-
vironment: a healthy and supportive environment for all, that 
creates a sense of belonging, responsibility and a caring and 
sharing culture; the establishment of services based on partner-
ship within the University and with the Students’ Union and ex-
ternal agencies and organisations; diversity in the services we 
offer, ensuring services are tailored to individual need as far as 
possible; the development of services that are sustainable and 
scalable to safeguard quality and student benefit; and to manage 
risk effectively. 
* Vice-Chancellor University of Essex.
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We are keen to learn and what this volume underscores 
to me is the importance of understanding different evidence 
based perspectives and needs. This approach is vital to ensure 
that everyone is supported in their transformational journey of 
living, learning and working in our community. 
Introduction
Ilaria Boncori and Tracey Loughran
We should be healthier and happier than any previous gen-
eration, according to some scholars. The Harvard psychologist 
Steven Pinker (2011: xxiii), for example, argues that violence has 
declined over time while human empathy has increased, and 
that “more peaceable societies also tend to be richer, healthier, 
better educated, better governed, more respectful of their wom-
en, and more likely to engage in trade”. Meanwhile, for much of 
the western world, the decades after 1945 constituted a ‘Golden 
Age’ of health. Life expectancy soared, maternal and infant mor-
tality declined, and scores of diseases were eradicated. The rise 
of welfare states improved the quality of life, not least through 
improved access to medical services. Yet, at least in the UK, we 
are not happier than previous generations. Research has found 
that people were happier in 1957 than at any point since – even 
though “in 1957 life expectancies were lower, Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) was lower, more hours were worked in a typical 
week and few households had central heating and less than half 
owned a television, levels of public happiness were at a height 
never reached again in the British post-War period” (Mental 
Health Today, 2017).
Why are people less happy now? One view is that hap-
piness is relative – if aspirations are higher, then people will 
be unhappy if those aspirations are not met, even if they have 
most of the things they need in life. But it is also true that recent 
political developments have made people less happy, and less 
healthy. As Professor Sir Simon Wessely, former president of 
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the Royal College of Psychiatrists, points out “The job of gov-
ernment is not to make people happy – that is most determined 
by the quality of our interpersonal relationships. By promoting 
good health, making our streets safer, ensuring better quality 
of care and helping people into meaningful employment we 
can however create the conditions for a happier society. Final-
ly, happiness is about fairness – In short; an unequal society 
is an unhappy society” (Mental Health Today, 2017). Since the 
Conservative-led UK Government launched austerity in 2010, 
introducing multiple policies that the UN rapporteur on ex-
treme poverty and human rights has described as “punitive, 
mean-spirited, and often callous” (Booth and Butler, 2018), 
British society has become markedly less equal. Government 
spending on the police, road maintenance, libraries, courts, 
prisons, and housing has been slashed (Mueller, 2019). Over a 
million people a year are now using foodbanks, homelessness 
has more than doubled, and one-in-three children and around 
one-in-five pensioners have now dropped below the poverty 
line. As the Institute of Public Policy Research (2019), a pro-
gressive policy think-tank, points out, “these are real people, 
families and communities, who rely on government support to 
get by, and who have been devastated by austerity”.
In theory, spending on education and health was protected 
from cuts made under austerity. In practice, miniscule increas-
es to the National Health Service (NHS) budget over the past 
decade has left it in crisis – not least because the cumulative ef-
fect of all the spending cuts made in the name of austerity has 
made the most vulnerable people in society weaker, more ill, 
and less able to cope on their own, at the same time as the local 
government services that they rely upon have been slashed to 
the bone. In late 2018, the number of vacancies across the NHS 
in England hit a record high, and it was revealed that the ser-
vice had an underlying deficit of £4.3 billion. The King’s Fund 
(2019), an English health charity, has outlined how the NHS is 
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“struggling to cope with record demand”, while “social care ser-
vices are stretched to the limit”. Many people are not healthier, 
and therefore not happier, than previous generations because in 
recent years, their health and happiness has not mattered to the 
successive governments that have held power over their lives 
and deaths. This is not mere rhetoric: the British Medical Journal 
(2017) reported that cuts in health and social care were linked to 
120,000 excess deaths in England alone. That figure has undoubt-
edly risen in the years since.
Austerity measures have had terrible effects on students 
and staff in the UK Higher Education sector too. The tripling of 
student fees and increase in means-tested repayable loans has 
left many students fearing crippling debt (Chalari and Sealey, 
2017). It is impossible to isolate the effects of financial anxiety 
on students’ mental health, but it is clear that there is a mental 
health crisis in the UK’s universities. In September 2017 the In-
stitute for Public Policy Research published a report on the need 
to improve mental health in universities (Thorley, 2017). It found 
that disclosure of mental health conditions among first-year stu-
dents at UK HEIs had increased almost five-fold in the previous 
decade; that female first-year students are more likely than male 
first-year students to disclose a mental health condition; and, per-
haps most worryingly, that just under half of the students who 
reported experiencing a mental health condition chose not to dis-
close it to their HEI. The report’s recommendations included that 
the HE sector should “collectively adopt student mental health 
and wellbeing as a priority issue, with individual institutions 
developing their own ‘whole-university’ approaches, which are 
subject to audit and quality assurance, and underpinned by com-
mon principles which draw on best practice”, that HEIs “should 
commit to increase the amount of funding dedicated to services 
which promote and support the mental health and wellbeing of 
students”, and that “Government should facilitate the introduc-
tion of place-based coalitions which aim to improve the health 
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of local student populations through greater integration across 
services” (Thorley, 2017: 3-5).
It’s not just students who suffer. Across the UK, most uni-
versities are struggling to maintain excellent standards for more 
students with fewer resources. In February 2018, the Times High-
er Education (THE) published the results of a major global survey 
of university staff views on work-life balance (Bothwell, 2018). 
The poll found that many staff believed “they are paid less and 
have a worse work-life balance than most of their friends”; that 
a “large majority of staff have considered leaving the higher ed-
ucation sector”; and that many staff “say that their job restricts 
their ability to see their friends and gets in the way of their abil-
ity to conduct a successful relationship”. One professor cited in 
the article explained, “I feel very stressed. Work is never-ending, 
never good enough, lucrative enough [or] impactful enough, so 
there is always a lot of pressure to do more”. Another said, “I 
don’t have the time for friendships outside the academic world. 
Friendships at work are hard to maintain because of workload 
and also lack of staff common room facilities”. It is not an easy 
time to study or work in a UK university – indeed, it is not an 
easy time to live in the UK. 
Are there any glimmers of light in this gloom? The same 
THE survey offered the merest sliver of hope. Despite often re-
porting negative experiences, 65 per cent of academics and 75 
per cent of professional staff said that they would recommend 
the job to their children, albeit, in the majority of cases “with res-
ervations”. As one respondent asserted, “I think about leaving 
HE but would have a hard time doing so because I love being 
surrounded by brilliant people and cutting-edge research. It is 
a vibrant and stimulating environment” (Bothwell, 2018). This 
volume on health and wellbeing, the third Essex Reader, speaks 
of the shadow but also the sunlight. The chapters unpick thorny 
problems in healthcare policy and practice across diverse organ-
isations, systems, and sectors; but where they put forward an 
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analysis of what is wrong, they also point towards ways in which 
these abuses could be put right. Our contributors have been sear-
ingly honest in their denunciations of certain aspects of policy, 
but equally truthful in sharing their own life stories, ways of cop-
ing, and reflections on the future. In doing so, they are helping 
to create the kind of environment that fosters the wellbeing of all 
its members – indeed, as Mental Health First Aid England (2019) 
states when describing its training course aimed at the higher 
education sector: 
Our courses won’t teach you to be a therapist, but we will teach 
you to listen, reassure and respond, even in a crisis – and even 
potentially stop a crisis from happening.
But more than that, our courses aim to give you the information 
and skills to look after your own mental health, promote positive 
wellbeing and raise awareness in the people around you. By giv-
ing you the tools to have these conversations, we hope to empow-
er you to create a mentally healthy, supportive environment in 
your university.
Perhaps the main reason to be hopeful, however, is that, as 
in previous Essex Readers, these chapters have been penned by 
both students and staff; from those undertaking undergraduate 
degrees, right up to professors who have been at this institution 
for decades. We work together; we learn from each other; we 
support each other; and, together, we have the power to change 
the world we live in for the better.
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Part 1

1. What the practice of yoga can do 
	 for	academic	practice:	personal	reflections
Martyna Śliwa
Introduction 
“This is the beauty of it: there is no point in thinking that 
you’re great just because you can do a certain pose as there is 
always somewhere else to go, a more advanced option to work 
towards”. It is Sunday morning and there are about 20 of us in 
the gymnasium of a primary school that makes its space avail-
able	for	fitness	and	yoga	classes	in	the	evenings	and	on	the	week-
ends.	Our	yoga	teacher	has	been	giving	instructions	for	getting	
into bakasana – crow pose – and we are all trying to get into and 
to hold this seemingly gravity-defying pose, even if only for a 
second or two. One participant has actually mastered it and per-
haps is ready for the next step now: jumping back, or – to use a 
more	elegant,	yoga-appropriate	expression	–	floating,	from	crow	
to chaturanga, low plank. Indeed, there is always somewhere else 
to go.
Crow, sometimes also referred to as crane, is an arm-
balancing posture which provides foundation for most other 
arm	balances	in	yoga.	It	might	be	the	first	arm	balance	typically	
learned by those practising yoga but as far as I am concerned, it is 
certainly hard enough: one requires a good deal of core strength, 
balance and concentration to do it. The determination to over-
come fear is also needed because of the quite realistic prospect of 
falling	down,	face-first.	But	it	promises	to	be	worth	it:	in	addition	
to	its	physical	benefits,	such	as	strengthening	and	toning	a	vari-
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ety	of	muscles,	the	crow	pose	is	supposed	to	build	confidence,	
relieve stress and anxiety, increase concentration and enable cre-
ativity in the practitioner. Precisely what I need! And therefore, 
just like everybody else in the room, I am giving this arm balance 
a go, hoping to get there without face-planting. 
Over the years, participating in yoga classes has become es-
sential to maintaining my health and wellbeing, and has been an 
activity that has accompanied and inspired me throughout my 
professional	career.	In	fact,	the	first	yoga	session	I	ever	attended	
took place on the premises of the sports centre of the university 
where	I	held	my	first	lectureship	position.	These	days,	at	the	be-
ginning	of	each	teaching	term,	after	I	fill	my	diary	with	a	sched-
ule of meetings and lectures for the coming months, I make sure 
to add yoga classes to it as well, two to three times each week. 
Whenever I visit other cities for a certain period of time – for 
example, to collaborate with colleagues from other universities 
on a piece of research – I try to join a local yoga studio, even if 
only for a couple of weeks at a time. While I have not become 
either acrobatic or serene, over time, I have come to believe that 
yoga	offers	a	form	of	exercise	that	is	perfect	for	supporting	me,	
in	many	different	ways,	in	my	professional	and	personal	work	
and growth, and is essential to my sense of wellbeing. This es-
say provides an opportunity to share some of my experiences of 
practising	yoga	and	benefiting	from	it	in	all	aspects	of	my	profes-
sional life. While my scholarly expertise is not directly related to 
yoga, throughout the text I refer to academic research as well as 
blogs	that	have	addressed	the	effects	of	yoga	practice	on	health	
and wellbeing. 
Viewed holistically, yoga encompasses a broad philosophy 
known as the eight-fold path – or the eight limbs of yoga – out-
lined	in	Patanjali’s	Yoga	Sutras	and	including:	attitudes	toward	
others/restraints (yamas), rituals/self-observances (niyamas), 
the physical practice of postures (asana), breathing practice 
(pranayama), withdrawal of the senses (pratyahara), concentra-
1. what the practice of yoga can do for academic practice 25
tion (dharana), meditation (dhyana), and state of enlightenment 
(samadhi) (Iyengar, 1979). The practice of yoga is expected to pro-
mote health in a holistic sense, through the balancing of physical, 
spiritual, psychological, and social aspects (Engebretson, 2002). 
In the Western context, the term ‘yoga’ is typically used with ref-
erence to physical exercise (asana), and to a lesser extent with re-
gard to breathing techniques (pranayama) and meditation (dyana) 
(Garfinkel	 and	Schumacher,	 2000).	While	 there	 is	 an	emphasis	
on the physical exercise element, yoga is generally understood 
to be a mind-body practice, whereby the physiological state is 
considered	to	“affect	the	emotions,	thoughts,	and	attitudes”	and	
there is an underlying assumption that “the mental state has an 
effect	on	the	body”	(Cowen	and	Adams,	2005:	212).	
Below	I	discuss	five	specific	areas	where	yoga	practice	has	
proven to be of great help to me, supporting me in my develop-
ment and in maintaining my physical and mental health: aca-
demic writing, relating to others, pedagogic practice, living and 
working without physical pain, and dealing with stress and anx-
iety. 
Yoga and writing
The development of awareness of the inseparability of the 
body	from	the	mind	was	one	of	the	first	 lessons	I	gained	from	
practising	yoga.	Surprisingly	at	first,	reflections	associated	with	
this observation transferred into how I began to view and re-
late to the academic writing process. As anyone who has tried 
to practise yoga will have noted, the ability to do a particular 
yoga pose is about much more than a strong and supple body. 
In yoga classes, the teacher would point out countless times: “if 
your mind is distracted, you will struggle to hold a pose”. Like-
wise, countless times I have been unable to ignore the fact that 
when	the	mind	is	“all	over	the	place”,	this	will	be	reflected	in	the	
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body’s struggle to get into and hold a particular asana, or to tran-
sition smoothly from one pose to another. From there, another 
observation followed, this time in relation to my academic writ-
ing practice: with a distracted mind, it is impossible for writing 
to	flow.	The	practice	of	looking	at	the	screen	of	the	laptop,	press-
ing keys in a particular order, reading words as they emerge – 
letter	by	letter	–	and	become	parts	of	sentences,	then	eventually	
form full sentences in front of my eyes, is an embodied practice 
that	requires	patience,	time,	skill,	confidence	and	a	great	deal	of	
concentration. In this regard, trying to write resembles trying to 
do yoga. Except, in the case of yoga, falling out of the pose when 
one loses concentration is immediately obvious. With writing, 
by contrast, one can spend a long time looking at the screen and 
even	pressing	the	letter	keys,	before	realising	that	not	much	has	
been happening because the mind has been distracted. 
Perhaps this does not happen to everybody but is certainly 
true about me, since this has been, more than once, my experi-
ence of writing. It used to frustrate me greatly. Crafting a text 
takes me a long time. There are moments when I think I must be 
the slowest writer in the world. It seems like a drawn-out process 
even when I am able to maintain concentration quite well, let 
alone when the mind wanders in multiple directions, undermin-
ing the intention to reach whatever “writing objective” I set for 
myself on a given day. From frustration would come negative 
self-judgement, irritation, and overall, a feeling of wasted – and 
unpleasantly spent – time. 
When one practises yoga in a class context, there is usually 
a teacher around who will say: “it’s ok to wobble out of a pose. 
Approach this with lightness and a sense of fun. So what if you 
can’t do it today? All you’re doing is trying to stand on one leg, 
it’s	no	biggy	if	you	can’t	do	it.	Be	joyful	about	it!	Use	your	band-
has – energy locks, and drishti – a focused gaze, to support you. 
And try again”. With the help of various yoga teachers, I have 
gradually realised that there is nothing wrong with the “wob-
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bling out”. Nothing wrong with the slowness, either. In addi-
tion,	trying	again	–	the	repetitiveness	of	getting	into	and	holding	
asanas – allows for developing greater bodily awareness and for 
deepening the practice. In fact, neither slowness nor repetitive-
ness are unpleasant experiences. The only obstacle, really, lies 
in the feeling of frustration and negative self-judgement that ac-
company	our	attempts	at	getting	on	with	working	on	the	yoga	
sequence – and it is wonderful to be able to rely on a teacher who 
will remind us about it. 
I	 completely	 agree	 with	 Wenger	 (2015:	 3)	 when	 she	 ad-
mits: “I can no longer think of writing and yoga as separate pro-
cesses”. I am full of gratitude and appreciation for what doing 
yoga has done for my writing – especially, for how learning to 
embrace the slowness and repetitiveness of yoga practice has 
helped	me	approach	my	writing	practice	differently,	 strength-
ening my sense of wellbeing along the way. It required, though, 
replacing the frustrated voice of my inner critic: “you’re way too 
slow”,	“this	 is	banal	and	trivial”,	“you’re	never	going	to	finish	
this text” – with the wise voice of a compassionate teacher: “you 
are doing your best”, “it’s normal for focus to come and go, it’s 
good that you have noticed it, take a deep breath and try again”, 
“trust the process”… 
It also required giving up on my assumptions about what 
my writing practice “should be” like – for example, immersive, 
confident,	efficient	–	and	on	the	misguided	belief	that	it	is	a	skill	
that can be acquired once and for good, and then it will be al-
ways available and ready for me to “switch it on” at any time. 
There are times when writing unfolds smoothly and pleasantly, 
and other times when it feels like ploughing through frozen soil. 
But	now	I	know	that	there	is	nothing	wrong	with	the	slow	as-
sembling of sentences. There is nothing wrong with reworking 
the same sub-section of a text again and again, modifying it, ever 
so slightly, each time. The practice of yoga has allowed me to feel 
through	my	own	body-mind	how	beneficial	repetitiveness	is,	the	
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process of going through the same sequence of exercises time 
and time again, introducing only very minor changes. As a re-
sult of practising yoga, the body gradually becomes more supple 
and stronger over a period of time, but even more obvious is the 
difference	in	how	it	feels	to	be	in	the	body	at	the	end	of	the	class	
compared to the beginning. Likewise, by the end of a day of writ-
ing, the text and the knowledge it constructs and conveys will 
have moved forward: on the screen and within the body-mind.
Yoga and encountering difference
It is necessary to acknowledge the common critiques of the 
commercialised dimension of yoga, such as Delaney’s (2017) 
point about the “narcissistic” aspect of the yoga enterprise, or 
Warner’s (2011: n.p.) worry that many young women choose to 
practise yoga since, for them, “there is no sense that personal 
liberation can be found by taking a more active role in the public 
world”.	No	doubt,	the	image	of	an	affluent	Western	yoga	practi-
tioner, whose “yogic lifestyle” revolves around a particular type 
of	conspicuous	consumption	–	Lululemon	or	Sweaty	Betty	ap-
parel, overpriced cold-pressed organic juices, and all-inclusive 
yoga	 and	 detox	 “retreats”	 in	 five	 star	 surroundings	 –	 evokes	
connotations	 of	 self-centredness	 and	 superficiality	 rather	 than	
an	openness	 to	others	and	self-reflection.	Notwithstanding	 the	
problematic consequences of the operations of the yoga industry 
and	of	an	unquestioning	subjection	to	its	profit-generating	log-
ic, the reality of who we encounter when participating in yoga 
classes	is,	from	my	experience,	very	different	from	what	market-
ing images would have us believe. 
The	 classes	 I	 attend	 in	my	neighbourhood	 are	 populated	
by	bodies	of	different	shapes,	ethnicities,	genders	and	ages,	pre-
dominantly	in	their	forties	and	fifties.	Some	of	us	go	regularly,	
others pop in from time to time, yet others come to class once 
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and are not seen again. For each asana, the teacher suggests sev-
eral	“options”	–	levels	of	difficulty	–	and	so	for	everybody,	there	
is	effort	involved.	Sometimes	my	body	feels	clumsy	on	the	mat,	
sometimes less so. Sometimes the body of the person next to me 
looks	clumsy,	finding	it	hard	to	bend	and	stretch	as	instructed.	
We are all physically close to each other, sweating, breathing 
loudly,	 trying	 to	 concentrate,	 getting	 distracted,	 working	 out	
the direction in which our shoulders, hips and toes should be 
turned.	The	teacher	will	remind	us	to	“find	our	edge”,	to	chal-
lenge ourselves without hurting or straining ourselves. 
Practising yoga poses in the company of other people sup-
ports the development of a relational, embodied perspective 
on self and others. Over time, a sense of togetherness emerges, 
even though we do not speak to each other during the class. An 
awareness of one’s own body as well as the presence of other 
people’s bodies deepens, and with it comes a greater gentleness 
and acceptance of self and others. We are together, although each 
of	us	faces	different	challenges	and	our	bodies	are	not	moving	
in	harmony	with	each	other.	This	does	not	matter,	however.	The	
co-presence of a group of strangers – all working hard, all doing 
the best they can in a given moment – feels supportive and reas-
suring. 
The experience of collective yoga practice – working with 
my body and sensing others’ bodies around me – has made me 
more	 aware	 of	 and	 reflexive	 about	my	 own	prejudices,	 biases	
and stereotypes projected onto others. As an organisation stud-
ies	scholar,	but	also	as	someone	who	often	finds	herself	 in	 the	
position of being a member of a minority group – a woman, a 
professor, a foreigner, a Central European, a non-Anglophone 
native speaker – I feel strongly about the need to make our or-
ganisations and society places free from prejudice and discrim-
ination.	For	a	 long	 time,	 I	was	conscious	of	 the	 significance	of	
“difference”	and	its	impact	on	how	we	relate	to	each	other.	How-
ever, until I started to become aware of the biases that surfaced 
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in	me	during	yoga	classes,	 I	had	not	seriously	reflected	on	the	
judgements I make about others; judgements that emerge even 
before words are exchanged. The proximity to others’ bodies that 
is	afforded	in	a	yoga	class	setting	can	become	a	powerful	source	
of knowledge. When we tune into what our body-mind tells us, 
we realise that it communicates the feelings we carry within our-
selves and project onto others. From this point, compassion can 
develop: towards the yoga co-practitioners, colleagues, students 
and strangers. The grip of judgement becomes looser, a sense of 
wellbeing increases.
Yoga and pedagogic practice
“Well	 done,	 guys.	 Beautiful	 practice	 this	 morning”	 says	
our yoga teacher at the end of the class, and regardless of the 
clumsiness	and	difficulties	we	experienced	over	 the	past	hour,	
we	feel	better	about	ourselves	and	are	grateful	to	her	for	guid-
ing us through the asana practice. From each yoga teacher I have 
encountered	–	be	it	in	Newcastle,	Brisbane,	Colchester,	Kraków,	
Copenhagen, Auckland or London – I have learned and continue 
to learn not only about yoga but also about being a teacher. The 
yoga	teachers	I	have	met	have	been	calm,	reflective,	non-judge-
mental, encouraging and compassionate. Many times I have ob-
served, in admiration, a yoga teacher’s ability to gently connect 
to the emotional landscape of the participants, to acknowledge 
their apprehensions and insecurities, and then to tap into their 
potential	to	become	more	present	on	the	mat,	to	find	and	explore	
their “edge”, and even to do something unimagined and extraor-
dinary – like a headstand!
Teaching yoga is linked to a particular ethos of self-care, 
looking after one’s health and wellbeing, showing commitment 
to the practice, and in many cases trying to follow a lifestyle 
that also draws on the tradition of the remaining seven “limbs 
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of yoga”, not only the physical asana practice. In addition to be-
ing	influenced	by	the	ethical-spiritual	dimensions	of	yoga,	yoga	
teachers are also subject to the demands of the “gig economy”. 
They are paid per hour and their work tends to be scheduled 
outside the “standard” working hours as clients are usually 
available for yoga classes either before or after day-time work. 
It is not uncommon for classes to take place at 6am or at 9pm; it 
is not uncommon for these classes to be delivered by the same 
person. Since their main “tool” is their own body, the risk of in-
jury or even a seemingly minor illness such as a cold adds to the 
precarity of yoga teachers’ position – not being in good physical 
form means not being able to teach; every class that is not taught 
is lost income. Perhaps as a result of both an individual commit-
ment to the ethos of yoga and due to the challenging working 
conditions in this occupation, those who choose to become yoga 
teachers are usually genuinely passionate about what they do 
and	follow	a	calling	to	share	the	benefits	of	yoga	with	others.	The	
yoga community popularises a certain ideal of a yoga teacher, 
for example through lists such as “10 Qualities of an Amazing 
Yoga Teacher” which include:
1. They connect with everyone in the class; 
2. They have a way with words; 
3.	 They leave their ego at the door; 
4. They love (and respect) yoga; 
5.	 They let their authentic personality shine through; 
6. They are prepared; 
7. They cater to all levels; 
8. They share their knowledge; 
9. They gain trust; 
10. They share their light. (Coventry, 2019: n.p.) 
It	has	been	20	years	since	I	first	started	teaching	in	the	high-
er education context and I would like to think that I am continu-
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ing to develop as a university teacher and supervisor. If there has 
been, indeed, a positive development in my pedagogic practice, 
it has been possible to a large extent thanks to my own yoga prac-
tice and thanks to the vicarious learning of the teaching practice 
of my yoga teachers. There is an atmosphere of warmth and 
positivity	that	usually	fills	yoga	classes.	The	messages	that	come	
from	yoga	teachers	are	encouraging	and	affirmative:	“Well	done!	
Good	work!	Beautiful!”.	The	 teacher	motivates	 the	 students	 to	
work hard enough to get to a point in their practice beyond 
which	 additional	 effort	would	 be	 excessive.	At	 the	 same	 time,	
students receive advice to become aware of their own bound-
aries and to be in touch with what they are capable of doing on 
a given day, so that when someone feels that they might injure 
themselves if they try any harder, they can take a break at any 
time and rest for a few breaths. Above all, good yoga teachers 
create a safe space for students to practise for themselves, not to 
impress the teacher and not to compete with others, and to enjoy 
the learning process. 
My experience of observing – and being on the receiving 
end of – yoga teachers’ “craft” over the years has inspired me to 
try to follow a similar approach in my own university teaching 
and supervision. It is not easy to teach with passion and com-
passion, to connect with and include all students, to encourage 
them, to make them feel that it is safe and fun to open up to 
something	new	and	challenging,	and	 to	explore	and	reflect	on	
oneself and on learning. Nevertheless, it is a worthwhile aspira-
tion to pursue, and I am grateful to my yoga teachers for show-
ing me through their pedagogic practice that this is possible.
Yoga and physical health
I developed the unhealthy habit of spending many hours, 
nearly	 every	 day,	 in	 a	 sitting	 position,	many	 years	 ago	 –	 and	
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have persisted with it ever since. When I was much younger, 
sitting	at	a	desk	used	to	fill	the	major	part	of	the	day	at	school,	
and	then	it	extended	over	additional	hours	of	sitting	at	another	
desk at home, doing homework. As an undergraduate, this pat-
tern	 continued:	 sitting	 in	 a	 lecture	 theatre,	 then	 back	 home	 in	
front of a computer screen, preparing coursework and revising 
for	exams.	Before	I	was	20,	I	would	find	it	normal	that	during	an	
intensive	study	time,	I	was	walking	around	with	a	stiff	neck	and	
shoulders, and once or twice a year the pain caused by a “spasm” 
in the neck would almost immobilise me for a few days. Many 
people around me – often my fellow students and later on fellow 
lecturers	 –	 suffered	 from	 similar	 problems:	 one	 person	would	
complain about a discomfort in the hips, someone else about a 
painful lower back, yet another person about an overall sense of 
stiffness	around	the	spine	that	felt	like	something	might	“snap”	
if they try to turn in the “wrong” direction or too fast. From what 
I recall, in my late twenties I thought that a pain-free life experi-
enced through a tension-free body was something only children 
could	be	lucky	enough	to	enjoy,	that	getting	older	would	inevi-
tably	involve	getting	stiffer	and	less	mobile,	and	that	there	was	
nothing that could be done about it. 
And yet, a sense of hope managed to surface from under-
neath	those	self-defeating	–	and	possibly	self-fulfilling	–	beliefs.	
I	turned	up	at	my	first	yoga	class,	driven	by	the	wish	to	get	rid	
of back and neck pain, and perhaps even to prevent another im-
mobilising “spasm”, and relying on ibuprofen and a physiother-
apist’s	skills	to	bring	me	back	to	form.	Alleviating	stiffness	in	the	
body	was	 a	 benefit	 of	 yoga	practice	which	 I	 experienced	very	
quickly,	and	which	got	me	“hooked”	in	the	first	place.	
Even now, the power of yoga to counter back and neck pain 
remains my opening gambit when I encounter a not-yet-convert 
who is willing to listen and embark on praising the wonders of 
yoga. I can wholeheartedly recommend it, even if only for this 
pain-relief reason, to everybody. Most of us in academia – re-
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gardless of whether we are a student or a university employee – 
tend	to	spend	a	lot	of	time	during	the	working	day	in	the	sitting	
position. As one yoga teacher explains in her blog:  
They say that sitting is the new smoking because of all the negative im-
pacts of a sedentary lifestyle. Sitting at a desk or computer all day takes a 
toll on more than just your eyes. It affects your posture, metabolism, risk 
of anxiety or depression and can lead to obesity, just to name a few… Bad 
posture can lead to serious issues like back pain, cardiovascular issues, 
digestion issues, and eventually changing of the curve of the spine itself, 
which will create a whole new level of back pain. (Mason, 2017: n.p.)
Fortunately, she also adds: “Yoga is a fantastic way to 
combat	the	negative	effects	of	sitting	at	a	desk	all	day	and	other	
things that contribute to bad posture” (ibid.).
That	 yoga	 brings	 about	 a	 range	 of	 benefits	 for	 physical	
health should not be surprising, bearing in mind that yoga is part 
of	Ayurveda,	a	traditional	Indian	medical	system	(Birch,	1995).	
The	popularity	of	different	varieties	of	physical	yoga	has	 trig-
gered	studies	investigating	its	effect	on	the	body,	especially	with	
regard to the treatment of musculoskeletal issues. For example, 
in	 people	 suffering	 from	 chronic	 neck	 pain,	 significant	 reduc-
tions in pain levels were reported following at least nine weeks 
of weekly yoga practice (e.g. Nambi et al.,	2015;	Wattamwar	and	
Nadkarni, 2012; Williams et al.,	 2009).	Other	 research	 findings	
addressing	the	benefits	of	yoga	for	the	musculoskeletal	system	
have	 included	 improved	 strength,	flexibility,	 balance	and	pos-
ture (e.g. Sarosky et al., 2008; Tekur et al., 2010). Apparently, after 
a	minimum	of	four	weeks	of	yoga	practice	once	a	week,	signifi-
cant reductions in back pain have been reported, whereas consis-
tent yoga practice for a period of between six and 12 months has 
been reported to result in sustained improvement in back pain 
(Tilbrook et al., 2011). It certainly works for me, and nowadays it 
feels liberating to be able to go about my day without pain in my 
neck	and	shoulders.	But	as	far	as	my	health	is	concerned,	there	is	
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much	more	I	owe	to	yoga,	thanks	to	the	effect	it	has	had	on	my	
mental health and wellbeing.
Yoga and anxiety
The	word	“yoga”	denotes	“union”	or	“unification”;	this	no-
tion of a union refers to the inseparability of body and mind. The 
objective of yoga is to achieve a state of body-mind integration 
and	to	maintain	all	aspects	of	the	body-mind	in	good	health.	By	
contrast, the etymology of words such as “anxiety” and “wor-
ry” points to the opposite state. “Anxiety” derives from the Latin 
word angere, anguere which means “to choke”, “to squeeze”, and 
is akin to the ancient Greek word ankho, which means “to con-
strict the throat”, “to strangle”. The root of the verb “worry” has 
a similar meaning. Its origin can be traced back to the Middle 
English word wirien, meaning “to slay, kill or injure by biting 
and shaking the throat” and to the Old English wyrgan, “to stran-
gle”. Anxiety and worry, then, describe a state in which we feel 
metaphorically “strangled” – and so have our head, which we 
typically	consider	to	be	the	“location”	of	the	mind,	cut	off	from	
the	body.	Put	differently,	anxiety	and	worry	are	the	reverse	of	
the yogic ideal of body-mind integration. 
While the images of yogi(ni)s promoted by yoga bloggers, 
yoga teachers’ websites and the marketers of yoga-related prod-
ucts convey serenity and calmness, there is also a plethora of 
research	 that	demonstrates	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 yoga	 as	 an	 an-
tidote to anxiety, worry and other mental health-related prob-
lems that are common in the 21st century western world. For 
example, a study by Taherkhani et al.	 (2003)	showed	beneficial	
effects	of	yoga	on	individuals	with	Obsessive	Compulsive	Dis-
order	 (OCD).	Other	 researchers	have	demonstrated	 significant	
improvements in individuals with anxiety and depression, af-
ter a period – sometimes as short as two months – of practising 
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yoga (e.g. Gupta et al. 2006; Javnbakht et al.,	2009;	Khalsa,	2004;	
Michalsen et al., 2006; Pilkington et al.,	2005;	Woolery	et al. 2004). 
Yoga has been shown to help in reducing anger, decreasing 
verbal aggression, improving sleep, decreasing the symptoms of 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and improving mood. 
One	 of	 the	 physiological	 effects	 of	 yoga	 is	 an	 increased	 heart	
variability	 (HRV)	 which,	 in	 turn,	 helps	 calm	 the	 autonomous	
nervous	 system	 and	 regulate	 emotions.	As	 Hutchinson	 (2019:	
n.p.) explains:
Decreased HRV is correlated with negative affective states such as anx-
iety, stress, PTSD, and anger. Individuals who suffer with depression, 
anxiety, flashbacks, and angry outbursts often have trouble regulating 
their emotions. People who have poorly regulated autonomic nervous 
systems can be thrown off balance easily both on a mental and physical 
level. Examples include being ‘set off’ by a minor hassle, road rage, or 
crying in public when it isn’t warranted. By practicing activities that 
increase your HRV—like yoga—you can help retrain your heart and 
physiology, which can lead to emotion regulation and a calmer state. 
The feeling of being strangled by an overwhelming sense of 
anxiety, where the mind races and the body seems to lack a solid 
base from which to slow down the thoughts of worry and fear is 
very	familiar	to	me.	But	so	is	the	feeling	of	the	floor	underneath	
my feet, grounding and supporting me, and the feeling of con-
nection between breath and movement as the body-mind calms 
down and transitions from one asana to the next. Yoga practice 
has taught me that this calm state is not only achievable but nor-
mal; it is a natural state to which it is possible to return and to 
overcome anxiety and worry. 
Stress always accompanies life and we need to be able to 
develop ways of dealing with the negative consequences of its 
excess. Working in higher education has its own, non-trivial 
stresses:	we	work	with	and	for	other	people,	we	differ	in	opinion	
and in personality, we have our own ambitions to meet as well as 
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objectives that others set for us. There are always new tasks to ac-
complish and diverse pressures to meet, and with all this, we do 
not know what the future brings for our universities. Of course, 
structural change, rather than yoga, is necessary to address the 
causes of a lot of the anxiety and worry that feature in the profes-
sional	lives	of	university	employees	and	students	in	Brexit	Brit-
ain. Nevertheless, yoga practice can be an important aspect of 
our self-care, of looking after our body-minds and helping them 
stay well regardless of external circumstances.
Conclusion 
In	this	chapter	I	have	reflected	on	the	personal	experience	
of	 the	 influence	of	practising	yoga	on	my	professional	 life	 as	
an academic. In particular, I have discussed how yoga practice 
has	supported	me	and	facilitated	my	development	in	five	areas:	
academic writing, relating to others, pedagogic practice, living 
and working without physical pain, and dealing with stress 
and	anxiety.	Since	I	have	found	yoga	highly	beneficial	to	all	as-
pects of my professional practice, I would like to encourage my 
colleagues and students to undertake yoga practice – especially 
if, upon reading this chapter, they think it might also support 
them. 
Obviously, I am aware of the criticisms directed at yoga 
that refer to its “dark sides”, for example those associated with 
the potential for encountering teachers who behave inappropri-
ately towards students or with the problematic nature of com-
mercialisation of the “yogic lifestyle” and its individualising, 
consumerism-oriented	 effects.	 I	 recognise	 that	 not	 everybody	
will have had the same positive experience of encountering yoga 
as	I	have.	I	would	like	to	emphasise	that	I	have	written	this	chap-
ter	solely	on	the	basis	of	the	–	often	surprising	–	benefits	of	yoga	
which I have observed in my case over an extended period of 
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time. My experience of yoga and how it has helped me live the 
life	of	an	academic	has	led	me	to	enthusiastically	affirm	the	ben-
efits	of	yoga	practice,	and	I	strongly	believe	that	yoga	provides	a	
very helpful way of approaching our professional practice from 
a body-mind perspective. 
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2. Academic labour, athleticism and wellbeing:  
	 An	alphabet	of	reflections	on	doctoral	study
	 and	early	career	academia	
Charlie V. L. Smith
An introduction to The Academic Athlete 
When	I	was	a	doctoral	student	at	the	University	of	Essex,	in	
the	Business	School,	I	used	to	go	to	the	gym	early	in	the	morning,	
then	drive	to	Colchester	and	work	on	my	thesis	all	day.	In	the	
lighter seasons after work I would then head out running along 
the Wivenhoe trail, or around campus in the darker months, be-
fore	returning	home	and	finishing	my	day’s	toil.	Whilst	the	idea	
of taking out life and indeed work frustrations with some form 
of	 exercise	 producing	 the	 release	 of	 endorphins	 (e.g.	 runner’s	
high)	is	well-known	and	was	at	play	here,	I	was	also	beginning	
to	 seriously	 identify	 and	 recognise	myself	 for	 the	first	 time	as	
an	athlete.	Even	though	I	had	been	into	sport	since	a	young	age,	
during	my	PhD	I	grew	in	confidence	and	started	to	understand	
myself	as	someone	who	is	proficient	in	sports	and	other	forms	
of	physical	exercise	as	well.	My	habits	and	routines	became	in-
grained	so	fast	that	I	never	reflected	on	them	properly	until	my	
first	academic	posting	after	completing	my	thesis	though.	There	
was something much more meaningful going on here but, ad-
mittedly,	even	when	I	did	engage	in	reflexivity	it	was	prompted	
by	 friends	 and	 colleagues	who	 frequently	 noticed	my	 athletic	
side	spilling	over	into	my	academic	life,	usually	through	what	I	
was	consuming	or	wearing.	It	is	these	supportive	and	inquisitive	
friends	who	have	often	encouraged	me	to	formally	write	about	
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and	develop	my	thinking	on	my	 ideas	pertaining	 to	 ‘The	Aca-
demic	Athlete’.	
During	my	PhD,	and	in	those	early	lecturing	years,	I	also	
became	aware	that	 I	had	started	out	 in	a	career	 that	has	many	
systematic	threats	to	an	individual’s	wellbeing,	and	I	grew	more	
curious	about	whether	and	how	my	athletic	activity	could	help	
academic	 life,	 beyond	 providing	 an	 endorphin	 rush.	My	 con-
templation	was	helped	by	being	a	scholar	 in	management	and	
organisation studies who had a general research interest in how 
people	organised	and	managed	their	performances,	experiences	
and	themselves	at	work.	As	Schmidt	and	Hansson	(2018)	have	
recently	 summarised,	 doctoral	 studies	 are	 often	 characterised	
by	constant	peer	pressure,	frequent	evaluation,	tight	deadlines,	
low status, high workloads, publication burdens, insecure em-
ployment	and	generalised	worry	about	the	precarity	of	their	un-
certain	future.	Whilst	I	submitted	my	thesis	in	the	allotted	time	
frame	(typically	between	3-4	years	in	the	UK),	I	had	an	accom-
panying	degree	of	stress,	anxiety	and	depression	that	these	days	
seem a normalised part of doctoral student life. Fast forward a 
few	years,	 and	not	 long	 into	my	 lecturing	 career,	 I	 completed	
my	first	Ironman	(a	triathlon	race	comprised	of	a	2.4-mile	swim,	
followed	 by	 a	 112-mile	 bike	 ride	 and	 then	 finished	 with	 26.2	
miles	 running,	 all	which	must	be	finished	by	a	 cut-off	 time	of	
17	hours).	 Shortly	 after	 this	first	 long-distance	 triathlon	 I	 then	
became	a	Team	Great	Britain	(GB)	Age	Group	triathlete,	an	am-
ateur	athlete	who	is	selected	and	races	for	their	country	at	inter-
national	level.	As	I	accumulated	further	Team	GB	selection	(by	
either	being	highly	ranked	in	international	races	when	racing	for	
GB	or	by	being	in	the	top	ten	per	cent	nationally)	 it	prompted	
further serious thought about the commitment entailed and the 
nature	of	 labour	 involved	 in	becoming	and	staying	an	athlete.	
Particularly,	 I	wondered	 about	 the	 interplay	 of	my	 lifeworlds	
and	the	effects	they	had	on	my	wellbeing	during	the	turbulence	
of	embarking	in	early	career	academia.	I	had	perhaps	not	been	
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more	forthright	in	discussing	or	believing	in	my	athletic	prow-
ess because I had been knee-deep in a prevalent but a successful 
doctoral	culture	that	bred	single-minded	focus	on	our	PhDs,	at	
whatever cost to ourselves. I remained afraid that those hours 
spent	training	each	week	(even	though	I	worked	more	than	stan-
dard full time) should instead be spent on other academic activ-
ities	like	publications	or	writing	my	first	lectures.	
In	this	chapter,	I	explore	the	notions	of	academic	and	athlet-
ic labour and performance, considering where the traits of ath-
leticism intersect, compare and contrast in support of academic 
wellbeing. I do not write with a background in sports science 
or	psychology	but	instead	use	my	knowledge	and	understand-
ing	of	my	autoethnographic	 reflections	on	my	self-governance	
as someone who has used this approach to manage themselves 
as	an	amateur	athlete	and	academic	 for	a	period	of	 time.	This	
is opposed to the now managerial preoccupation with Western 
organisations	managing	people’s	health	and	fitness	at	work	 in	
the	purist	sense	of	efficiency	and	productivity	 (Holmqvist	and	
Maravelias,	2010).	What	have	I	learnt	from	being	an	amateur	ath-
lete	to	help	the	life	of	an	early	career	academic?	What	are	the	ma-
terial	parts	of	my	athletic	practice	that	are	useful	for	academia?	
What	are	the	dangers	for	one’s	health	of	treating	their	PhD	like	
a	competition?	My	hope	is	that	some	of	my	discussion	may	be	a	
useful	means	of	reflection	for	anyone	beginning	their	journey	in	
academia.	Readers	do	not	need	to	be	exercise	junkies	to	contin-
ue.	Whilst	my	case	may	come	across	as	extreme,	and	not	 least	
because the boundaries between amateur and professional sport 
are	 becoming	more	 indistinct	 (Howe,	 2003),	 the	 general	 traits	
and arguments about the practice of academia and sport more 
generally	 are	widely	 applicable.	 The	notions	 of	wellbeing	 and	
flourishing	can	be	highly	contested,	therefore	before	I	present	a	
series	of	my	reflections	organised	as	an	alphabet,	I	briefly	outline	
my	theoretical	background	focusing	on	human	flourishing	and	
wellbeing. 
Charlie V. L. Smith44
Human flourishing, eudaimonia and sport 
Eudaimonia	is	the	Greek	word	for	happiness or welfare, which 
today	is	often	termed	“wellbeing”,	“wellness”	and	“happiness”.	
It	 is	 the	highest	good	for	humans,	the	energy	of	the	soul	 in	 its	
completeness	(Roumpou,	2018).	Methodologically	speaking,	it	is	
also	 a	process	 of	 self-discovery,	 the	perceived	development	of	
one’s	best	potential	as	they	seek	a	sense	of	purpose	and	meaning	
in	life	and	enjoy	activities	as	personally	expressive,	in	thoughtful	
relationships and in accordance with their deeper principles. It 
involves	many	ways	of	 behaving	 including:	 striving	 for	 excel-
lence;	 acting	 in	 line	with	 one’s	 self	 and	deep	values;	 develop-
ing oneself and promoting personal evolution; using the fullest 
range	of	what	one	 is	 (including	unpleasant	emotions);	striving	
to	serve	a	greater	good	and	sustainable	long-term	goal;	actively	
applying	oneself	 and	being	deeply	 immersed;	 focusing	on	 the	
quality	of	the	means	to	an	end;	and	contemplating	one’s	actions	
and	acceptance	of	oneself	as	they	are	(Huta,	2012).	Human	flour-
ishing has long been connected and valued in competitive sport 
because	it	creates	excitement,	challenges	and	mastery	of	a	sense	
of	 belonging	 and	 identity	 (Loland,	 2004).	 Integral	 to	 this	 are	
“performer	 theories”,	 that	 if	utilised	and	practiced	 in	 the	right	
manner	can	become	a	sphere	of	human	flourishing	which	indi-
viduals	use	 to	 realise	 their	 talents	 and	abilities	 (Loland,	 2004).	
As	Hochstetler	 and	Hopsicker	 (2016)	 have	 noted,	 this	 human	
flourishing	 is	 closely	 connected	 to	 and	 created	with	 phronesis, 
or	practical	wisdom,	a	process	dependent	on	an	athlete’s	 indi-
vidual	subjectivity	and	practice-based	attentiveness.	I	therefore	
understand sport as something that carries some universal or es-
sential	meaning,	as	something	that	is	culturally	embedded,	and	
which	holds	its	meaning	in	relation	to	dominant	cultures	(Howe,	
2003).	Alongside	this,	 I	understand	my	body	and	mind/psyche	
in	a	transparent	unity	–	inseparable	elements	of	one	indivisible	
substance	pursuing	the	same	goal	(Roumpou,	2018).	
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In	 the	 following	 I	 present	 an	 alphabet	 of	my	 autoethno-
graphic	reflections	and	ideas	on	“The	Academic	Athlete”,	includ-
ing	 key	 contextual	 details	 on	 the	difficulties	 of	 doctoral	 study	
and	early	career	academia.	I	have	chosen	to	organise	them	as	an	
alphabet for the simple reason that I needed a tool to help me 
arrange	my	thoughts	and	reflections.	Obviously,	I	only	have	26	
letters	in	total,	but	the	process	of	choosing	these	has	been	a	much	
longer	 one.	 There	have	been	 a	multitude	 of	 options	 to	 choose	
from	that	have	required	choices	of	inclusion	and	exclusion	that	
on	the	whole	cover	all	the	broader	aspects	of	my	practices	that	I	
considered	prudent	to	discuss.	More	specifically,	I	have	chosen	
these words in association with the idea of creating performances 
which	appears	to	be	the	considered	goal	that	justifies	or	defines	
the	means	 in	both	of	my	worlds	 in	pursuit	of	 the	approach	 to	
human	flourishing	noted	above.	One	of	my	particular	interests	
is	how	these	two	worlds	coincide	and	corroborate	to	maximise	
wellbeing	and	human	flourishing.	I	have	also	chosen	these	let-
ters	and	words	on	the	basis	that	I	would	like	to	offer	some	more	
optimistic	points	that	move	beyond	existing	literature	in	higher	
education	 that	 gives	 a	 very	detailed	 and	harrowing	picture	 of	
how	depression,	anxiety	and	general	threats	to	wellbeing	affects	
academics	of	all	standing	at	some	point	in	their	careers.	Each	of	
these	words	have	occurred	to	me	over	the	past	five	years	as	part	
of	my	experiences	of	learning	to	be	an	academic.	I	hope	readers	
can accept its casual nature. It makes sense front to end, but each 
excerpt	can	be	read	selectively.	
The academic athlete alphabet
Authenticity ~ “Describes something that is real or genuine and 
not counterfeit”. 
One	of	the	greatest	pleasures	I	get	from	engaging	in,	watch-
ing	and	playing	sport	is	the	notion	of	authenticity,	appreciating	
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the	 uniqueness	 and	 specialty	 of	 a	 team’s	 or	 individual’s	 per-
formance.	Not	dissimilarly,	when	I	started	out	as	an	academic	
and	became	a	more	serious	athlete	(on	both	occasions	not	really	
knowing	if	 I	could	make	it),	 I	have	only	ever	promised	myself	
one	thing:	to	try	my	very	best	whilst	being	myself.	As	time	has	
passed,	I	have	realised	that	acting	in	line	with	my	deep	values	
and	doing	so	authentically	extends	to	the	conjunction	between	
the broad spheres of academia and athleticism. As I have rel-
ished	in	the	existence	of	these	two	domains,	I	have	continually	
fostered a supportive environment that has enabled me to realise 
my	true	self.	Academia	too	easily	renders	academics	as	machines	
in	large	institutions	operating	in	fluctuating	environments	–	for	
me	it’s	been	important	to	remain	true	to	who	I	am	and	part	of	
that means being an athlete as well. 
Bravery ~ “Ready to face and endure danger or pain; showing 
courage”. 
The	values	I	have	internalised	as	an	athlete	have	given	me	
a	significant	degree	of	normative	autonomy	as	a	source	of	per-
formativity	in	further	competition,	but	also	outside	of	sport	and	
in	 academia	 (Loland,	 2004).	When	 training	 and	 racing,	 I	 have	
done	many	things	that	have	terrified	me	because	of	their	associ-
ated	danger	(e.g.	riding	bikes	down	mountains	at	serious	speed	
in hideous conditions) but also because of their overwhelming 
amount	of	energy	expenditure	required	(e.g.	riding	a	bike	for	24	
hours	non-stop).	 I	continually	draw	on	this	athletic	courage	 in	
the	more	performative	aspects	of	academia.	For	example,	being	
nervous about a lecture, or talk, or learning a new task. 
Competition ~ “An activity of striving to gain or win something 
by defeating or establishing superiority over others”. 
In sport I have long been used to embracing a social log-
ic that measures, compares and ranks competitors according to 
their	performances	which	are	often	(especially	at	elite	levels)	de-
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termined	by	the	smallest	of	margins.	Admittedly,	when	I	entered	
early	 career	 academia,	 I	was	not	 expecting	 such	a	 competitive	
ethos	to	be	in	existence	there	too.	This	was	perhaps	one	of	the	
greatest	 threats	 to	my	wellbeing.	 I	was	comfortable	donning	a	
competitive	mindset	in	sport	and	to	some	extent	this	gave	me	the	
determination	 to	 keep	fighting	 academic	 battles,	 but	 ultimate-
ly,	on	reflection,	I	felt	that	I	was	operating	in	an	environment	in	
which	I	could	not	be	truly	competitive	as	I	was	competing	with	
more	established	academics	beyond	my	career	stage.	
Discipline ~ “The practice of training people to obey rules or a 
code of behavior”.
The	obligation	 to	 follow	rules	 throughout	sport	 is	widely	
accepted	 and	 rarely	 contested	 (Ciomaga,	 2013).	Given	 the	 du-
ration of an Ironman,	 this	discipline	especially	plays	out	 in	 the	
amount	of	commitment	(averaging	15	hours	training	most	weeks	
annually)	but	also	in	the	required	consistency	of	training.	Tak-
ing	a	disciplined	approach	to	triathlon	has	significantly	affected	
my	academic	routines	positively	and	both	psychologically	and	
practically.	On	a	practical	basis,	I	have	become	disciplined	into	
a	 routinised	way	 of	 life	which	 equates	 to	 training	 before	 and	
sometimes	after	work,	eating	6	regular	meals	daily,	and	main-
taining	adequate	sleep	patterns	that	all	 foster	excellence	 in	my	
general wellbeing but also in broader spheres of life and work 
(Hochstetler	and	Hopsicker,	2016).	This	naturally	leads	to	a	con-
sistent	way	of	 living.	Beyond	practical	routines,	discipline	also	
extends	 to	my	approach	 towards	academic	work.	 I	have	often	
thought that if I have enough discipline and dedication to main-
tain grueling training programmes and nutritional regimes, then 
I am capable of upholding similar control towards making deci-
sions	in	my	academic	and	work-related	behaviours	(Hochstetler	
and	Hopsicker,	2016).	
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Endurance ~ “The ability to tolerate an unpleasant or difficult 
process or situation without giving way”. 
Completing a doctoral thesis or an Ironman both take 
inordinate	 amounts	 of	 time	 and	 effort	 and	 can	 often	 be	 diffi-
cult	and	unpleasant.	As	I	begun	to	finish	Ironman competitions 
(on	a	bad	day	up	 to	15	hours	 in	duration)	 I	have	noticed	how	
my	ability	to	push	my	body	physically,	and	carry	on	when	it	is	
screaming	in	pain,	has	been	a	confidence	booster	to	help	me	deal	
with	the	painful	and	harder	parts	of	academia.	This	is	not	to	say	
that	difficult	taxing	thinking	utilising	the	mind	is	pain-free,	but	
rather	knowing	that	I	can	push	my	body	to	breaking	point	often	
gives	me	the	safety	net	of	a	reservoir	of	power,	knowing	I	am	less	
likely	to	do	that	with	my	work.	Long	distance	endurance	events	
have often been said to have the purpose of allowing people to 
find	out	‘how	far’	they	can	push	their	bodies	(Howe,	2003).	Hav-
ing	 that	 other	 breaking	point	 allowed	me	 to	 consider	 that	my	
PhD	was	not	the	only	thing	that	could	break	me,	and	I	was	safe	
in	the	knowledge	that	I	could	break	myself	elsewhere.	
Flow ~ “Proceed or be produced continuously and effortlessly”. 
Flow	is	a	state	wherein	no	time	and	ego	exist,	when	one	is	
entirely	involved	in	their	activity,	being	able	to	engage	with	it	for	
the	reason	they	love	it	and	with	even	a	feeling	of	transcendence	
or	connection	to	a	greater	whole	(Roumpou,	2018).	In	sport,	this	
often	means	training	the	body	so	there	is	perfect	immediacy	be-
tween	body	and	mind,	and	thus	getting	the	body	to	do	 things	
effortlessly.	Pedaling	perfectly,	or	 swimming	with	exemplarily	
technique,	being	obvious	examples.	The	important	aspect	of	this	
is	 the	state	of	absorption	 it	creates,	 letting	oneself	flourish	and	
perform their best without constraint. It is also when an individ-
ual	can	be	at	their	happiest	(Csikszentmihalyi,	1990).	I	have	long	
aspired	to	replicating	this	flow	in	my	academic	labour,	import-
ant	in	allowing	myself	to	work	without	inhabitation.	However,	
like in sport, I have found that creating this state and overcoming 
2. academic labour, athleticism and wellbeing 49
these gaps in academia must be worked at, as it will not necessar-
ily	be	smooth	from	the	start	or	come	naturally,	with	much	of	my	
thinking	 here	 stemming	 from	Cal	Newport’s	 (2016)	 principles	
and	practices	of	beginning	‘Deep	Work’.	One	of	these	aspects	is	
ensuring	the	environment	I	am	working	in	is	conducive	to	my	
best	work,	and	from	a	physiological	basis,	I	have	found	that	be-
ing	fit	helps	me	maintain	concentration	levels	to	create	this	state.	
Game ~ “An activity that one engages in for amusement or fun”. 
Whilst	I	take	my	triathlon	activity	seriously	as	an	amateur,	
it	remains	fun	for	me,	and	it	is	something	I	consider	a	‘game’	in	
the	loosest	sense	of	the	word,	otherwise	I	wouldn’t	do	it.	When	
academic	anxiety	is	furious,	or	I	feel	I	am	restraining	my	ideas	by	
overthinking	when	writing,	I	find	treating	my	approach	to	work	
as	a	game	helps.	Applying	this	attitude	gives	me	the	pretense	to	
have	a	 ‘bit	of	 fun’	and	as	such	lets	my	ideas	run	wild	without	
restraint.	Essentially,	it	is	giving	myself	a	chance	to	just	‘have	a	
go’	and	experiment.	
Hero ~ “A person who is admired for their courage, outstanding 
achievements or noble qualities”. 
Having	a	favorite	player	or	looking	up	to	a	hero	has	long	
been	a	part	of	sports	spectatorship.	It	has	been	no	different	for	
me,	especially	concerning	professional	cyclists,	which	is	my	best	
sport	of	the	three	(cycling,	running	and	swimming).	Heroes	usu-
ally	 incarnate	excellence	 in	their	field,	perhaps	even	ascending	
towards	 perfection	 as	 they	 continuously	 provide	 new	 sources	
of	sporting	excellence	that	other	athletes	and	amateurs	can	tran-
scend	towards	themselves	(Aggerholm,	2016).	However,	we	do	
not	always	consider	somebody	a	hero	because	they	are	the	very	
best	at	what	they	do.	Of	course,	they	might	be	this,	but	we	can	
equally	admire	other	aspects	of	their	being	–	perhaps	their	cour-
age,	 tenacity	 or	 alternate	 noble	 qualities.	Unsurprisingly	 then,	
I	 had	 academic	 heroes	 too.	Who	we	 choose	 as	 heroes	 is	 quite	
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personal, but the most helpful part of having a hero in mind in 
academia	has	been	 that	 it	has	allowed	me	 to	 reflect	on	what	 I	
think	their	attitude	might	be,	what	would	they	do	in	difficult	cir-
cumstances	and	so	on.	There	was	never	the	expectation	that	they	
were perfect, and I did not idolise them, but aspiring to someone 
with	noble	qualities	has	always	helped	me	keep	academia	in	per-
spective	throughout	the	better	and	worse	times.	
Intuition ~ “The ability to understand something instinctively 
without the need for conscious reasoning”.
An	 athlete	 is	 astute	 at	 knowing	when	 something	 is	 ‘just	
right’	 or	 when	 they	 should	 take	 their	 chances	 (e.g.	 in	 a	 race)	
given	 a	 sound	 understanding	 of	 their	 body	 and	 knowing	 its	
capacity. Being well versed in the idea of intuition and knowing 
to	trust	my	body	in	triathlon	has	helped	me	trust	in	my	abilities	
in	academia.	Academia	can	require	considerable	conformity	and	
orthodoxy	 to	how	we	should	 think	and	 feel,	or	 even	what	we	
are	expected	to	write	and	say.	If	I	wanted	to	work	with	an	idea	
that	wasn’t	so	mainstream,	or	perhaps	a	little	brave,	reminding	
myself	of	the	capacity	of	intuition	has	greatly	expanded	my	con-
fidence	 to	 try	something	different.	 It	has	also	helped	me	place	
boundaries	around	my	performance	and	especially	when	meet-
ing	deadlines	or	finalising	a	piece	of	work	(e.g.	 ‘it’s	done’,	 ‘be-
cause	it	feels	right’).	Beyond	assessing	quality,	I	have	also	learnt	
patience and the knowledge that the moment when a piece of 
work	‘feels	right’	will	come	with	time.	
 
Journey ~ “An act of travelling from one place to another”. 
A	PhD	is	often	described	as	a	 journey,	yet	many	doctoral	
students	understandably	feel	pressured	to	get	from	A	to	B	as	fast	
as	possible.	Being	an	athlete	is	also	a	journey,	albeit	a	slower	one	
representing and recognising a conversation towards the self in 
preparation	for	being	open	to	and	ready	for	challenges	that	may	
occur	later	(Aggerholm,	2016).	I	wish	I	had	allowed	myself	the	
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patience	 to	 accept	deviations	 from	 that	direct	path	during	my	
PhD	as	it	would	have	reduced	an	inordinate	amount	of	unneces-
sary	self-imposed	deadline	stress.	
Knowledge of the self ~ “The fact or condition of knowing some-
thing with familiarity gained through experience or association”. 
An	athlete	is	more	attentive	to	the	abilities	and	disabilities	
of	 both	 their	 mind	 and	 body.	 They	 are	 also	 assumed	 to	 be	
better	 equipped	 to	 deal	 with	 shortfalls	 through	 recovery	 and	
re-adaptation	 (Howe,	 2003).	 This	 has	 helped	 me	 in	 academia	
because being indoctrinated to conduct regular self-assessments 
of	my	 body	 has	meant	 that	 I	 can	 identify	when	 academia	 (or	
indeed	triathlon)	is	starting	to	affect	my	health	and	when	I	need	
to	take	early	reparatory	actions.	On	a	very	practical	level,	such	
knowledge has taught me when to take a break. 
 
Luck ~ “Success or failure apparently brought by chance rather 
than through one’s own actions”. 
An athlete is educated in the regime that intensive train-
ing and skill lead to superior formal results and achievement 
(Hämäläinen,	 2014);	 they	 make	 their	 own	 luck	 through	 mea-
sured	approaches.	One	of	the	hardest	parts	of	being	an	academic	
for	me	has	been	that	there	remains	an	element	of	luck,	especially	
with	external	factors	and	subjectivities	involved	in	assessing	our	
work	e.g.	grants	and	publications.	This	has	often	threatened	my	
wellbeing,	and	I	try	where	possible	to	adopt	the	philosophy	of-
ten	seen	in	sport	of	“make	your	own	luck”.	
Measureability ~ “The extent, dimensions, quantity, of some-
thing ascertained by comparison with a standard”. 
A	definitive	aspect	of	an	athlete’s	performance	and	subse-
quent	 living	of	 their	 lives	 is	 the	practice	 of	measuring	 against	
their	own	standards	or	those	of	competitors;	essentially	rational	
calculations	to	achieve	the	optimal	means	(Guttman,	1978).	For	
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an	athlete,	it	is	not	enough	to	finish	a	training	session	or	eat	an	
unknown	quantity	of	food.	Instead	practices	like	these	must	be	
set	 in	context	 to	sustain	and	develop	performances.	Underpin-
ning	measurability	is	therefore	an	attitude	of	quantification	that	
continually	 expects	 enhancement	 and	 growth.	 If	 something	 is	
counted,	then	an	athlete	always	expects	a	better	result	than	pre-
viously.	Setting	expectations	in	this	quantified	way	has	been	par-
adoxical	 for	my	academic	work.	 In	some	senses	setting	myself	
targets	(e.g.	the	number	of	words	to	write	in	a	day)	helped,	and	
especially	with	allocating	myself	a	sensible	amount	of	work	to	
do	(something	physiologically	possible	to	do	in	a	day).	However,	
certain	parts	 of	 the	 academic	 craft	 should	 simply	not	 be	mea-
sured, and forcing standards onto something that should not be 
standardised sometimes left me without a backstop. 
Nutrition ~ “The process of providing or obtaining the food nec-
essary for health and growth”.
As mentioned above, throughout the course of a training 
year,	my	weekly	amount	of	hours	training	–	unless	I	am	injured	
or	unwell	–	will	never	go	below	fifteen	hours.	Considering	that	
on	average	a	 triathlete	burns	anywhere	 from	600-1000	calories	
per	hour,	that’s	a	reasonable	amount	of	energy	required,	which	
must	 be	 replenished.	Over	 the	past	decade,	 the	 importance	 of	
nutrition	has	escalated	and	is	now	said	to	equate	to	roughly	80%	
of	an	athlete’s	performance,	with	the	calories	taken	in	having	to	
be	of	 the	highest	quality.	Having	a	measured	approach	to	eat-
ing	and	hydration	has	considerably	helped	my	academic	work	
as	I	seek	to	ensure	my	body	and	mind	is	supported	in	the	best	
way	possible	with	the	sustenance	they	need.	On	a	practical	level,	
needing	to	eat	regularly	(around	6	small	meals	per	day)	to	sup-
port	my	training	has	also	helped	me	structure	my	working	day,	
ensuring	 I	 take	breaks	when	necessary	and	also	ensuring	 I	do	
not reach for suboptimal food that will not support either kind 
of performance. 
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Obsession ~ “A persistent disturbing preoccupation with an of-
ten-unreasonable idea or feeling”. 
The	adjectives	‘excessive’	and	‘compulsive’	are	well	associ-
ated	with	athletes	(Howe,	2003)	and	there	have	been	many	dis-
cussions	of	over-training	and	training	addictions	(e.g.	Landolfi,	
2013).	However,	the	idea	of	having	an	obsession	or	preoccupa-
tion	has	always	been	helpful	in	both	sport	and	academia	for	me,	
and	 specifically	with	 the	 energy	 and	drive	 they	 determine.	 In	
sport,	I	have	found	that	being	‘obsessed’	has	always	led	to	the	
completion	of	training	sessions,	even	when	the	exertion	is	hard,	
and	my	body	and	mind	want	to	stop.	In	academia,	whilst	I	hav-
en’t	become	quite	so	obsessed	with	the	development	of	my	work	
performance on a broader level, I have found this mindset has in-
stead transpired with the craft of writing, leading to meticulous 
practice	at	every	level	from	rephrasing	and	rewriting	sentences,	
to	formatting,	to	saving	references	and	so	on.	
Persuasion ~ “The action or process of convincing someone or of 
being persuaded to do or believe something”.
A considerable amount of sport is about persuading oth-
ers	or	persuading	oneself.	Examples	might	include	persuading	
a	coach	that	you	are	the	best	athlete	to	select	for	the	team,	or	
persuading	yourself	 to	 endure	 the	parts	of	 training	you	 least	
enjoy.	Early	on	in	academia	I	could	see	persuasion	was	key	too.	
Environmental	aspects	like	a	crowded	job	market	and	short	re-
sources meant smaller chances of success. Furthermore, com-
petition against well-established academics also means there 
is	more	risk	 involved	when	 it	 comes	 to	choosing	early	career	
academics	 for	 jobs,	 tasks	and	awards.	Persuasion	 is	 therefore	
doubly	important	here	too.	An	example	is	when	I	feel	less	con-
fident	–	I	try	to	persuade	myself	to	at	least,	have	a	go,	at	a	diffi-
cult	task	and	not	readily	accept	defeat,	and	this	at	the	very	least	
gives	me	a	feeling	of	accomplishment.	Another	example	is	that	
this	approach	helps	foster	my	best	performance	and	self-esteem	
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as	I	carefully	evaluate	my	own	traits	and	consider	the	best	way	
to	present	myself.	
 
Quota ~ “A fixed share of something that a person or group is 
entitled to receive or is bound to contribute”.
Just	like	anyone	else,	an	athlete	has	a	set	number	of	hours	
available	 in	any	week	to	perform	their	 tasks,	and,	even	 if	 they	
are	 the	 best	 athlete	 in	 the	world,	 they	wouldn’t	 be	 able	 to	 do	
any	more	training	because	there	simply	are	not	enough	waking	
hours.	 They	 often	 divide	 their	 training	 into	 blocks	 of	 several	
months	using	a	process	of	periodisation.	As	part	of	this,	a	quota	
is	 therefore	a	 limit,	 and	 this	 limit	 is	very	 important	because	 it	
makes	no	 judgement	on	 the	person,	but	 instead	 is	 an	external	
boundary	beyond	which	further	activity	cannot	proceed.	I	have	
learnt	to	think	of	my	quota	of	energy	each	week	in	hours,	divid-
ing	it	into	academic,	sleeping	and	training	time.	This	helps	me	
realise	there	is	more	to	life	than	academia	and	balancing	my	two	
worlds enables them to corroborate. 
Resilience ~ “The capacity to recover quickly from difficulties; 
toughness: the ability of a substance or object to spring back into shape”. 
Academia	 has	 a	 contemporary	 and	 somewhat	 unhealthy	
fixation	on	competitive	success	as	a	mark	of	achievement	which	
systematically	overlooks	self-care	around	rejection,	and	under-
values	 the	 importance	of	 resilience	 (Russell,	2016).	After	a	 few	
acceptances	early	in	my	lecturing	career,	I	then	had	a	tough	pe-
riod	 of	multiple	 rejections.	 I	 found	 this	 excruciatingly	 painful	
because	I	had	thus	far	learnt	from	my	sport	that	input,	followed	
by	process,	leads	to	output.	Essentially	the	onus	is	on	me,	and	if	
I	train	properly	and	effectively,	with	the	right	consistency,	then	I	
am	rewarded	on	race	day.	However,	often	in	academia	decisions	
on	our	performance	or	pieces	of	work	are	subjectively	made	by	
others outside of our control and with whom we sometimes 
disagree.	 I	 therefore	 found	 it	 incredibly	 hard	 to	 accept	 these	
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‘rejections’	and	‘losses’	and	unhealthily	internalised	them	until	
I	 could	make	 a	 better	 and	helpful	 comparison	with	 sport	 that	
appreciates	resilience	differently.	I	realised	that	athletes	contin-
ually	overcome	their	weaknesses	in	training,	and	in	competition	
with	their	more	or	less	equal	rivals,	that	affords	them	another	op-
portunity	for	self-transformation	requiring	the	use	of	 ‘physical	
skills’	(Tuncel,	2015).	Some	of	these	obstacles	are	also	voluntary	
encounters	and	beyond	an	athlete’s	control	(Suits,	2007).	Whilst	
athletes	internalise	the	so	called	defeats,	they	do	so	with	a	pathos 
that	enables	them	to	grow	and	fulfill	who	they	become	–	mean-
ing	 that	 they	 rarely	direct	 their	misfortune	at	 someone	else	or	
lay	blame	on	others,	but	instead	turn	it	productively	onto	them-
selves for future learning and enhancement. 
Surrender ~ “To give up completely or agree to forgo, especially 
in favour of another or something else”. 
One	of	the	hardest	parts	of	academia	is	our	ever-growing	
workloads which are situated in a culture that makes it far too 
easy	to	take	on	whatever	we	are	asked	or	invited	to	do.	For	me,	
part of the problem lies with the fact that we are passionate and 
enjoy	what	we	do,	but	also	because	of	 the	blurred	boundaries	
delineating what counts as academic work, which make it eas-
ier	 to	 agree	 to	do	more,	 even	without	 capacity.	 In	my	 earliest	
days	as	an	academic	I	would	say	‘yes’	to	everything,	but	I	soon	
learned that this was far from the impressive badge of honour 
that	 I	 considered	 it	 to	be.	Even	 though	 I	had	a	warrior	 athlet-
ic	personality	 that	meant	 I	knew	 I	 could	work	20	hours	a	day	
if	 needed,	 I	 realised	 that	working	 every	possible	hour	outside	
of training was not a sustainable long-term prospect, drawing 
on the more appreciated notion of surrender in sport. I noticed 
that	I	was	far	more	able	to	surrender	my	participation	in	a	race,	
for	example,	 than	 I	was	 in	comparison	with	an	academic	 task.	
In	sport,	I	was	also	aware	that	it	is	appreciably	more	acceptable	
to	surrender	yourself	(e.g.	 if	you	are	injured)	than	it	 is	to	have	
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pushed	yourself	beyond	your	limits	and	end	up	being	carried	to	
the	finish	line.	Slowly	but	surely,	I	am	learning	to	say	no,	without	
justification	or	feeling	inadequate,	instead	understanding	that	I	
have	surrendered	an	academic	task	in	pursuit	of	my	wellbeing.	
There	is	some	way	to	go.	
Talent assessment and management ~ “Natural aptitude or skill, 
planning and organising to realise those skills”. 
An athlete is often likened to a craftsman who develops 
their	 skills	alongside	 their	work.	Unsurprisingly,	 the	organisa-
tion	of	sport	has	a	very	specific	and	direct	approach	to	managing	
and	investing	in	such	talent.	This	management	also	embraces	an	
integral element of self-assessment. In addition, an athlete often 
learns	 to	 sell	his	own	activity	and	athletic	persona	 (and	craft),	
viewing	 his	 own	 body	 and	 skills	 as	 a	marketable	 commodity	
(Howe,	2003)	–	the	key	part	being	knowing	their	unique	and	best	
aspects.	For	me,	recognising	the	parts	of	my	academic	practice	
that	I	am	not	so	good	at,	as	well	as	the	ones	I	am	best	at,	is	very	
important	for	supporting	flourishing	and	wellbeing.	Academia	
has	become	enduringly	commodified	itself,	requiring	staff	to	be	
exceptional	 at	 all	 aspects	 of	 the	 practice	with	 often	 inhumane	
constraints.	 I	 have	 found	 taking	 on	 a	 realist	 approach	 to	 my	
skills and viewing it as talent management helps me to invest in 
personal	development	myself,	 gain	 some	 sense	and	 sensibility	
of what is doable with the dominant and prevalent skills I have 
available,	and	lastly	enhance	and	protect	my	unique	skills	that	
are	most	valuable	to	me	and	my	academic	career.	
Underdog ~ “A competitor thought to have little chance of win-
ning a fight or contest”. 
Academia	 is	 relatively	 good	 at	 creating	 spaces	where	 all	
those	on	the	hierarchy	from	PhD	student	to	Professor	can	often	
mix	and	work	together,	even	if	they	can’t	compete	on	the	same	
grounds.	Naturally,	this	can	be	a	bit	daunting	to	those	in	their	
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earlier stages, such as when a doctoral student presents their re-
search	at	a	conference	to	a	leading	Professor	in	the	field;	or	when	
an	 early	 career	 researcher	 applying	 for	 a	 grant	 is	 in	 a	 pool	 of	
applications	 that	 is	 open	 to	 any	 career	 level.	When	 I	 have	 en-
countered	these	times,	and	more	often	than	not	labelled	myself	
as	an	‘underdog’,	it	has	been	helpful	to	remember	that	in	sport,	
this	label	may	be	disputed	at	any	point	(Fry,	2017).	So	whilst	I	
have	accredited	myself	with	this	pessimistic	label,	it	has	simulta-
neously	given	me	the	greatest	optimism	about	myself	because	it	
allows	me	to	believe	that	the	unexpected	is	possible,	surprises	do	
happen	and	that	an	underdog	often	exhibits	grit,	determination	
and	hope	prevailing	against	the	odds	(Fry,	2017).	Reinforcing	the	
possibility	that	I	might	do	OK,	or	even	better	than	OK,	is	preva-
lently	more	than	enough	for	me	to	give	something	a	try.	
Victory bearing ~ “An engagement ending in such triumph”. 
“The act, capability, or period of producing or bringing forth”. 
An instrumental purpose for an athlete is to win, and since 
the	earliest	days	of	sport	and	Greek	athletics,	victory-bearing	has	
been	a	special	task.	The	victorious	athlete	was	not	supposed	to	
boast	or	exuberate	arrogance	but	 instead	be	modest	with	 their	
victory	(Tuncel,	2015).	This	approach	differs	considerably	from	
what	I	have	seen	in	modern	academia	thus	far.	Either	we	do	not	
celebrate	our	achievements	(e.g.	a	paper	acceptance	or	a	funded	
bid)	at	all,	or	they	are	calculably	forced	into	the	public	domain	
by	 our	 institutions	who	want	 to	 show	 off	 their	 staff.	Whilst	 I	
have	disagreed	with	 and	 critiqued	 the	 competitive	 regimes	 of	
academia	already,	 they	do	exist	 and	 I	have	accepted	 that	 they	
will	 remain	a	steadfast	part	of	 the	 industry	 for	 the	 foreseeable	
future.	I	therefore	try	to	deal	with	these	by	making	an	effort	to	
celebrate	whenever	and	whatever	I	feel	is	a	worthy	achievement	
for	myself	and	do	so	in	the	same	way	that	I	would	a	race	victory.	
This	usually	means	cake,	a	rest,	and	spending	time	with	those	
who	relentlessly	help	me	get	there.	
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Winning ~ “Gaining, resulting in, or relating to victory in a con-
test or competition”. 
The	 central	 purpose	 of	 sport	 and	 contest	 is	 to	 determine	
which athlete or team is superior and to provide an accurate 
measure	 of	 athletic	 superiority	 (Hämäläinen,	 2014).	 Natural-
ly	 this	 is	 conducive	 to	 a	 structure	 that	 compares	 and	 ends	up	
in	a	 ‘better	than’	or	 ‘worse	than’	conclusion	(Kretchmar,	2012).	
There	is	then	a	dangerous	trend	in	the	spirit	of	sport,	the	notion	
of	winning	at	all	costs,	in	whatever	way	possible	(Tuncel,	2015).	
This	 trend	 is	 also	 sadly	prevalent	 in	academia	and	admittedly	
I	have	found	this	aspect	to	be	one	of	the	greatest	threats	to	my	
wellbeing, being an athlete who in their sport strives for win-
ning	 at	whatever	 cost,	 even	 though	 I	may	 celebrate.	 The	 only	
way	I	have	been	able	to	manage	this	is	to	consider	that	I	am	in	
competition	with	myself	and	not	with	other	academics.	In	sport	I	
am	happy	to	engage	with	the	winning	mindset,	but	in	academia,	
for	the	sake	of	my	wellbeing,	I	try	to	ensure	that	the	only	wins	I	
strive	for	are	those	for	myself	and	personal	development.	With	
the compulsiveness and obsessiveness of an athlete engrained, it 
would	be	too	threatening	for	my	mental	wellbeing	to	do	other-
wise,	and	especially	in	academia	where	there	is	often	unfair	and	
unbalanced competition. 
Xenial ~ “A friendly relationship between two parties, especially 
to strangers or foreigners”. 
In	the	beginning,	as	I	have	mentioned	already,	I	speculated	
on	 the	 incompatibility	 of	 serious	 sport	with	 an	 academic	 career	
owing	 to	 the	perceived	 conflicts	 between	 time	 and	 energy.	As	 I	
have worked through these practices and ideas over the past few 
years,	and	indeed	in	this	text,	I	have	realised	how	incorrect	my	ear-
ly	thoughts	were.	Whilst	these	two	worlds	might	have	originally	
seemed	incompatible	given	each	of	their	required	time	and	effort,	I	
have	found	they	have	a	friendly	relationship.	On	the	serious	sport	
side,	my	experiences	are	that	it	has	positively	influenced	my	aca-
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demic practice. I have found that the more and harder I train, the 
better	I	work	and	write,	probably	because	it	means	I	take	a	more	
structured	approach	to	my	life	generally	and	feel	more	energised.	
It	might	be	expected	that	if	I	am	more	physically	tired	then	I	would	
be	suboptimal	at	work,	but	this	certainly	has	not	been	the	case.	
Yearning ~ “A feeling of intense longing for something”. 
The	 idea	 of	 sport	 as	 a	 constant	 and	 continual	 search	 for	
improved	performance	stands	strong	(Loland,	2004),	connected	
with	the	personality	and	psychological	traits	of	an	athlete	who	
never	loses	that	intense	longing	to	grow	on	their	journey.	Allow-
ing	this	relentless	attitude	of	yearning	from	sport	to	apply	in	pur-
suit	of	my	PhD	and	not	just	see	my	thesis	as	a	means	to	an	end,	
supported me with a permanent stream of motivation. It allowed 
me	the	space	and	capacity	to	let	myself	enjoy	and	engage	with	
knowledge for the sake of knowledge, rather than in instrumen-
tal	framed	terms	of	getting	from	A	to	B.	Of	course,	this	is	much	
easier	now	that	I	have	a	PhD	and	a	permanent	post.	
Zen ~ “A state of calm attentiveness in which one’s actions are 
guided by intuition rather than by conscious effort”. 
I	 understand	 why	 many	 people	 consider	 all	 the	 three	
triathlon	sports	(which	I	admittedly	do	for	hours	on	end)	to	be	
monotonous,	banal,	boring	and	repetitive.	This	is	not	something	
I	have	 experienced	 though,	 as	 sport	provides	 a	 sanctuary	 and	
solace	 for	me.	Whilst	pleasingly	simple	 to	do,	 I	find	it	permits	
a	 degree	 of	 control	 that	 enables	 reflection	 on	 my	 academic	
achievements	and	self-worth.	Not	only	is	affect	configured	in	this	
way,	I	also	find	that	thinking	about	the	zen-like	state	of	riding	my	
bike	at	work	provides	an	equally	calming	effect.	Just	an	hour’s	
training	in	the	morning	is	enough	for	me	(although	I	normally	
train	 for	 around	 1	 hour	 45	minutes)	 to	 remember	 snippets	 of	
such	pleasure	and	re-live	the	happy	and	positive	thoughts	I	had	
at	the	time	throughout	the	rest	of	the	day	(Cauldwell,	2015).	
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Conclusion
Herein	 I	 have	 shared	 some	 of	my	 early	 career	 academic	
journey,	exploring	 the	notions	of	academic	and	athletic	 labour	
and	performance,	with	a	key	focus	of	this	discussion	being	how	
these	 two	 worlds	 have	 supported	 and	 helped	 my	 wellbeing.	
I’ll	 inevitably	 continue	 this	 journey	a	 lot	 longer,	but	 if	 readers	
wanted a take home point then I suppose I would encourage do-
ing	your	best	to	create	a	working	environment	and	career	that	
doesn’t	necessarily	feel	 like	work,	or	one	in	which	you	perma-
nently	 feel	 you	 need	 a	 break	 from.	 Those	 are	 the	 best	 careers	
and	 jobs,	 and	 I	know	 from	my	experiences	 included	here	 that	
enabling	my	two	worlds	to	collaborate	has	helped	me	go	a	long	
way	towards	achieving	that.	It	does	not	necessarily	have	to	be	a	
sport	or	exercise,	it	could	be	any	hobby	–	find	some	way	of	using	
those	non-work	academic	practices	to	help	you	love	what	you	do	
either	as	an	academic	or	in	your	life	aside	from	it.
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3. Being ‘recovered’ and doing research: 
 the challenges and complexities of using 
 autoethnography to conduct doctoral 
 research into anorexia nervosa
Lauren O’Connell
Introduction
As I tear the brown paper off the four, heavy packages on the table 
in front of me, my hearts pounds and I whisper to myself ‘oh my God’. I 
am opening copies of medical documents from my four long-term stays 
as an inpatient in an eating disorder unit, the last of which was around 
seven years ago. These piles of paperwork are a slice of my past. It is a 
past which often doesn’t feel real, with so much of it now existing only 
in my memory. Here I can glimpse it via the experience of others; a 
piece of myself, viewed through a clinical lens. I flick through the pa-
perwork and am momentarily transported back. The weight graphs, the 
nurses’ handwriting, the sectioning paperwork, the meal plans. Here 
is a material representation of my personal crisis, with intimate and 
personally meaningful details littered throughout the organisational 
structure of the documents. In addition to the clinical functions they 
once served, these documents are also to become data for my PhD. I look 
at them and wonder what will happen to the content and its meaning 
as they transform into their new purpose. What will be left behind and 
forgotten, and what will be created?
In my doctoral research, I am exploring individual’s sub-
jective experiences and meanings of being diagnosed with an-
orexia, their shifting relationship to the diagnosis over time, and 
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the ways in which the diagnosis informs their ongoing identity-
work. I am using autoethnography. Broadly, this is a research 
approach which involves “the study of the self” (Reed-Danahay, 
1997: 9). Sociological autoethnographies “… draw upon the ex-
perience of the author/researcher for the purposes of extending 
sociological understanding” (Sparkes, 2000: 21). I am analysing 
my own experiences of being diagnosed with and treated for an-
orexia, drawing on memory, diaries and medical documents. In 
doing so, I am utilising my experiences as a vantage point for 
addressing broader sociological, theoretical concerns (Anderson, 
2006; Vryan, 2006). I have also carried out in-depth interviews 
with fourteen others who have been diagnosed with anorexia. 
I have done so as a known ‘insider’, having been open with my 
participants about my identity as a ‘recovered anorexic’ through-
out, and sometimes sharing aspects of my experiences with them. 
In this chapter, I address challenges that I have faced as 
a PhD student using autoethnography. These challenges have 
been multifaceted, often cutting across the realms of the theoret-
ical, practical, personal, and professional. Specifically, I discuss 
the problems and complications involved in designing and im-
plementing my autoethnography, identifying myself as an au-
toethnographer, revealing my identity as a ‘recovered anorexic’ 
to different audiences, and continuing to manage my own ‘well-
ness’ throughout my research. I also consider potential impacts 
of my autoethnography on my future career.
Designing and implementing autoethnography
When I first considered using my own experiences for 
research, I had not heard of autoethnography, and had been 
exposed to little academic writing that incorporated the expe-
riences and identity of the researcher in any significant way. I 
therefore first found autoethnography while actively searching 
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for an appropriate method. Initially, the term was confusing. It 
seemed to mean something different in each publication I read, 
and much of what I read didn’t seem like research (as I knew it) 
at all. Partly, this confusion stemmed from there being numerous 
‘types’ of autoethnography, each varying in their emphasis on 
the researcher’s self, wider culture, the research process, tradi-
tional analysis, and interaction with others (Ellis et al., 2011; Ellis 
and Bochner, 2000). Further, my reading led me to such meth-
odological approaches as autobiography, reflexivity and nar-
rative research, and the boundaries and relationships between 
these and autoethnography were not immediately obvious. Wall 
(2016) notes the confusion that exists over naming material au-
toethnography, and the tendency to call approaches autoethnog-
raphy when, prior to the term becoming relatively popular, they 
might have been called otherwise; her observations resonate 
with my experiences of ‘getting to grips’ with autoethnographic 
literature.
Through continued reading, I began to make sense of the 
different approaches to autoethnography. Two which are of-
ten invoked as polarising stances are analytic and evocative au-
toethnography. Analytic autoethnography (Anderson, 2006) 
is conducted in a context of traditional ethnography. It values 
conventional research practice and has a strong emphasis on in-
terpretation and analysis. Conversely, evocative autoethnogra-
phy (Ellis, 1995, 2004; Ellis and Bochner, 2000, 2006) is emotional, 
narrative, literary-based, postmodern-influenced and heavily 
emphasises the self. These two distinct approaches can be under-
stood as occupying either end of a continuum, such that in prac-
tice, research may fit anywhere between these extremes (Wall, 
2008, 2016). By critically reflecting on existing autoethnographic 
practice, I began to locate my own research preferences in terms 
of this continuum. I came to share others’ concerns regarding the 
limited social scientific and analytic potential of (some) evoca-
tive autoethnography (Anderson, 2006; Atkinson, 2006; Chang, 
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2008; Delamont, 2009; Walford, 2009; Wall, 2016) and I wanted 
to distance myself from the postmodern sensitives associated 
with this approach. Specifically, I was concerned that privileging 
evocation and the experiential value of writing can undermine 
the scholarly goals of analysis and theorising (Atkinson, 2006), 
and restrict the writing to the level of descriptive autobiogra-
phy (Chang, 2008). Analytic autoethnography resonated more 
strongly with my research values. However, I did not agree that 
autoethnography need be limited to only being what is essential-
ly heightened reflexivity and researcher visibility in ethnograph-
ic research (Vryan, 2006; Wall, 2016) and I needed an approach 
that would allow me to directly analyse my own experiences 
as a case in their own right (while also interviewing others). I 
therefore developed my own stance to autoethnography. The 
result is akin to Wall’s (2016) moderate autoethnography; it sits 
somewhere between the two extremes of analytic and evocative 
autoethnography (but towards the analytic end). My research is 
heavily influenced by analytic autoethnography in that it is ori-
entated towards explicit analysis and seeks to address broader 
conceptual and theoretical issues (Anderson, 2006). However, 
my research is not couched in traditional ethnography and I am 
free to engage with my own experiences and related material in 
innovative ways. 
Following this explication of my theoretical stance on au-
toethnography, an ongoing challenge has been translating this 
into practice. There are no ‘how-to’ training courses that one 
can attend for autoethnography like there are for conventional 
methods, and existing guidance and suggested techniques (E.g. 
Chang, 2008; Hughes and Pennington, 2017; Muncey, 2010) have 
been of limited use. Autoethnography is as personal and idio-
syncratic as the experience that it draws upon, and as such there 
cannot be guidance that is applicable to all. My autoethnogra-
phy – which is ‘moderate’ (Wall, 2016), analytically focused, uses 
memory and extensive personal diaries and medical documents, 
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and is being conducted alongside interviews – is unique. An im-
plication of this is that the implementation of my autoethnog-
raphy, in terms of the practical steps I take, is proving highly 
emergent and constantly (re)negotiated. This occurs with all 
research to varying extents, but autoethnography feels especial-
ly unknown, and it is harder to ‘plan ahead’ than it is for other 
methods.
In practice, then, I have sought to find a way to both tell and 
explicitly analyse my own experiences. I began by writing the nar-
rative of my experiences drawing on memory and my personal 
diaries and medical notes. Here, I began to ‘re-immerse’ myself 
in my past and structure my memories into chronological order. 
During this process I also began documenting initial analytic in-
sight as I noticed connections to existing sociological themes and 
generated ideas that were relevant to my research questions. I 
am now in the process of analysing interview material, and I in-
tend to later use the insights generated from this to make sense 
of my own experiences. Thus, the two methods are iterative; 
insights from my own experiences have shaped the interviews, 
and my engagement with interview material has in turn shaped 
the analysis within my autoethnography. 
However, this approach is not set in stone, and remaining 
open and willing to be ‘experimental’ has been a necessity. I have 
also had to be very clear about my epistemological and ontolog-
ical stance, and the specific purposes and scope of my autoeth-
nography, since early on in my research. 
Identifying as an autoethnographer 
I have adopted autoethnography during a time when it 
is becoming increasingly popular. Indicative of its growing ac-
ceptance as a viable research method is the new ‘Journal of Au-
toethnography’ due to be launched in 2020, which is to be the 
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first journal “devoted to the purposes, practices, and principles 
of autoethnography” (University of California Press, 2019). 
Nonetheless, autoethnography remains a relatively marginal-
ised method. The subjective nature of self-study is contested in 
some areas of social science, and autoethnography is therefore 
sometimes viewed as not being ‘proper research’. This is the case 
particularly in areas in which conventional ‘scientific’ notions of 
researcher impartiality and silent authorship have pervasive in-
fluence. Even where scholars do not completely accept tradition-
al notions of objectivity, methodology still tends to be strongly 
affected by it (Hammersley, 2011). 
Sociology is a varied discipline which is shaped by its meth-
odological divides, and the issues raised in the accusation of 
autoethnography being ‘too subjective’ draw on long-standing 
epistemological debates. It is normal and expected for research-
ers to hold conflicting ideas about what makes research valuable 
and how it should be conducted. Nonetheless, I do sometimes 
feel weary of identifying as an autoethnographer. In situations 
where there are other researchers present who adopt more (so-
called) ‘scientific’ approaches to research, I am aware that doing 
so would require me to justify and defend my approach (lest my 
PhD be judged as lacking worth). As a doctoral student, I do not 
have the title ‘doctor’ or a history of successful research to de-
fend my credibility in the face of such judgements. However, I 
have found that in other situations, autoethnography is actively 
valued. I often attend academic events which centre on sociolog-
ical and critical approaches to health or mental distress. In my 
experience, autoethnography tends to be valued at such events, 
especially those that centralise critique of the traditional privi-
leging of ‘objective’ professional knowledge over the ‘subjective’ 
experiences of service users. In these situations, I more readily 
identify as an autoethnographer. 
At times, I describe my approach as a ‘personal experience 
method’ (Wall, 2016) rather than autoethnography. This is a de-
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liberate attempt to sidestep the ‘baggage’ that goes with the term 
due to the ‘evocative vs analytic’ debate. Moreover, it is to avoid 
my research being wrongly identified as evocative autoethnog-
raphy; this could easily occur given that evocative autoethnog-
raphy tends to be more widely-used and well known than ana-
lytic autoethnography, and may be considered as synonymous 
with ‘autoethnography’ (Adams and Manning, 2015; Muncey, 
2010; Wall, 2016). My reason for not wanting to be identified as 
an evocative autoethnographer is simply that this would be a 
misrepresentation of my approach, which is closer to the ana-
lytic rather than evocative end of the spectrum. Furthermore, I 
wish to avoid opening myself up to the critiques that are levied 
at evocative autoethnography – particularly those that I person-
ally agree with (such as the aforementioned concerns regarding 
the lack of explicit analysis). 
Revealing anorexia through my research
My ‘recovery’ from anorexia necessitated letting go of my 
identity as a ‘sick anorexic’ in need of care, and recreating it as 
someone ‘normal’ and ‘well’. Literature supports this idea that 
anorexia ‘recovery’ involves reclaiming a past identity or discov-
ering a new one (Conti, 2018; Dawson et al., 2014; Patching and 
Lawler, 2009; Smith et al., 2014). After four long term admissions 
to an eating disorder unit, the latter three of which were spent de-
tained under the mental health act, the freedom that came from 
adopting a role as a ‘normal person’ was immense. However, it 
was also fraught with contradiction, and letting go of anorexia 
was simultaneously a painful loss. Anorexia can provide a sense 
of belonging and become a valued part of one’s identity (Espin-
dola and Blay, 2009; Fox and Diab, 2015; Rich, 2006; Warin, 2010). 
For me, it had been both source and solution to a deeply personal 
crisis (Lavis, 2016; Rance et al., 2017) and while it severely limited 
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and almost ended my life, I had simultaneously felt empowered 
by the label of disorder (Warin, 2010). I dealt with this sense of 
loss, and the distress of out-of-control ‘overeating’ which ensued 
shortly after my final discharge, by moving on from anorexia 
quickly. I completed the postgraduate degree that I had begun 
prior to the interruption of anorexia, and then moved to a new 
area and began a career in teaching. In doing so, I deliberately 
parted from the physical spaces which held memories of my eat-
ing (dis)order; the places I associated with the drama and excite-
ment of weight loss, the dark monotony of self-starvation, and 
the despair of not being able to stop eating. After I moved, no one 
(beyond my family and close friends) knew me as Lauren who 
had had anorexia. The fear of someone seeing me and thinking ‘is 
that Lauren, didn’t she used to be thin?’ lessened. As just another 
ordinary person, it was OK that I was normal-sized, because the 
expectations on me were the same as they were on anyone else. I 
began to build a life that had nothing to do with eating disorders 
or psychiatric care, and I mostly did not mention my past. 
Gradually, over the course of the next five years, I began to 
feel more able to face my past, and when exploring potential top-
ics for doctoral research, I felt motivated to critically explore the 
diagnosis and treatment of anorexia. Within this topic, I felt that 
the most valuable approach I could take would be to make use 
of my experiences as a unique opportunity to gather rich data, 
and that attempting to ‘bracket them out’ and eliminate them 
from my research would be dishonest and artificial. It was this 
position that led me to autoethnography. 
Since the outset of my PhD, I have (necessarily) regularly 
informed others of my identity as a ‘recovered anorexic’. Among 
academic colleagues and peers, my previous experience of an-
orexia and treatment is well known. It is one of the first pieces 
of information that my supervisor and cohort of fellow PhD stu-
dents learned about me, and it only takes a short conversation 
about my research with a new acquaintance at an academic con-
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ference for them to realise this. Revealing personal information 
to people I do not know well sometimes makes me uncomfort-
able. I spent many years keeping my past hidden, and as such, 
readily revealing my previous diagnosis and details such as 
having been detained under the mental act, can feel alien. I also 
imagine that me revealing this information might make the other 
person feel uncomfortable. I tend to deal with this by attempting 
to define the situation for them (Goffman, 1959); I portray myself 
as being comfortable with the interaction, as if the information 
I was revealing were not ‘sensitive’, in order to help them feel 
comfortable, and this then feeds back into reducing my own 
discomfort. However, while it can feel strange, revealing details 
of my personal experiences in academic contexts does feel rela-
tively safe. Somehow, I imagine as if the information will be re-
ceived through an academic lens, and thus more neutrally, with 
less judgement and fewer detrimental personal implications (or 
at least with awareness on the part of the other person that they 
ought to treat the information in this way). 
However, academia is not the only context in which I dis-
cuss my research. Any situation in which someone alludes to 
what I do for a living – such as in conversations with my hair-
dresser, a taxi driver, or other parents at the school gate – can po-
tentially lead to questions about my research topic. These times, 
I tend to reveal as little as possible, stating only that I am un-
dertaking a sociology PhD in the field of eating disorders. Both 
in the context of discussing research and otherwise, I generally 
choose not to reveal my past diagnosis to new people (aside from 
those who become close friends). I often expect that the other 
person ‘wouldn’t understand’, and that they may hold reduc-
tionist, simplistic ideas about anorexia, such as believing that it 
is only about ‘wanting to be thin’ or ‘feel in control’. I am not 
alone in wishing to hide my past diagnosis for these (or simi-
lar) reasons. Many participants in my research described being 
selective about with whom they reveal their diagnosis because 
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of how they imagine others understand anorexia. Relatedly, 
Dimitropoulos et al. (2016) found that individuals undergoing 
treatment for anorexia were often reluctant to publicly identify 
as ‘anorexic’ due to their belief that the general public stigmatise 
anorexia by portraying it as a volitional choice resulting from 
sociocultural influences. 
The personal impact of autoethnography 
The potential detrimental impact of autoethnography on 
the researcher’s self is an ethical concern (Chatham-Carpenter, 
2010; Dashper, 2015; Pearce, 2010; Tamas, 2009; Tolich, 2010). 
Tolich (2010) argues that autoethnographers should treat all per-
sons addressed within an autoethnography as vulnerable. Here, 
he alludes to relational ethics. This concerns the researcher’s 
responsibilities to ‘intimate others’ and how they are represent-
ed and identified within the text (Ellis, 2007). However, he also 
specifies that this recognition of vulnerability ought to include 
the autoethnographer themselves. 
Most days, I am very aware of the size and shape of my body. 
I often feel ‘large’ (compared to how I once was), and sometimes, 
‘too-large’. I tend to deliberately avoid attaching to these embod-
ied feelings and sensations or affording them too much meaning. 
As someone who has previously struggled intensely with and 
through their body, they will probably always be there. Howev-
er, while I mostly experience these in a non-intrusive manner, I 
am none the less sensitive to others’ (and my own) judgements 
about my body. When others learn of my previous diagnosis, 
this sensitivity is accentuated. Anorexia tends to be associated 
with bodily emaciation. I imagine that when others learn of my 
previous diagnosis, they assess this in terms of my current bodi-
ly appearance; they acknowledge that I appear ‘normal’, and 
from this deduce that I must now be ‘recovered’. This assump-
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tion (which it seems to me that others sometimes make) feels dif-
ficult because it negates the ways in which struggles around food 
and weight – although now far less problematic and different in 
form – continue to impact on my day to day life. Indeed, the very 
idea that I am ‘recovered’ does not account for the complexity of 
my lived experience (Conti, 2018). 
Further, even as someone who no longer seeks food re-
striction or desires the diagnosis of anorexia, knowing that my 
body no longer lays claim to my previous intense struggles with 
food can feel difficult (at times). Relatedly, I sometimes wonder 
whether I ought to become a little thinner – not drastically so, but 
enough to attest to my previous diagnosis. These are not imagin-
ings that I act on or believe to be ‘true’, but nonetheless I feel their 
ebb and flow as I move through the social interactions in which 
my identity as an ‘ex-anorexic’ is at the fore. They could be in-
terpreted as a kind of ‘anorexia hangover’; evidence that I still 
have a little ‘pathological thinking’ hanging around. However, 
as my PhD research itself is exploring, I would tend to under-
stand these experiences in terms of different forms of identity 
work (Snow and Anderson, 1987; Wagner et al., 2017) as opposed 
to pathology. I also would not draw sharp lines between ‘well’ 
and ‘unwell’ thinking, but recognise the fluidity and dynamic 
nature of such internal experiences for individuals who have 
moved through ‘recovery’. 
As alluded to above, autoethnography affects my every-
day experience of living in a ‘recovered’, normal-sized body. 
Similarly, Dashper (2015) describes how, when others learned 
of the damage done to her teeth and mouth in a horse riding 
accident through her autoethnographic publication, she became 
more self-conscious of the appearance of her teeth. However, for 
me the research process has not led to a ”strong pull to go back 
into anorexia” as it did for Chatham-Carpenter (2010: n.p). Any 
sense of feeling compelled to reduce my food intake or seek an-
orexia that results from my research is no more intense than that 
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which I experience in day to day life anyway (and that is mild). 
Chatham-Carpenter suggests that “you have to be in a certain 
space to feel comfortable to write.” (2010: 9). Ultimately, I feel 
that I am in that certain space.
Professional impact of autoethnography
There are professional implications of undertaking autoeth-
nography (Chatham-Carpenter, 2010; Jago, 2002; Tolich, 2010). 
While in the early stages of trying to carve myself an academic 
career, it goes against the grain to bring very personal and vul-
nerable aspects of my past experiences to the fore. Such informa-
tion would normally remain ‘backstage’ in the performance of 
an academic self (Goffman, 1961); one does not ordinarily per-
form as a professional (whether in the context of academia or 
otherwise) by making others aware of very intimate aspects of 
their personal life. Even when scholars purposefully decide to 
make personal disclosures, they tend do so selectively, in adher-
ence with norms which govern the limits of sharing (Veletsianos 
and Stewart, 2016). At times, conducting autoethnography can 
threaten these limits, because information about one’s person-
al experiences that would ordinarily be kept private is publicly 
known and is apparent in a whole range of professional social 
encounters.
Tolich argues that, when a novice researcher is planning to 
write about a stigmatised experience such as bulimia or attempt-
ed suicide “they should imagine dressing up in sandwich boards 
and walking around the university proclaiming their stigma […] 
Like an inked tattoo […] the marking is permanent. There are 
no future skin grafts for autoethnographic PhDs” (2012: 1605). A 
reviewer warned Jago (2002) against publishing her autoethnog-
raphy of major depression, due to the possible damage posed to 
her career resulting from stigma. Jago suggests that if publishing 
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her story were to damage her career for this reason, then this 
is “the best reason” to do so; it is an opportunity to “demystify 
and demythologise depression”, by making “my version of the 
story part of the permanent record” (2002: 753). Chatham-Car-
penter (2010) wondered what impression of herself as a college 
professor she would give if she were open about her ongoing 
struggles with anorexia in her autoethnography. Controlling the 
‘face’ that she presented in relation to her anorexia became tied 
up with how she managed her presentation as a researcher and 
professional. 
There is, then, the question of whether the potential stigma 
of anorexia, or specific details of my experiences (such as hav-
ing been sectioned), may have lasting implications for my ac-
ademic career. Anorexia is a potentially stigmatising diagnosis; 
stigma is relational, emerging out of social interaction (Goff-
man, 1963), and therefore shifts depending on context. Research 
suggests that in treatment settings, anorexia is experienced as 
a stigmatised identity due to its reductive construction as a pa-
thologised, medicalised condition, and that this can lead individ-
uals to feel misunderstood, isolated, invalidated or stereotyped 
(Boughtwood and Halse, 2009; Eli, 2014; Malson et al., 2004; Rich, 
2006). Rance et al. (2017) note that women with anorexia are of-
ten perceived negatively in wider society as well as in treatment 
contexts. Indeed, research suggests that the general public hold 
stigmatising attitudes towards anorexia (Crisp, 2005; Stewart et 
al., 2008). Individuals with eating disorders are viewed negative-
ly due to beliefs that these conditions are self-inflicted, and an-
orexia in particular is often trivialised (Crisp, 2005). Further, as 
alluded to above, individuals with anorexia describe perceiving 
general others as misunderstanding anorexia and holding ste-
reotypical, stigmatising and simplistic views (Dimitrilous et al., 
2016; Rance et al., 2017). 
I can remember well how it felt while in treatment to be 
positioned as pathological, incapable, irrational and childlike. As 
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previously discussed, the academic (as opposed to medical) lens 
through which my experience of anorexia will be ‘read’ feels as 
though it would at least mostly avoid this positioning. Important-
ly, I am writing about my experiences of anorexia and treatment 
in retrospect as someone who can claim to be ‘recovered’, and 
this feels far less problematic (in terms of feeling exposed and 
risking stigma) than writing about current struggles. Nonethe-
less, I have questioned the possible future professional implica-
tions that may result from me exposing details of my experienc-
es, especially my apparently ‘irrational’ and ‘extreme’ behaviour 
while in the midst of food restriction and in treatment, and the 
more ‘severe’ aspects of my treatment. Unlike Jago, I would not 
say that potentially stigmatising aspects of my experiences are 
the ‘best’ reason for publishing an autoethnography, but I would 
say that they are not a reason to avoid doing so. Also, the po-
tential benefits of my autoethnography (gaining valuable insight 
into my research questions and producing a meaningful thesis) 
seem to me to outweigh the risk of select others holding negative 
judgements about me, and the even smaller risk that these judge-
ments would then have direct implications for my career. 
Conclusion
Undertaking my PhD has felt like a continuous moving 
in-and-out of being an insider and an outsider, of sharing com-
monalities and feeling ‘other’. As a doctoral student, I occupy a 
space somewhere in between a student and researcher. I have a 
shared identity with other PhD students in my cohort by nature 
of our common educational experience, but feel different to them 
due to the overtly personal nature of my research. With regard 
to my interviewees, I shared with them a significant experience 
which (I felt) ‘bought us together’ and facilitated the interviews. 
However, our experiences were also diverse, and we were differ-
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entiated by our respective roles as ‘researcher’ and ‘researched’. 
In my part-time work as a lecturer, I present and draw on dif-
ferent aspects of my self (as an academic researcher, teacher and 
‘ex-service user’) in a myriad of ways, but do not feel as though I 
belong wholly or properly in each of these categories. 
I imagine that most doctoral students experience some 
extent of difficulties around justifying and explaining their re-
search, managing their academic identity and keeping them-
selves ‘well’ during their PhD. However, autoethnography 
brings its own, specific challenges, which can shape the doctoral 
experience significantly. This is in part due to autoethnography 
being a relatively new and contested method, and it also derives 
from the ways in which the personal and professional intertwine 
in autoethnography. This adds additional layers of complexity 
in terms of establishing oneself as a potential academic, during 
a process which can already feel very tentative and unknown. 
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4. Mental Wellbeing in Higher Education: 
 a pedagogical perspective and manifesto
Abby Shovlin
Introduction
With recent research indicating a notable decline in lev-
els of student wellbeing (Thorley, 2017), and higher levels of 
mental illness and low wellbeing among students in relation 
to the UK general population (Neves and Hillman, 2017), stu-
dent mental health has become an area of growing concern for 
the Higher Education sector. In response, Universities UK’s 
(2017) Step Change Mental Health in Higher Education framework 
and the Institute for Public Policy Research report Not by de-
grees (Thorley, 2017) both stress the importance of developing 
a ‘whole-university’ approach to student mental health. This 
whole-university response is defined by Universities UK (2017) 
as a “population approach to student mental health [which] 
asks universities to reconfigure themselves as health-promot-
ing and supportive environments”. It is clear that a whole-
university response involves all staff, but as recent research 
has highlighted, an academic’s role in a “health-promoting 
and supportive environment” remains less clear (Hughes et al., 
2018). This chapter acknowledges this current lack of clarity 
and, by way of response, aims to present a clearly delineated 
pedagogical perspective on student mental wellbeing. In order 
to do so, it will outline current concerns surrounding an edu-
cator’s role in student mental health before presenting a self-
determination theory (Ryan and Deci, 2017) informed approach 
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to mental wellbeing supportive pedagogical practice and cur-
riculum design. 
Mental wellbeing in and through the curriculum: a contested 
area
Firstly, it is important to acknowledge that many elements 
of this debate predate current drives to embed mental wellbeing 
in the curriculum (Houghton and Anderson, 2017). Concerns 
that a pedagogical focus on mental wellbeing will blur bound-
aries between education and therapy and/or pose a risk to ac-
ademic standards are not new. Both of these concerns featured 
in Ecclestone and Hayes’ (2009) argument against what they 
termed the therapeutic turn in The Dangerous Rise of Therapeutic 
Education. According to Ecclestone and Hayes (2009), education-
al practice was increasingly affording the affective precedence 
over the academic, which they saw as “therapeutic” and “pro-
foundly anti-educational” (Ecclestone and Hayes, 2009: xiii). 
Moreover, Eccleston and Hayes (2009) not only argued against 
this ‘therapeutic turn’ on academic grounds, they also criticised 
it for creating what they described as “the diminished self” (Ec-
clestone and Hayes, 2009: xi). This diminished self, as Eccleston 
and Hayes (2009) explained, was the product of therapeutic ed-
ucation’s emphasis on students’ “emotional needs” and “per-
ceived emotional vulnerability” which resulted in an “emotion-
ally diminished human subject” and promoted “a life focused 
on the self and self-fulfilment rather than with understanding 
and changing the world”(Ecclestone and Hayes, 2009: ix & 164). 
Whilst it is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a critique 
of The Dangerous Rise of Therapeutic Education in its entirety, it 
is necessary to address and respond to the authors’ key points 
and ideas, including that of ‘the diminished self’. As this chapter 
will demonstrate, taking student needs into account is a requisite 
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part of mental wellbeing supportive pedagogies, and this in no 
way leads to the creation of a diminished self. Instead, mental 
wellbeing supportive curricula (see Houghton and Anderson, 
2017) arguably facilitate the creation of a self that is limitless in 
its capacity for personal and academic growth. 
Secondly, in addition to acknowledging this pre-existing ed-
ucational debate, the concern that mental wellbeing is the domain 
of mental health professionals and not educators must also be 
addressed. A recent qualitative study (Hughes et al., 2018) which 
interviewed 52 staff across 5 universities has indicated that this 
concern is of particular pertinence to those staff who have a remit 
for personal tutoring. Whilst it is generally accepted that a person-
al tutor role includes an element of pastoral care, Hughes et al.’s, 
(2018) study highlights that lack of clarity around the meaning of 
pastoral care results in “uneven responses for students, uncertain-
ty for staff and unequal levels of accepted responsibility for stu-
dent mental health” (Hughes et al., 2018: 5). Hughes et al., (2018) 
therefore emphasise the need to adequately address this ambigui-
ty as it can “lead to weak and uncertain boundaries and increased 
risk to students, staff and universities”(Hughes et al., 2018: 5). 
Whilst the focus of this chapter is teaching and curriculum design 
and not the role of the personal tutor, it acknowledges the impor-
tance of clearly delineated boundaries between roles. In this way, 
it presents a case for mental wellbeing supportive practice within 
the pedagogical domain and by doing so, seeks to facilitate a clear 
delineation of the boundary between the roles of mental health 
professionals and educators. 
Thirdly, but no less importantly, is the concern that a men-
tal wellbeing supportive curriculum is unfeasible because of cur-
ricular time restraints and increasing staff workloads. This is a 
relatable concern for all teaching staff; time is both in short sup-
ply and high demand. Time therefore, is a concern that any cur-
ricular initiative needs to take seriously and address effectively. 
However, as this chapter will demonstrate, mental wellbeing 
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supportive pedagogies are not an added extra but can instead 
be woven into everyday teaching practices and are therefore not 
necessarily time intensive enhancements.
Self-determination theory and basic psychological needs
Self-determination theory focuses on understanding and 
supporting human development, growth and motivation and 
was developed by researchers and clinicians Richard Ryan and 
Edward Deci in 1985 (Ryan and Deci, 2017). Since its inception, 
a large corpus of empirical evidence has been produced on its ef-
ficacy and application in a wide variety of fields, including edu-
cation (Ryan and Deci, 2017; Vansteenkiste and Ryan, 2013; Nie-
miec and Ryan, 2009; Ryan, 2009). Organismic theories, such as 
this one, operate from the tenet that humans have an inherent ca-
pacity for growth which can either be supported or hindered by 
their environments. More specifically, self-determination theory 
is “centrally concerned with the social conditions that facilitate 
human flourishing [and] examines how biological, social and cul-
tural conditions either enhance or undermine the inherent human 
capacities for psychological growth, engagement and wellness” 
(Ryan and Deci, 2017: 3). Self-determination theory is macro in 
nature as it is composed of six mini-theories: cognitive evaluation 
theory, organismic integration theory, causality orientations theo-
ry, goal contents theory, relationships motivation theory and basic 
psychological needs theory (Ryan and Deci, 2017). It is the latter 
mini theory of Basic Psychological Needs and its application in the 
field of education that this chapter will specifically focus on. 
According to Ryan and Deci (2017), autonomy, relatedness 
and competence are universal human basic psychological needs, 
and their theory posits that environments which support these 
needs provide the psychological nutriments that are a prereq-
uisite of wellbeing. Conversely, environments in which these 
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needs are thwarted frustrate an individual’s inherent propen-
sity towards self-organisation, growth and flourishing and are 
associated with a variety of “ill-being indicators” including emo-
tional exhaustion, anxiety, aggression and increases in levels of 
immunological proteins in the body associated with stress (Ryan 
and Deci, 2017; Vansteenkiste and Ryan, 2013: 268-269) Before 
mapping basic psychological needs onto a pedagogical context, 
it is important to define and describe each of these three constit-
uent elements of autonomy, competence and relatedness in turn.
Firstly, when defining autonomy, it must be highlighted 
that the autonomy of basic psychological needs is not to be mis-
understood as an assertion that an individual always requires 
choice in and control of every element in their environment. In-
stead, the autonomy of basic psychological needs is concerned 
with an individual being able to align their actions and choic-
es with their values through “the experience of volition and the 
self-endorsement of one’s activity” (Vansteenkiste and Ryan, 
2013: 264). In this way, self-determination theory research high-
lights the key role that autonomy plays in supporting intrin-
sic motivation, demonstrating that “the more autonomous the 
person’s motivation, the greater their persistence, performance 
and wellbeing in that domain” (Ryan, 2009: 2). In the domain of 
undergraduate education, research has indicated that intrinsic 
motivation is also linked to psychological wellbeing (Burton et 
al., 2006). Burton et al.’s (2006) study, which investigated the rela-
tionships between undergraduate students’ intrinsic motivation, 
psychological wellbeing and academic achievement, found a sig-
nificant association between intrinsic motivation and psycholog-
ical wellbeing, independent of academic achievement (Burton et 
al., 2006). 
The second element of Basic Psychological Needs theory, 
relatedness, describes an individual’s need to experience a sense 
of belonging and feel part of a community. Ryan and Deci de-
scribe relatedness as “feeling socially connected and significant 
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among others” (Ryan and Deci, 2017: 11).When describing this 
basic psychological need in workshops, I highlight that relat-
edness also includes a sense of “mattering” (Schlossberg, 1989). 
“Mattering” as Schlossberg identified, plays a key role in success-
ful transitions into a new environment. Her research on transi-
tions pre-dates the recent focus on transitions in Higher Educa-
tion (Thomas, 2013), but continues to bear relevance and provide 
insight. In this way, her observation that “institutions that focus 
on mattering and greater student involvement will be more suc-
cessful in creating campuses where students are motivated to 
learn” (Schlossberg, 1989: 7) is now recognised as good practice 
in transitions at sector level (Stuart, 2008; Thomas, 2013). Howev-
er, as this chapter will demonstrate, students’ sense of belonging 
and mattering is strengthened if relatedness is not only a focus of 
inductions and transitions, but is also woven into course design 
and everyday classroom interactions.
The third basic psychological need, competence, is noted by 
Ryan and Deci (2017: 11) as a fundamental element of motivat-
ed actions as it supports the satisfaction of an individual’s basic 
need to have an element of control over their environment (ef-
fectance) and independently accomplish moderately challeng-
ing tasks within it (mastery). More specifically, in the context of 
Higher Education, competence is described as “the experience 
of being good or effective at what one does, or the belief that 
one can become so” (Baik et al., 2016a). Becoming good or effec-
tive at learning, studying, coursework, and assessment in High-
er Education has traditionally been seen as the focus of ‘study 
skills’ centres within universities. In order to support students’ 
academic development in these areas, many academic skills cen-
tres offer students 1:2:1 support in addition to a wide range of 
resources on study management. Whilst this competence sup-
portive provision is helpful to those students who make use of 
it, in my own experience, academic skills development is not 
universally embedded in the curriculum and thus only a per-
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centage of students benefit from it. Additionally, this “add on” 
approach to students’ academic skills development can operate 
as a “deficit model” in which the students themselves are seen 
as “lacking” (Wingate, 2006; Lea and Street, 2006). Alternate ap-
proaches to developing students’ sense of competence, such as 
academic literacies (Lea and Street 2006), focus not on “fixing” 
students, but on pedagogy and course design as a vehicle for the 
academic skills development of all students (Drummond et al., 
1999). This chapter contends that the basic psychological need 
of competence in a Higher Education context is fully supported 
through a combination of academic skills development within 
the curriculum and the provision of study skills services rather 
through the latter alone. 
Thought experiment 
Before mapping each basic psychological need onto a learn-
ing and teaching context, I would first like to invite you to experi-
ence the theory in action by way of a thought experiment. Whilst 
a thought experiment cannot count as robust empirical evidence, 
it does provide us with a valuable opportunity to test the efficacy 
of the theory in relation to our own experiences1. Interestingly, in 
addition to the large literature base on the validity and applica-
tion of self determination theory, Ryan and Deci (2017) point out 
that “we can also see natural experiments everywhere in which 
promising human potentials are diminished by impoverished or 
oppressive social conditions” (Ryan and Deci, 2017: 4). In this 
short experiment, I am going to ask you to think about work. 
1 For a detailed meta-analytic review of self-determination theory in the 
workplace research, see Broeck, A. and Rosen, C. (2016) ‘A Review of Self-Deter-
mination Theory’s Basic Psychological Needs at Work’. Journal of Management 42 
(5): 1195-1229.
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From my own experience of running workshops for staff this is 
often an unexpected question to ask in a session on curricular 
design; however, it is an illuminating one. The instructions I give 
to workshop participants are as follows: 
Think of a working environment that you are part of/have been part of. 
Try to think of one positive and one negative work environment.
How was your sense of autonomy, competence and relatedness support-
ed/thwarted in each environment? How was your mental wellbeing in 
each environment?
This pause for thought and reflection allows staff to think 
about the factors and conditions which have and have not sup-
ported their own sense of mental wellbeing in working environ-
ments they have experienced. It is useful to have identified tangi-
ble personal examples of what can support or thwart autonomy, 
relatedness and competency before applying the lens of basic 
psychological needs theory to the working environments that 
we create for ourselves and our students in Higher Education. 
Mapping Basic Psychological Needs to pedagogy and curricu-
lum design: what works?
As indicated previously, there is an evident synergy be-
tween psychological needs satisfaction, and good practice in 
learning and teaching in Higher Education such as enhanced 
academic transitions (Thomas, 2013) and academic literacies de-
velopment (Lea and Street, 2006). Filak and Sheldon (2003) have 
also demonstrated a significant association between basic psy-
chological needs supportive practice and students’ evaluation of 
their teachers in a study of undergraduate students. This study 
examined the relationship between students’ psychological 
needs satisfaction and “instructor evaluation” in two undergrad-
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uate programmes (with 268 and 179 participants, respectively) 
and, in both programmes, needs satisfaction “positively predict-
ed instructor and/or course ratings” (Filak & Sheldon, 2003: 244). 
However, pedagogical practice informed by basic psycho-
logical needs provides a theoretical and empirical framework 
not only for enhancing learning, but also for supporting stu-
dents’ mental wellbeing. In this way, recent case studies and re-
search on basic psychological needs supportive pedagogies and 
curriculum design describe a positive impact on both learning 
and mental wellbeing (Baik et al., 2016b; Field et al., 2014; Slavin 
et al. 2014). The following summary, informed by the case stud-
ies in Baik et al.’s (2016b) Enhancing Student Mental Wellbeing: A 
Handbook for Academic Educators and current Higher Education 
good practice, provides concrete examples of how pedagogy 
and curriculum design can support students’ sense of autonomy, 
competence and relatedness and, in turn, their mental wellbeing: 
Autonomy
Providing students with a choice in assessment method; involving 
students as partners in course design through student represen-
tation in curriculum approval processes; incorporating space in 
the curriculum for students to share their experience and perspec-
tives; goal setting with students to help build their intrinsic and 
autonomous motivation which in turn facilitates engagement (this 
tasks fit well with the remit of personal tutors); and the provision 
of meaningful rationale for non-choice elements in programmes.
Competence
Providing students with early formative feedback; embedding 
contextualised academic skills within programmes; not making 
assumptions about students’ current knowledge/academic skills 
set; promoting growth mindsets and sharing our own stories of 
‘failure’; introducing challenge such as problem based learning or 
interdisciplinary projects in a supported environment early on not 
only in the final years of an undergraduate programme; design-
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ing programmes that gradually increase in complexity with each 
stage of learning thus providing a solid foundation for the next 
stage.
Relatedness
Promoting peer support and peer mentoring schemes; incorpor-
ating group and pair work (such as think/pair/share) in lectures; 
providing open space and/or offering drop ins; running initiatives 
and projects in which staff and students work together; extending 
(or developing) academic community building initiatives to 
online students; replacing Welcome Week talks with enhanced 
inductions that engage students in activities or tasks. 
As the above summary suggests, there is an element of 
overlap between basic psychological needs supportive practice 
and good teaching. However, this chapter supports Baik et al.’s 
(2016a) assertion that good teaching is a necessary but not suffi-
cient element of mental wellbeing supportive pedagogies. These 
pedagogies are more than ‘good teaching’ as the former require 
knowledge of i) the psychological nutriments for human flour-
ishing and ii) how to translate this knowledge into pedagogical 
practice, course design and everyday interactions with students.
Addressing objections
After presenting a case in support of basic psychological 
needs supportive pedagogy, this chapter will now turn to ad-
dressing the three areas of concern it outlined at the outset. 
Firstly, in response to Ecclestone and Hayes’ (2009: xiii) claim 
that affording importance to the affective in education is “anti-
educational”, it would seem appropriate to highlight how peda-
gogies informed by basic psychological needs support students’ 
academic development and ability to engage with complexity 
and abstraction. As the summary of good practice illustrated, ba-
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sic psychological needs informed practice emphasises the need 
to support students’ sense of competence through curricular de-
sign. This competence supportive curricular design introduces 
elements of academic complexity gradually through building in 
opportunities for students to experience and grapple with chal-
lenge and uncertainty in a supported environment early on in 
their studies. Recent research (Shovlin and Docherty, 2017) has 
indicated that without the introduction of these elements in a 
supportive environment in first and second year, students can 
find the transition to higher levels of learning in third and fourth 
year of undergraduate programmes to be troubling. The third 
and fourth years of an undergraduate programme generally re-
quire students to engage with higher levels of complexity more 
autonomously which can, as one student described, be an entire-
ly new experience:
in the second year a lot of what you could do is just study at the last min-
ute, pick up the notes and learn. Whereas in third year you’ve reached 
the stage where it’s like ‘Oh, I can’t do that anymore!’ it isn’t just a 
case of reading the notes and turning up on the day… So, I think third 
year required a lot more understanding of the material rather than just 
being able to learn it by rote almost . . . and now I have to sit and think 
through the material and almost be able to teach myself in it. (Shovlin 
and Docherty, 201: 85)
In a similar way, staff in this small-scale, qualitative study 
also commented on the unhelpful ‘gap’ between second year and 
third year and suggested how it could be remedied: 
I think having students work more with a little bit more of the abstract 
stuff in the earlier classes for a little bit and then you know, they get used 
to sort of working this way over a time period… I just think it takes a 
long time to develop and it’s not something you can quickly do. (Shovlin 
and Docherty, 201: 88)
All of the teaching staff interviewed in this study echoed 
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the comment above with one member of staff suggesting that 
“by leaving the introduction of these elements [of abstraction 
and complexity] to Honours years, we are doing our students a 
disservice” Shovlin and Docherty, 2017: 89).
It is important to point out that although the fourth-year 
students in this study had not been able to benefit from it, the 
School has recently developed a new first-year course on ‘Proofs 
and Problem Solving’. This first-year course supports students’ 
basic psychological need for competence as it introduces first-
year students to elements of challenge, abstraction and com-
plexity in a supportive and ‘lower stakes’ environment. Feed-
back on the new course has been overwhelmingly positive with 
students informing staff that “this course is really hard, and I 
loved it” (Shovlin and Docherty: 87). This approach to course de-
sign serves to illustrate that basic psychological needs informed 
pedagogies foster students’ capacity to engage with academ-
ic complexity and therefore provide the opposite of the “anti-
educational” experience that Ecclestone and Hayes (2009: xiii) 
predicted as a consequence of the therapeutic turn. 
Secondly, in response to the concern that a curricular focus 
on mental wellbeing will blur the boundaries of an academic’s 
role, this chapter has demonstrated that building curricula that 
support mental wellbeing does not require educators to oper-
ate outside of their academic remit. Therefore, instead of blur-
ring boundaries between teaching, student support and mental 
health services, basic psychological needs informed educational 
practice clearly delineates pedagogical and curricular approach-
es which teaching staff can employ to support mental wellbeing. 
This approach to mental wellbeing in and through the curriculum 
focuses on how educators can build positive learning environ-
ments for themselves and their students and it does not require 
educators to provide mental wellbeing support that they are not 
trained for and feel uncomfortable with. It does, however, ask 
educators to think deeply about the learning experiences they 
4. mental wellbeing in higher education 93
create and how the academic environment can support or thwart 
both student learning and mental wellbeing. 
The pedagogical position this chapter espouses is perhaps 
best illustrated by revisiting the classic educational debate of 
teaching subjects vs. teaching students (Moje, 1986). Ecclestone 
and Hayes’ (2009) argument clearly gives precedence to the for-
mer as they claim that “knowledge can be taught passionately 
or indifferently by and to people who may be distraught, upset, 
happy. It does not matter. Knowledge, as it were, conquers all. 
What we are teaching is not touched by the emotions” (Eccle-
stone and Hayes, 2009: 153). The knowledge-centric pedagogy 
that Ecclestone and Hayes (2009) describe is one that this chap-
ter strongly contests on the grounds of both student learning 
and mental wellbeing. If we accept Eccleston and Hayes’ (2009) 
proposition, then it would appear that the infamously knowl-
edge-centric classroom of Dickens’ Thomas Gradgrind in Hard 
Times meets the necessary conditions to qualify as education:
Thomas Gradgrind, sir. A man of realities. A man of facts and calcula-
tions. A man who proceeds upon the principle that two and two are four, 
and nothing over. Thomas Gradgrind now presented Thomas Gradgrind 
to the little pitchers before him, who were to be filled so full of facts. 
‘Girl number twenty,’ said Mr Gradgrind, squarely pointing with his 
square forefinger, ‘I don’t know that girl. Who is that girl?’
‘Sissy Jupe, sir,’ explained number twenty, blushing, standing up, and 
curtseying.
‘Sissy is not a name,’ said Mr Gradgrind. ‘Don’t call yourself Sissy. Call 
yourself Cecilia.’
 ‘Let me see. What is your father?’
‘He belongs to the horse-riding, if you please, sir.’
 ‘Very well, then. Give me your definition of a horse.’
‘Girl number twenty unable to define a horse!’ said Mr Gradgrind, for 
the general behoof of all the little pitchers. ‘Girl number twenty possessed 
of no facts, in reference to one of the commonest of animals! Some boy’s 
definition of a horse. Bitzer, yours.’
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‘Quadruped. Graminivorous. Forty teeth, namely twenty-four grinders, 
four eye-teeth, and twelve incisive. Sheds coat in the spring; in marshy 
countries, sheds hoofs, too. Hoofs hard, but requiring to be shod with 
iron. Age known by marks in mouth.’ ‘Now girl number twenty,’ said 
Mr Gradgrind. ‘You know what a horse is.’
She curtseyed again, and would have blushed deeper, if she could have 
blushed deeper than she had blushed all this time […] She was very 
young, and she looked as if she were frightened by the matter-of-fact pros-
pect the world afforded’. (Dickens, 1995: 4-6).
Sissy Jupe, might now ‘know’ what a horse is, but the state 
of fear that she is in by the end of this passage is arguably con-
ducive neither to deep and effective learning nor mental wellbe-
ing. Evidently, it would be unreasonable to infer that Eccleston 
and Hayes’ (2009) argument explicitly supports a Gradgrindian 
approach to education. However, it is equally important to high-
light that their ‘knowledge conquers all’ definition does not in-
clude the qualities that would automatically rule this classroom 
experience out as ‘anti-educational’. Moreover, their assertion 
that knowledge “can be taught to people who may be distraught 
and upset” (Eccleston and Hayes, 2009: 153) is called into ques-
tion by basic psychological needs theory’s large corpus of empir-
ical evidence on the detrimental effects of needs thwarting envi-
ronments (Ryan and Deci, 2017; Vansteenkiste and Ryan, 2013)
This chapter therefore supports Wright’s (2014) assertion 
that Ecclestone and Hayes’ argument is based on “a false dichot-
omy that separates rationality and emotion” (Wright, 2014: 145) 
as we teach both subjects and students. Laurence Krieger’s (2008) 
extensive work on humanising the legal education curriculum 
operates from a students and subjects perspective as he reminds 
educators that “human nature [must] be a primary guiding phi-
losophy for our educational responsibilities . . . as human nature 
is the primary resource with which educators inevitably work” 
(Krieger, 2008: 248). As this chapter has demonstrated, basic psy-
chological needs theory provides us with knowledge of the en-
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vironments in which humans feel well and therefore features as 
a key component of educational practice that seeks to support 
both mental wellbeing and learning (Field et al., 2014; Larcombe 
et al., 2015). 
Thirdly, the last objection to be addressed is that of time 
constraints. As this chapter has argued throughout, basic psy-
chological needs supportive curricula and pedagogies are fun-
damental to both effective learning and mental wellbeing and 
not ‘added extras’. As a corollary, this type of practice is also 
not an extra in terms of time demands. Instead, as this chapter 
has shown, basic psychological needs informed practice can be 
incorporated into simple actions which can be woven into ev-
eryday teaching and interaction with students. Evidently larger 
scale initiatives such as embedding academic skills development 
into programme design are more time intensive, but as recent 
case studies from Australia demonstrates (Baik et al., 2016b), 
mental wellbeing can be supported in our teaching and course 
design in simple yet impactful ways. 
Conclusion and manifesto
In conclusion, this chapter contends that a pedagogical and 
curricular focus on mental wellbeing is a requisite element of an 
effective whole-institution response to mental health. Whilst it 
is essential to continue to focus on strengthening and develop-
ing extra-curricular mental wellbeing activities and initiatives, 
this chapter argues that an institution’s wellbeing strategy is 
limited if it fails to consider the ways in which the curriculum 
and pedagogies can either support or thwart students’ mental 
wellbeing. As illustrated throughout, Ryan and Deci’s (2017) Ba-
sic Psychological Needs theory provides a practical framework 
that educators can use to design curricula which can not only 
enhance learning, but also foster students’ sense of autonomy, 
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relatedness and competence, which in turn supports student 
mental wellbeing. The premise of this chapter’s argument is 
simple: students learn better and feel better in classroom envi-
ronments which foster belonging, competence and autonomous 
motivation. However, implementation of this vison at both an 
institutional and sector level in the UK is far from simple, as this 
calls for a fundamental shift in the way we conceptualise and 
provide support for teaching in Higher Education. Hence, the 
following seven point manifesto:
1.  A whole university approach to student mental well-
being includes pedagogical practice and curriculum 
design.
2.  Universities have a responsibility to create working and 
learning environments which support, not thwart, staff 
and student mental wellbeing. 
3.  Curriculum and pedagogies can be designed to develop 
students’ sense of autonomy, relatedness and compe-
tence, which in turn supports mental wellbeing. Con-
versely learning and teaching which does not consider 
these basic psychological needs is a missed opportunity 
to support student wellbeing and may even inadver-
tently undermine it. 
4.  Professional mental health support does not fall within 
the remit of the educator, but student mental wellbeing, 
supportive pedagogical practice, and curriculum de-
sign are not. 
5.  Learning contains both cognitive and affective elements 
and including a focus on the latter is not ‘anti-educational’ 
but a pre-requisite of pedagogical practice that supports 
both student learning and mental wellbeing. 
6.  As we teach both subjects and students, professional 
education for university teachers needs to equip them 
with the necessary skills and knowledge to address the 
needs of both subject teaching and learners by includ-
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ing courses on the psychology of learning and mental 
wellbeing supportive pedagogical practice, and curric-
ulum design. 
7.  If the Higher Education sector is to demonstrate a com-
mitment to excellence in teaching, then it should con-
sider bringing the professional education of university 
lecturers in line with that of teachers in others sectors of 
education by making some level of training for univer-
sity educators compulsory
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5. Learning To Listen To Your Own Health 
 And Wellbeing
Peter J. Martin and Edward M. Holt
Introduction
People know how to learn, they did it from birth until they went to school. 
It’s a question of helping them remember how to do it. We need to help 
people have confidence in their perceptions and how to question their 
interpretation of reality, within a framework of competence. (Hase and 
Kenyon, 2001:7)
Most people will have some form of lived experience of 
compassion either as the recipient of compassion or as the 
giver; but when we subject compassion to scrutiny in a class-
room we render it a dry topic to be learned and risk losing 
its human dimension. We risk also losing a sense of the effort 
required to show compassion and the resilience needed to do 
so day-after-day in a stressful, under-resourced, healthcare 
environment. 
It would seem self-evident that people in need of health 
and social care should receive it from compassionate profession-
als who are able to manage their own stress. However, this did 
not reflect the environment reported on by Robert Francis at the 
Mid-Staffordshire Health Trust in the United Kingdom (UK), 
leading to his assertion:
Improved support for compassionate caring and committed nursing: 
proper standards of nursing care lie at the heart of what is required to 
protect patients when in hospital. The majority of nurses are compas-
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sionate, caring and committed. They should be given effective support 
and recognition, and be empowered to use these qualities to maintain 
standards. (Francis, 2015:7)
In citing Francis we are not seeking to align ourselves with 
the abundance of literature which exhorts nurses to be ‘more 
compassionate’. Rather, the lack of compassion seems to us to be 
symptomatic of a lack of resilience; an inability to maintain a 
compassionate stance towards those in need when faced with 
poorly contained anxiety and increasing workloads. 
What made nurses at Mid-Staffordshire – or indeed any other hospital 
– change from being caring individuals with a vocation to help patients, 
to individuals who showed such an utter lack of compassion? Could it be 
that relentless demands, lack of appreciation for their efforts, an intoler-
able push for process, procedure, cost-savings, the desperate lack of staff 
and support simply drained the capacity of those nurses to respond with 
care and humanity? (Haslam, 2015, n.p.)
This chapter outlines a teaching strategy developed spe-
cifically to enhance compassion in care and build resilience 
among mental health nursing students. The chapter will de-
scribe the problem with reference to contemporary research on 
the subject; this will be followed by an outline of the compo-
nents of the strategy with exemplars from our own teaching 
experience. 
We argue that if we, as teachers, can create a safe space in 
which students can share their experiences of compassionate 
care, then we can begin to acknowledge our unique responses 
to what we experience. In doing so, we can begin to recognise 
(without prejudice) our own strengths and weaknesses in order 
that we can build unique resilience strategies that will improve 
our health and wellbeing.
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Context
The primary focus of the School of Health and Social Care 
at the University of Essex, which provides the context for this 
chapter, is in the delivery of pre-qualifying education to health 
and social care students. As such, the provision is externally 
scrutinised and validated by regulatory agencies as well as being 
monitored internally for academic quality. 
For the past three years we have delivered a module within 
the University of Essex Nursing Programme entitled ‘Deliver-
ing Compassionate Care as a Mental Health Nurse’. The mod-
ule is delivered simultaneously on the School’s two campuses 
at Colchester and Southend with Peter leading the module at 
Colchester and Edward at Southend. 
This module was specifically designed in 2016; it was a 
response to what we saw as a growing number of our students who 
completed the mental health nursing programme and either became 
quickly disillusioned with mental health nursing or negatively af-
fected by the stresses that being a mental health nurse in contempo-
rary services can engender. It is one of the first modules studied and 
is underpinned by our belief that students, first and foremost, must 
be cognisant of their own health and wellbeing before they can begin 
to understand and work with those in mental distress.
In designing the module we decided that we should not 
‘sugar coat’ the stresses that students would be required to 
manage both as student and future mental health nurse; it was 
important to us to offer a realistic view of working as a mental 
health nurse in the 21st century. 
The problem
Anecdotally we were aware from our own experience, 
from research (e.g. Freeburn and Sinclair, 2009) and vicariously 
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(from listening to our students), that working as a mental health 
nurse is challenging. The mental health nurse must balance the 
demands of people with whom they are working, the employ-
ing organisation and the UK regulatory body for nursing – the 
Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC). Alongside this task, 
they must also listen to their own ‘moral compass’ and act in a 
manner consistent with their own beliefs. 
The term ‘emotional labour’ (Hochschild 1983) implies that, 
to carry out people-facing jobs, the agent must present an ac-
ceptable public face; a face that may not reflect the underlying 
emotional state. So, we may be working with someone who is 
acutely disturbed and verbally abusive but, as a nurse, we must 
present a professional face in order to manage the situation de-
spite (potentially) experiencing fear for our own safety or being 
personally offended.
In order to manage such situations we need to be resilient. 
Over the last decade building resilience and an awareness of per-
sonal wellbeing has become embedded in the nursing curricu-
lum. 
Mental health nurses must have and value an awareness of their own 
mental health and wellbeing. They must also engage in reflection and 
supervision to explore the emotional impact on self of working in mental 
health; how personal values, beliefs and emotions impact on practice, and 
how their own practice aligns with mental health legislation, policy and 
values-based frameworks. (NMC, 2010 n.p.)
Approved education institutions, together with practice learning part-
ners, must ensure that all students: […] are provided with information 
and support which encourages them to take responsibility for their own 
mental and physical health and wellbeing. (NMC, 2018 n.p.)
The significance of including resilience in nursing curricu-
la reflects the growing awareness of the potential harm that un-
managed stress and poor resilience can cause to nurses in the 
pursuance of delivering compassionate care.
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In mental health nurse education stress amongst the stu-
dent population has been reported on numerous occasions (e.g. 
Galvin et al., 2015; Jones and Johnston, 2000). Freeburn and Sin-
clair (2009: 341) report that the stress experienced during mental 
health nurse training can, on occasions, have “… significant neg-
ative effects on health and wellbeing and on their personal and 
professional development”.
Tully (2004) used a questionnaire to explore the experiences 
of thirty-five psychiatric/mental health nursing students in Ire-
land. Comparable with other studies, student stress levels were 
found to increase through training. The study offers a number 
of insights into the degree and the sources of stress. Notably, 
however, students reporting higher levels of stress used coping 
mechanisms such as wishing things were better, drinking, smok-
ing, medication and comfort eating. Those reporting lower stress 
levels employed strategies which built resilience such as talking 
to others, actively seeking help and seeking to change the stress-
ful situation. Similar findings were reported in Jackson et al.’s 
(2007) literature review on resilience in nursing.
Turner and McCarthy (2017) undertook a review of the 
literature (2009 to 2015) with regard to intervention strategies 
employed to reduce stress and anxiety among nursing students. 
The authors identified twenty-six articles which they grouped 
into three areas (1) those reducing the number or intensity of 
the stressors (2) those focused on coping responses and (3) those 
which sought to reappraise the stressors. None of the studies 
were described by Turner and McCarthy (2017) as having strong 
methodological rigor and, they argued that, controlled trials 
were needed to gain a more precise understanding of the issues.
McAllister and McKinnon (2009), writing in an Australian 
context, reviewed literature in relation to resilience in nurse ed-
ucation. The paper lays out the importance of delivering an or-
ganised and visible preparation for resilience for students. Three 
strategies are outlined, which seem to help students build sus-
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tainable frameworks: identity building work; coping, capacity 
and strengths development; and learning leadership for change. 
In the context of Higher Education institutions and students 
in general, Grant and Kinman’s (2013) paper on developing emo-
tional resilience within the curriculum outlines the competencies 
that tutors should attempt to instil in our students. They present 
the competencies that underpin an ‘emotional curriculum’ and 
suggest that educators should: 
1. Enhance students reflective ability
2. Develop effective mentoring and peer coaching systems 
to enhance support
3. Encourage the use of mindfulness
4. Develop in students’ greater awareness of experiential 
learning. 
Such competencies, Grant and Kinman (2013) argue, are 
important to enhancing resilience in students training for the 
helping professions.
Heutagogy, the study of self-determined learning (Hase 
and Kenyon, 2000), has been explored by Canning and Callan 
(2010) who note that the development of emotional literacy is 
essential if students are to use past learning to influence cur-
rent and future learning. This is a challenge particular to mature 
learners who: 
• Lack confidence in ability across a range of study skills;
• have had little encouragement to have high academic or career ex-
pectations;
• mature students often torn between competing priorities for study 
and daily life;
• feel unsupported by peers in the workplace;
• have a negative self-image which is reinforced by lack of status, pay 
and recognition in the workforce. (Canning and Callan, 2010: 76)
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Our students closely match these characteristics being, 
predominantly, mature and often coming into higher education 
from non-traditional routes.
The literature suggests that stress is an unavoidable aspect 
of being a mental health nurse. If students are not taught strate-
gies to manage stress, their health and wellbeing are at risk. Fur-
thermore, they are unlikely to remain in mental health nursing 
which will further exacerbate the current nursing staff shortages 
in the NHS. Heutagogy may provide a structure to enhance resil-
ience. Consequently, we now explore how we facilitate the devel-
opment of resilience through the Compassionate Care module.
Creating the safe space
Developing Heutagogy meant creating a self-directed learning environ-
ment for students to discover their own strategies for learning. It consist-
ed of building confidence to actively participate to share their knowledge. 
(Canning, 2010: 59)
At the outset our purpose in designing and delivering 
the Compassionate Care module was to create, within the con-
straints, a self-determined learning space where students could 
take ownership of their learning. Brookfield (2103) describes this 
as ‘a process of democratisation of the classroom’ and argues 
that the learning space is divided into thirds: teacher controlled 
third; student controlled third; and teacher and student negoti-
ated third.
As teachers in a Higher Education institution, we were 
cognisant of our responsibilities in delivering a part of the cur-
riculum in a safe, effective and efficient manner (teacher third). 
At the same time, we wanted each student to reflect upon their 
experience of compassion and of being resilient, taking control of 
their own learning (student third). This space had to allow stu-
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dents to openly examine assumptions associated with their own 
culture, beliefs and past experience in relation to compassionate 
care and resilience (negotiated third). 
Treating the student cohort as a ‘group’ we co-constructed 
ground rules by which we would work together over the dura-
tion of the module. These ground rules were not static and were 
revisited throughout the module to keep them current as this 
random collection of people (the cohort) developed into a work-
ing group with all the shifting power dynamics that inevitably 
ensues.
The module begins with an examination of ‘Who am I?’. 
Leading by example, we (the authors) talked frankly about our 
backgrounds, critically examining our own strengths and weak-
nesses – our assumption being that, if we were to make a differ-
ence within the relatively short time available within the module, 
there could be no room for ‘masks’, as students must recognise 
that there is strength in acknowledging one’s own deficiencies.
A second thread of the first week is examining what causes 
individuals to experience disgust. This purposeful activity con-
cerned our need to help students to experience what Hochschild 
(1983) described as ‘surface’ and ‘deep acting’. Our experience is 
that students begin from a highly defended position “It is my job, 
I am not there to be disgusted or upset, I am there to do my job”. 
As tutors we facilitate discussion on disgust until students feel 
able to openly acknowledge that handling a ‘malodorous bowel 
movement’ or a ‘vibrant green sputum sample’ is certainly part 
of the job, but is also something which many may find disgusting 
even though professionally this may not be displayed facially. 
Through this experience students begin to understand, in prac-
tical terms, ‘surface’ and ‘deep’ acting in emotional labour; per-
haps, most importantly, they also learn that emotional labour is 
as exhausting as any other part of nursing work. 
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Compassion stories
Sharing our experiences of compassionate care
The recounting of individual compassion stories is funda-
mental to the teaching of the module. It is through these stories 
that students begin to take control of the learning space. 
In week one, leading by example, the session is tutor-led; 
thereafter, students volunteer to lead sessions by telling their 
own story. Each story tells of the lived experience of compas-
sion; such stories may be about being compassionate, receiv-
ing compassionate care or witnessing compassion. Hereafter, 
exemplars reflect the ‘nature’ of student contributions rather 
than the ‘detail’ of any single story. Students have recounted 
stories: 
• where they have been able to intervene and offer sup-
port to someone in need
• where they have been able to prevent abuse of a vulner-
able person
• where they have simply reached out in silence to hold 
the hand of someone in distress
• where the careful and sensitive delivery of an aspect of 
personal care has given someone a sense of hope.
Importantly, these are rarely stories of ‘fame and glory’; 
they are most often stories of everyday events which would have 
gone unnoticed without the opportunity to share them with oth-
ers – the ‘taken for granted’ emotional labour of nursing. 
Acknowledging our unique responses to our experiences
In the student-led sessions it is up to the student how they 
tell their story and how they manage the ensuing discussion. The 
role of the tutor is to help the student group as a whole to ap-
preciate that, whilst each story is unique, each is underpinned 
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by principles which can be understood through theory and re-
search. For example:
• When a student talked of sitting holding the hand of an 
elderly person, in terminal stages of illness, and just be-
ing silent – we might explore this through the concept 
of ‘silent immersion’ (Parse, 1998).
• When a student talked of trying to ascertain from a 
terrified person experiencing auditory hallucinations 
what they could do to make it less terrifying – we might 
explore this through Barker’s Personal Security Plan 
(Barker and Buchannan-Barker, 2005: 95).
• When a student talked of a felt need to help a young 
person who was self-harming because they understood, 
having been there themselves – we might explore this 
through the concept of ‘wounded healer’ (Nouwen, 
1994). 
It would, perhaps, be easier to move to a more teacher-
-centred approach and deliver a lecture on ‘silent immersion’ 
or ‘wounded healers’, but this would risk rendering the subject 
dry and theoretical. By bringing theoretical understanding to the 
lived experience of compassion we retain the human dimension, 
and students can experience, for example, ‘silent immersion’ as a 
live account of a lived experience. 
The interpretation of each compassion story becomes a 
form of coaching which could be described as ‘joint experimen-
tation’ (Schön, 1987). As tutors we do not know what the story 
will be about so we have to listen and try out ideas through clar-
ification with the storyteller, whilst taking account of competing 
theoretical positions from the student group.
Through joint experimentation the group develops a sense 
of competence in interpreting and bringing theory to elucidate 
the exemplar. The freedom to explore the story offers a sense of 
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growing autonomy in the ability to construct arguments. It also 
powerfully establishes relatedness between the theory and prac-
tice on mental health nursing.
The challenge of assessing compassionate care
To enable us to assess student learning, we decided that, 
maintaining the perspective adopted throughout the module, 
we would turn the assignment back onto the student. Having 
observed the process and developed skills in making meaning 
from the compassion stories, the student is tasked with making 
meaning from their own unique personal experience.
Selecting the right story
The assignment requires the student to reflect on a per-
sonal experience of stress and distress experienced whilst in 
their practice placement (hospital ward, clinic, community 
mental health team and so on). Students will often talk about 
dramatic incidents from their practice, tales of aggressive or bi-
zarre behaviour; however assignments that discuss complexity 
and the reality of practice are equally powerful. The following 
narratives, whilst fabricated and as such rendered anonymous 
through pseudonyms, draw upon our experience of a number of 
student submissions for this module; it represents the power of 
such pieces of work to bring to the surface a form of existential 
crisis faced by many nurses.
Jay [a student mental health nurse] wrote about working intensively 
with Cal [a mental health service user] to prepare them for discharge 
from an in-patient unit following a psychotic episode. Jay wrote that they 
had been helping Cal to explore and practice ways in which they could 
keep themselves healthy and not resort to self-medicating with illegal 
substances. Cal had left the unit feeling very positive about the future 
and expressing gratitude to Jay for all their input.  
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Whilst Jay was still on placement, Cal had been re-admitted with a re-
currence of psychotic symptoms brought about, to some extent, by us-
ing non-prescription drugs. Jay met with their placement mentor where 
they were tearful and expressed dismay about what they described as the 
‘pointlessness of being mental health nurse’.
Jay had a supportive mentor who helped them to reframe the situation, 
helping them to understand that there are limits to the role of the mental 
health nurse and, ultimately, Cal was an individual who was entitled to 
make his own decisions about his own life.
Recognising (without prejudice) our own strengths and weak-
nesses
In the second part of the assignment students are asked to 
examine their own strengths and weaknesses in relation to the 
event. We ask the student to identify why they experienced emo-
tions such as fear, disgust or sadness in response to the incident 
they had outlined.
This is a demanding assessment requiring students not 
only to analyse their own experience, but be willing to surface, 
and expose, their own weaknesses to ‘public’ scrutiny. The as-
signment can only work when the student feels supported and 
in a safe environment where they will not be adversely judged.
Building unique resilience strategies
The third part of the assignment requires students to con-
struct an action plan for building their resilience should they be 
confronted with a similar situation. 
The action plan may relate to practical activities such as 
improving sleep hygiene; it may also concern invoking relax-
ation or mindfulness principles when confronted with stressful 
situations. Both plans may be effective in helping the student to 
construct strategies that will help them be more resilient in their 
future practice; importantly, the plan is a unique strategy written 
by the student for the student.
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Evaluation
Student ‘reaction’ to the module gauged through the Stu-
dent Assessment of Module Teaching (SAMT) has been very 
positive. From the narrative feedback students responded to the 
question “What did you like best about the module”:
Hearing everyone share their compassion stories – the lesson were struc-
tured, but didn’t seem too planned.
The module was taught in an interactive way, such as the compassionate 
care stories each week.
How it enabled me to examine myself, my values, insights ad attitudes 
about many things.
The module was empowering and I enjoyed every bit.
The positive reaction of students to module teaching 
and their engagement with the learning style becomes evi-
dent through the quality of the assignment submissions. In 
our experience to date, students have presented work which is 
academically sound and which evidences their ability to write in 
an open and creative manner. 
An improved state of health and wellbeing
Nobody escapes being wounded. We are all wounded people, whether 
physically, emotionally, mentally, or spiritually. The main question is 
not ‘How can we hide our wounds?’ so we don’t have to be embarrassed, 
but ‘How can we put our woundedness in the service of others?’. When 
our wounds cease to be a source of shame, and we become a source of 
healing, we have become wounded healers. (Nouwen, 1994)
Nurses, amongst others in the caring professions, all have 
lived experiences which impact daily on their ability to deliver 
compassionate care. Many will never notice or choose to give the 
time to examining the complex interplay between a nurse and a 
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patient within a caring event, described by Watson (1988) as the 
phenomenological field. Such endeavours may be perceived as 
uncomfortable, unimportant or an unaffordable indulgence.
It will require a longitudinal study to ascertain wheth-
er these students leave our HEI more equipped to manage the 
stresses and strains of practice; but as Jackson and colleagues 
note “… combating these adverse effects through minimising 
vulnerability and promoting resilience has the potential to im-
pact positively on nurses’ daily experience.” (Jackson et al., 2007: 
7).
Conclusion
In ‘Delivering Compassionate Care as a Mental Health 
Nurse’ we facilitate students to better understand their own 
identity through critically considering their unique responses to 
everyday scenarios. We have argued that, through the delivery 
of this module, the learning space is made available for students 
to build their resilience and, consequently, their ability to deliver 
compassionate care.
Through the module assignment students develop a strate-
gy which is unique to their own needs for resilience. Important-
ly, they can return to this strategy throughout the programme of 
study and into their future careers. We also encourage students 
to recognise that, by responding rationally and with resilience to 
stressful situations, each student becomes a leader in that envi-
ronment. 
As we have constructed this account of our journey in the 
development of ‘Delivering Compassionate Care as a Mental 
Health Nurse’, we have looked closely at the thinking that un-
derpinned the design module. We hope that our colleagues, and 
readers with an interest in developing resilience and compas-
sion, will draw from the account perspectives that may help de-
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velop their own teaching practice. Such perspectives, we believe, 
will help to better prepare students to deal with the stresses of 
working in contemporary health and social care services.
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6. Fifteen
Nileema Vaswani and Ilaria Boncori
Introduction
All of us are affected by bereavement, in different ways, 
and probably at multiple times in our lives. Experiencing be-
reavement can be challenging on a personal, psychological and 
social level. The manner in which we think about bereavement 
in the presence of ourselves, how we present our grief to others, 
and what we perceive is required by society of someone who is 
grieving, are often different. 
The process of grief is also heightened when the bereave-
ment upsets the natural order of life. The death of a baby is 
one such experience. An “out of order” experience brings with 
it traumas that are distinct from other types of bereavements. 
There are also few memories of that life-in-becoming to bring re-
lief during times of grief. Bereavement support, accessed formal-
ly through organisations, or informally through family, friends 
or employers, is critical for parents to enable them to grieve that 
death and continue to live their lives as they wish. In recognition 
of the needs of bereaved parents, there are a number of profes-
sionals and also national charities in the UK that specialise in 
supporting different types of loss, namely miscarriage, stillbirth, 
neonatal death and cot death. Sands is one such charity and it 
specialises in supporting families through stillbirth and neonatal 
death. 
This chapter briefly explores how understandings of be-
reavement grow and change, and considers more generally the 
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opportunities and challenges for those who work in bereave-
ment. We aim to offer some insight into the world of baby loss 
from the perspective of professionals who work in this envi-
ronment and those who may choose to access relevant support 
services. In order to do so, this contribution is enriched by the 
presentation of a reflective dialogue between the two authors, 
providing two different perspectives: a personal view on the first 
author’s work at Sands as Bereavement Support Services Manag-
er, and a commentary from the second author as a woman who 
has experienced and researched perinatal loss. The views and 
experiences shared in this chapter are the authors’ own and are 
not in any way representative of Sands or other professional be-
reavement support service providers.
Fifteen
Nileema: A few months ago if you had asked me what the number 15 
meant to me, I would have thought this a strange question. Had I an-
swered it, I might have said, “the middle of the month” or “a quarter 
or an hour”. I’m not actually sure at all what I would have said. Now, 
however, I have a clear answer. The number 15 has just one association 
for me: the number of babies who die before, during or shortly after birth 
every single day in the UK. 
Ilaria: Five. Five is more meaningful for me. That’s the age of my baby 
when they died. We had not yet been able to probe about in search of their 
gender, we had not seen the frantic fluttering of their heartbeat, we had 
not bought onesies, mittens, or teddy bears. Only five weeks; it wasn’t 
even a baby yet. Wasn’t it, though? They were for me. A baby is only 
really dignified with that status after 24 weeks, when their death is legal-
ly recognised as stillbirth. Otherwise, they are a miscarriage. 24: that’s 
another interesting number.
Published figures for 2017 show that 15 babies a day are 
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stillborn or die within four weeks of birth in the UK (Office for 
National Statistics, 2018). It is estimated that of these fifteen ba-
bies, nine are stillborn and six die as neonates (ibid.). In 2017, one 
in every 238 babies delivered in the UK was stillborn (ibid.). In 
2017, one in every 363 babies born in the UK died in the first four 
weeks of life (ibid.). Each year, one third of stillborn babies (ap-
proximately 1200 babies) die after a full-term pregnancy when 
a baby should otherwise have the greatest chance of survival 
(MBRRACE-UK, 2018). Every year, around 280 babies die at the 
end of pregnancy from an intrapartum-related event – that is, 
they start labour alive but die due to something that happened 
during labour (Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecolo-
gists, 2016). A recent enquiry found that eight out of ten of these 
deaths might have been prevented with better care (MBRRACE-
UK, 2016). For one out of four of these deaths, a hospital review 
to learn lessons either didn’t take place or was of unacceptably 
poor quality (Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, 
2016).
Working at Sands
Sands was set up in 1978 by Hazelanne Lewis and Bel 
Mooney, two bereaved mothers who noticed how inadequate 
support was for parents who had experienced the death of a 
baby. The charity has a national presence and has grown con-
siderably over the past 40 years. Sands aims to support anyone 
affected by the death of a baby, work with health professionals 
to improve bereavement care in hospitals and in the community, 
promote improvements in maternity care, and fund research to 
save babies’ lives.
The first author led a team that offers support at the front-
line by talking with parents over the helpline, offering email 
contact, facilitating peer support on the online community, pro-
Nileema Vaswani and Ilaria Boncori122
viding accessible information on the Bereavement Support App, 
developing ‘memory making’, creating print information and 
organising remembrance events. The wide range of support is 
intended to enable people to choose options that fit their indi-
vidual needs. As the team offers support to bereaved families 
during the day, 15 new bereaved families will be created. The 
cycle is relentless; the work is never-ending. The number 15 is as 
reliable as night and day. It is a hard fact to swallow, a fact that 
must be changed. 
Pregnant colleagues at Sands enter into a world of baby loss 
that contains more information than they would have had other-
wise. They are surrounded by a wealth of resources for bereaved 
parents. While everyone hopes that ‘one of our own’ won’t have 
to make use of any of these resources, sadly there is no immunity 
from loss for anyone. No one says this but everyone knows. In 
some sense, having this knowledge skews staff’s view of child-
birth and it is often not easy to remember all the healthy babies 
who are born every day.
Nileema: The innocence and joy created around pregnancy can be damp-
ened when working in a baby loss environment. During the commute 
to work, I notice pregnant women on the underground. At one time, I 
would make sure they had a seat or offered them mine; now, I find myself 
thinking “I hope your baby lives”. I find myself entering the world of a 
stranger in a way that I would not have done previously, simply because 
she is pregnant.
Ilaria: All of a sudden all you can see are pregnant women; they are 
everywhere in town, and there are babies playing hide and seek under 
their fluffy covers in cosy prams. Would my baby have looked anything 
like that? Would they have had my eyes, his lips, our shared cheekiness? I 
look at pregnant women speeding past behind the bus window; they walk 
slowly, caressing their bump, perhaps even being annoyed with back pain 
and swollen feet. Interestingly, I am not jealous of their motherhood, I am 
somewhat worried for them. ‘I hope you and your baby are safe. I hope 
you never lay awake at night, for hours, endless minutes, wondering if 
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you will ever be able to have another baby, if there is something wrong 
with your body, if it was really ever meant to be.’ 
In addition to Baby Loss Awareness Week, Sands organises 
two key remembrance events for parents every year: the Garden 
event held at the National Memorial Arboretum in Staffordshire 
every June, and the Lights of Love service held in December in 
London. These events are well attended and offer opportunities 
for collective grieving, understanding and hoping. There is an 
inherent tension between organising an event to enable parents 
to remember their babies in a collective space and the sad fact 
that such an event is necessary. Whilst the remembrance events 
at Sands provide a visual representation of this tension, the very 
existence of Sands speaks to this tension. 
Nileema: As proud as I am of our services and as rewarding as my job is, 
there is something terribly sad about any of this being necessary. The eti-
quette at these remembrance events is fascinating. A lady I had never met 
before started talking with me and within about 30 seconds asked, “Have 
you lost a baby?”. Many people assume that the only way to understand 
the experiences of a bereaved parent is to be a bereaved parent oneself. I 
do not know if this was her assumption but, if it was, she wouldn’t be 
alone. Sometimes, I believe, there is the assumption that if you work for a 
baby loss charity you have a direct or at least an extremely close personal 
experience to the death of a baby. Equally, if people believe that you don’t 
have this connection, there are a few who think that the quality of support 
offered by a “non-bereaved” member of staff would be inadequate. Some-
times staff who are not bereaved parents themselves feel the need to assert 
their connection to the death of a baby.
It is of course a myth that high quality support is exclu-
sively dependent on personal experience. No one who works in 
any of the caring professions would have the breadth of personal 
experience that is needed to match every professional scenario 
that they encounter. A counsellor would not be expected to have 
lived the lives of their clients to be able to offer them counselling, 
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and an Accidents and Emergency department doctor would not 
be expected to have been in a severe accident and nearly died 
to be able to help those in that position. Yet, there is something 
so emotive about support for baby loss that it often occupies a 
space that is fiercely restrictive. To question these assumptions 
and make the space more inclusive is an ongoing challenge. 
However, not everyone who does hold a connection to the death 
of a baby may feel able to announce this. Working in a baby loss 
environment might create the space for some people to be more 
expressive while, for others, it might feel too painful to let their 
colleagues know of this connection. It is important, therefore, 
to have an awareness not only of those colleagues who are be-
reaved by the death of a baby, but also of others who might well 
bear a similar connection. 
When personal and professional spaces overlap
Working in bereavement hour after hour, day after day, 
provides a connection with the subtlest of similarities. The sensi-
tivity that is developed towards those who seek help also creates 
a gateway for a further understanding of staff’s own experiences 
and an opportunity for unresolved emotions to rise to the sur-
face. As useful as this is, it can be immensely unsettling.
Nileema: The movement between one’s professional and personal spac-
es can be rapid. There I was making sure that the event was running 
smoothly, trying to offer support to those who needed it, and generally 
functioning very much in “work mode” when I found myself in a per-
sonal space. I was struck by how personal a question I had been asked 
and how it could only be passable, if that, at a remembrance event. The 
interface between oneself and bereavement is broader than having direct 
or indirect experience of the death of a baby. Working in bereavement can 
create the most unexpected triggers. When I started my current role, and 
given my experience as a counsellor, I mentally prepared myself for mem-
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ories of personal events that could be triggered. However, all the triggers 
that I have experienced have been unexpected. 
Where triggers are fresh rather than historical, there can be 
a tendency to compare one’s bereavement experience to that of 
the death of a baby and undermine the other experience. There is 
an unspoken language that the death of a baby is the worst pos-
sible experience anyone could have. It is certainly an extremely 
sad and traumatic experience, perhaps even the worst. However, 
there are numerous other traumas that need similar levels of 
support. Perhaps the baby loss space is so confined that it does 
not recognise with sufficient seriousness many other types of be-
reavement. These may be experienced by members of staff who 
then underestimate the impact of these bereavements on them-
selves because these do not ‘measure up’ to the standard of baby 
loss. The emotion attached to the premature loss of a life, rather 
than, for instance, that which is associated with someone who 
might have died of illnesses connected to their old age, is also 
significant. The latter is often seen as a death that fits the natural 
order of life: people grow old and die. However, the impact of 
any bereavement should not be underestimated both for those 
who seek and those who offer bereavement support.
Notwithstanding the triggers and the heightened aware-
ness that comes from working in bereavement, there is also a 
certain normalising and desensitising of the situation. For exam-
ple, working on post-mortem materials can, for the Bereavement 
Support Services team, sometimes feel like just work that needs 
to be done. For a few people from other departments, however, 
it could be distressing to see. As staff count memory boxes, edit 
resource on funeral arrangements, and then take lunch breaks, 
there is a certain ‘normal’ in their world. Everyone knows, 
though, that the death of a baby is not and should not be normal. 
It is hugely traumatic and, yet, to provide support to families 
who are bereaved, a work space must be created that is ‘normal’. 
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Experiencing perinatal loss
Experiencing perinatal loss can be a profoundly touching 
experience for all parents, whether the pregnancy was planned, 
desired, natural or occurring in different circumstances. Al-
though a number of charities are available to support those in 
need, parents who have not previously experienced or witnessed 
such events may be unaware of the support available to them in 
those circumstances. This is also due to the fact that miscarriage, 
abortion, death, illness and bodily processes are still treated not 
only as taboo at the social level, but also often within families 
and close communities. Organisations and workplaces often fail 
to offer specific support in terms of bereavement and perinatal 
loss, and also miss the opportunity to promote internal networks, 
public resources or free external services that staff could take ad-
vantage of in order to process and manage such difficult circum-
stances. However, many people choose not to report their loss 
in the workplace and hide it behind personal or sickness leave 
without publicly acknowledging the nature of their bereavement 
at work. 
Ilaria: I didn’t tell people to start with. I definitely did not want to talk to 
strangers about it, or even to my family. It is such a personal, intimate, 
emotional experience that I wanted to find my own way to deal with it. 
My way is writing, which I find cathartic and really the only effective 
way to deal with emotional challenges. I have been practising cathartic 
writing since I was a child. I shared that text about my miscarriage with 
a few people whom I thought would be able to understand it. Then I start-
ed mentioning the miscarriage to some colleagues and acquaintances. 
Surprisingly, men and women then shared stories of their own baby loss. 
Those statistics regarding the common nature of miscarriage suddenly 
became people, individuals with names and eyes, suddenly jumping out 
of spreadsheets and inhabiting real life. I wasn’t alone. But it’s rare for 
people in organisations to share this, even though there is no shame in 
bereavement. So why wasn’t I sharing my story? And so I did. 
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Losing a baby is something that happens in a nebulous 
domain suspended between the privacy of one’s organs and the 
public nature of one’s changing body. The loss is not just of a 
physical foetus, or a child, as it is also the loss and disintegration 
of possibilities, dreams, anxieties, nightmares, commitments, 
and consequences. Perinatal loss is challenging to deal with on 
many levels – physically, psychologically and emotionally. This 
is enacted at the individual, couple and collective level. Many 
people do not want to disclose this plurality to others who might 
be in their physical proximity at work and yet not in their inti-
mate emotional sphere. 
The use of language
It is worth pausing to look at language here. At Sands, ‘I lost 
my baby’ is a phrase that is taboo as it implies agency and blame, 
and Sands would not want any parent to feel responsible for the 
death of their baby. The word ‘died’ is more acceptable in terms 
of the organisation’s culture. The word is cold, harsh and yet 
true. It reflects something that happened rather than something 
that a parent did. While this approach recognises the feelings of 
loss, it focuses on helping parents recognise that they did nothing 
wrong. It is important to distinguish between ‘I lost’ as a point 
about agency, and ‘feelings of loss’ as a descriptor of what has 
gone. It has often been pointed out that one loses keys and not 
babies. The death of a baby is not an act of absent-mindedness or 
carelessness on the part of the parents. 
Nileema: I am reminded of Miss Prism from Oscar Wilde’s The Impor-
tance of Being Earnest. Miss Prism did lose a baby. She left the baby in 
a large handbag in the waiting room at London’s Victoria station. Miss 
Prism might have also lost her keys. She was absent-minded. However, 
she did not experience the death of a baby. I notice that I am careful to use 
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the word “died” not only at work but also in my personal life. While this 
might be more accurate, most of the people I speak with are used to lan-
guage that is softer and use terms such as “lost” and “passed away”. As 
much as this language might conform to social etiquette, I also see these 
phrases as coping strategies. Using softer language might delay pain and 
acceptance. For some, it is not possible to confront pain straight away; for 
others, they move into that space with less difficulty.
Ilaria: I thought very carefully about the use of language to describe what 
happened. The first words in the title of the article I wrote on perinatal 
loss in organisations are “I lost my baby today” (Boncori and Smith, 
2018). These are strong words to me, a slap in the face, a punch in my 
empty belly. I was only able to finish writing that article once my second 
baby was born, healthy and happy. I always think of her as my second 
baby, always remembering the first child I never had. For some reason, 
in my mind, they were a boy. There is also some statistic somewhere 
claiming that miscarriages tend to be correlated with male babies, but 
I am only going with my instinct. I know that they died, and it wasn’t 
my fault. I recognise the fairness in the language suggested as it lifts 
the weight of agency from my shoulders in terms of the biological end of 
a life. But that’s not all it was. To lose can mean to misplace, to fail, to 
evade or waste. Loss can also mean the detachment and the disappearing 
of something, a damage, a defeat, a deficit of something, or someone – not 
by accident, not from being absent-minded or forgetful. I literally lost a 
part of my flesh, it’s gone. I was permanently damaged in my soul by a 
deficiency that will never be compensated ever again. I lost some of that 
joy and carelessness I would have approached my second pregnancy with 
instead of obsessing over the baby’s health every single day. So, yes, I lost 
my baby that day.
Fighting against the taboo of baby loss is something that 
Sands has been engaging with for many years. One of its cam-
paigns, “Finding the Words”, focussed on helping people under-
stand what to say when a family member, friend or colleague has 
experienced the death of a baby. It highlights behaviours such as 
crossing the road to avoid a friend whose baby has died as negative 
behaviour, and encourages people to start talking by simply saying 
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“I’m so sorry”. This campaign not only raised awareness among 
those who were too afraid to talk, but it also helped more parents 
who had experienced this type of avoidance from friends and 
family to come forward and say that this is what had happened 
to them. The death of a baby should not be a subject that must be 
avoided; people need to acknowledge it and offer help if possible. 
Nileema: This campaign has made me think of how much or little I am 
able to talk about my work and whether I am playing into the same avoid-
ance by not sharing aspects of my work. There is a great deal of my work 
that is confidential, but I know that even what I would like to share with 
friends and family, simply because I am passionate about my job, is care-
fully edited. A colleague of mine told me once how they are careful about 
dinner party conversations as they do not want to scare their friends. I 
could understand this straight away as I have a parallel fear that I might 
upset my family and friends. 
Ilaria: I know, they are just trying to help and be supportive. I probably 
wouldn’t know what to say to a friend either. I cannot even remember 
what I said to my sister when it happened to her. Maybe just that I was 
sorry. People said “it was only five weeks, so that’s lucky”. Not quite the 
way I feel about it, but I understand logically that it would have been 
worse later on. They said “don’t worry, I am sure you’ll have other chil-
dren”. Well, they don’t know that I will, and that’s not the point anyway, 
is it? I wanted this baby. “It happens to one in three women”, they said. 
I know, I know, I know the stats, but it doesn’t make me feel any better 
now; I don’t care about others now, only about that little life that died 
prematurely in me and is never going to live outside of me. One of my 
friends looked me in the eyes stating “I am sorry, that’s really shit” and 
gave me a tight hug. And that was the only thing that really made sense 
to me.
Providing support for bereaved families
Bereavement support services help people acknowledge 
pain and process it in a way that is right for them. There is no 
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rush to move on and there is never an expectation that anyone 
should ever ‘get over’ the death of a baby. The specific bereave-
ment support model that Sands offers is evolving from a model 
where support is available as soon as someone needs it to one 
that considers more carefully when support should be available. 
On the one hand, a service that is ‘on tap’, as it were, is comfort-
ing and reassuring while, on the other hand, it carries a message 
that people should not process pain on their own and that it is 
only with the help of others that they can they heal from their 
traumas. The balance between availability and the creation of 
self-sufficiency would be the ultimate goal of that bereavement 
support model. 
Providing support entails understanding each person’s 
individual situation, entering their world, walking alongside 
them, appreciating what they need at that moment and on that 
day, and still ensuring that professionals are just a visitor to their 
world and do not start residing in it permanently. This interac-
tion could last five minutes, an hour, or anything in between. As 
soon as it is over, the process re-starts and preparations are made 
for the next email or the next phone call. There isn’t always time 
for staff to process what has just happened, causing a cumulative 
effect of holding numerous stories and experiences at the end of 
a shift. 
People access support for a wide variety of reasons. They 
might have been recently bereaved and need practical informa-
tion on post-mortems, funeral arrangements, or ‘memory mak-
ing’; they could be contacting a support organisation because of 
their baby’s anniversary, the impact of their baby’s death on their 
relationship, because they are concerned about their other chil-
dren, or for many other reasons. Bereavement and grieving can 
also result in anger. How anger manifests itself can depend on the 
medium of support being accessed. On the helpline, people can 
feel angry about their situation and the anger can be expressed 
through vulnerability; on the online platform, the anger is often 
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directed at what someone else has said and is louder, more ex-
pressive, hidden behind their anonymity and the anonymity of 
others. Staff who work on the helpline and the online communi-
ty need to be especially skilled at managing these different forms 
of anger from those who use these services. Families might also 
be, as one might expect, sad, distressed or confused.
The need for self-care and support for staff
It is easy to forget about oneself when providing support 
to others, and to notice that something is unravelling only when 
one reaches a breaking point. Sands encourages bereavement 
support staff to access external professional supervision; this is 
arranged by the employee and funded by the charity. In addition 
to this, staff are encouraged to be aware of the impact that their 
work is having on them, to debrief with colleagues and line man-
agers, and to learn to identify what they need when their work 
creates personal triggers. 
Where there is a specific event like a bereavement, in many 
other organisations, staff might be offered compassionate leave 
where they can focus on their critical life event and then enter 
a work-space that is bereavement-free. At Sands, staff would 
always re-enter a work space that is bereavement-focussed, so 
even those who do not work specifically in bereavement support 
within the organisation would still work in areas where there is a 
clear connection to the death of a baby. This type of environment 
would not then be able to provide a distraction or any respite 
for staff who wish to return to work after having experienced a 
bereavement as a way of taking themselves away from the on-
going activities and emotions of their home life. This is why the 
management of staff’s own grief through reflection and relation-
ships is crucial in order to be able to function in this professional 
environment.
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As professionals in this particular field of bereavement 
support, many staff also hold knowledge of grief theory, and it 
is possible that they see themselves at a point in their recovery 
which is frustratingly slow. There might be the risk of becom-
ing impatient with oneself, even though one would be patient 
with someone else in the same situation. Equally, understanding 
grief theory offers an insight and understanding that can enable 
someone to translate that to their own situation and thereby be 
more compassionate towards themselves. 
One of the most positive aspects of working in bereavement 
at a time when one is experiencing a personal bereavement, is 
that there is a level of empathy and understanding that one is un-
likely to find in most other places. This may be due to the nature 
of the work undertaken by the organisation, as well as because 
the culture of the organisation is such that staff are supported 
in ways that are specific to their needs. This is an approach that 
could be adopted in any type of work environment. Just as there 
is no formula for bereavement support for the families that con-
tact the charity, staff are also asked what their individual needs 
are to help them through difficult times. This could include time 
off, working from home, a phased return to work following a 
bereavement, flexible working, or a conversation with their line 
manager or a colleague. There are also designated bereavement 
support staff available to support colleagues in other depart-
ments. Such a personalised and flexible approach to staff can be 
incredibly powerful in terms of staff wellbeing, retention and 
performance.
Nileema: For me, even when I have chosen not to share details of a be-
reavement or a death anniversary at work, I have felt supported simply 
by knowing that if I did share my feelings and experiences, these would be 
understood. Staff support is not always about accessing different forms 
of support but simply knowing that these are available. Moreover, it is 
about the environment and just as much about what is unsaid as is about 
what is said. The culture here is a space where, whether I share personal 
6. fifteen 133
experiences or not, I still feel well supported. It is a space where care is 
offered and self-care is encouraged. 
Boundaries form an integral part of self-care. This means 
being able to recognise which emotional experiences belong to 
the member of staff and which pertain to others. It is also about 
identifying areas of overlap and exploring these at supervision. 
On a day-to-day basis, it is about making a determined effort to 
end work, at whatever time that might be, and do something 
specific as a wind-down activity. Neglecting to do so may re-
sult in negative effects not only on one’s personal life and mental 
wellbeing but also bring difficulties in being able to provide sup-
port to others.
Nileema: Understanding boundaries for me is also about recognising 
where my help is needed and wanted, and where I need to step back. I 
have noticed that since working in bereavement support I have felt the 
need to support certain people in my personal life perhaps more than I 
might have done otherwise. On reflection, these are people who are not 
necessarily close enough to me to want my help and yet something in me 
felt that I had to offer it. I have learnt that working in bereavement makes 
it hard to step back and it is therefore important to be aware of whether 
my help is actually wanted. 
The need for self-care does not mean that working in be-
reavement support services is a ‘sad job’, as is sometimes as-
sumed for those who choose to work in the field. However, it 
does mean that this is sometimes an emotionally challenging 
job, one that often requires people to ‘recharge’ to face an-
other day, create conscious spaces for reflection, and develop 
mechanisms for coping with that emotional labour. Enabling 
support is positive, rewarding, and can make staff immensely 
happy. 
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Conclusions
This chapter intended to present two varied, although not 
necessarily contradictory, perspectives on baby loss. We have 
presented the personal feelings of loss and the sensitivity around 
talking about baby loss for someone who has experienced the 
death of a baby. For a professional offering support, we have 
highlighted the importance of self-care and reflection, boundar-
ies, and the power of language. Where personal and professional 
spaces collide, we have explored how it is necessary to find a 
way for them to co-exist. 
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Part 2

7. The Disability Wage Gap: Economic 
 Literature, Theory and Measurement
Filippo Sinicato
Introduction
In this chapter, we first review the economic literature on 
wage discrimination, its causes and effects. We point to both pos-
itive and negative effects, including the negative effect of wage 
discrimination on the incentive to acquire skills. We then review 
the empirical work on the disability wage gap. While this is gen-
erally an under-researched area, the overall conclusion is that a 
significant wage gap exists. Furthermore, the gap cannot be ex-
plained fully by differences in productivity across disabled and 
non-disabled groups, and seems ‘stubborn’ in the face of legisla-
tion. We outline the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition as a method 
of studying the disability wage gap and apply this technique to 
a sample of males in the UK. We estimate that the portion of 
the wage gap that can be attributed to discrimination is between 
14% and 40%, depending on our specification. We conclude with 
some caveats on these findings and an appeal for further work.
Wage discrimination in the labour market has been brought 
into focus recently with discussions of the ‘gender wage gap’, 
‘age wage gap’ and ‘race wage gap’. These gaps refer to the dif-
ference across subgroups of the population in the amount of pay 
they receive for equal work. For instance, older workers or fe-
male workers or workers from certain ethnic groups might earn 
less in the same or similar occupation. 
Despite the fact that disabled people represent the largest 
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minority in the world, accounting for 15% of the global popu-
lation (World Health Organisation and World Bank, 2011:28), 
they have not been the focus of research on wage discrimination. 
As a result, a ‘disability wage gap’ is much harder to discuss or 
address based on existing analysis. Indeed, the first empirical 
analysis was carried out during the 1980s by Johnson and Lam-
brinos (1985), drawing academic attention to the situation of 
disabled workers. Since then, a number of countries have im-
plemented targeted laws to help disabled people better integrate 
into the labour market and the general social fabric. However, 
this academic work and the legislation associated with it ap-
peared relatively late compared to both race or gender wage gap 
analysis and legislation.
This paper reviews the economics literature to date on 
wage discrimination of disabled workers. We outline a struc-
tured approach to diagnosing the magnitude of wage discrimi-
nation and apply this approach to UK data on disabled workers 
as an illustration. While the work contains limitations, discussed 
in the conclusions, this analysis nonetheless provides an idea of 
the scale of the problem facing those with disabilities in the UK. 
For comparison, the figures in this work are not out of line with 
the level of wage discrimination detected for other groups, al-
though those literatures have shown that the magnitudes vary 
considerably across samples, countries, and time periods. Hence, 
we see that wage gaps, which we can potentially attribute to dis-
crimination, exist for a number of groups in similar magnitudes.
The theory: why do we observe discrimination?
Some, perhaps most notably Nelson and Winter (1982), 
have made an “evolutionary” argument that discrimination in 
the workplace should not persist in a competitive environment. 
Any firm that restricts its ability to hire the best workers for the 
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lowest cost will tend to be less efficient than a firm that recruits 
from the widest possible pool. Hence, a firm that discriminates 
should be less efficient than a firm that does not discriminate and 
so the discriminating firms should be the first to be ‘killed off’ by 
competition. This type of argument implies, then, that discrimi-
nation should be disappearing as a simple result of competition. 
Little direct policy action is necessary, other than ensuring that 
competition is free to operate. It ‘solves’ the problem of discrim-
ination on its own.
This is not what we observe, however. Casual observation 
suggests that there is widespread and persistent discrimination 
even in highly competitive economies. Becker (1971) provided 
a partial answer to this conundrum by postulating that wages 
are lower for discriminated groups because people have an aver-
sion – a distaste or a fear – of certain groups. As a result, people 
may have a ‘taste’ for discrimination in the sense of getting plea-
sure out of not associating with certain groups. This can make 
discriminatory workplaces more desirable for people and more 
functional, thus reversing the efficiency argument we have just 
made above. 
To see the implications of this theory for hiring and com-
pensation more clearly, we first must think that we experience 
the characteristics – such as skin colour or disability or personal-
ity – of our co-workers whenever we interact with them. If these 
characteristics are pleasing to us, we get pleasure out of the ex-
perience but, if they are not, we suffer. For example, a combat-
ive colleague can make everyday interactions a chore whereas a 
humorous or obliging colleague may make interactions a plea-
sure. Closer to our theme of discrimination, if working with an 
individual from a ‘disfavoured’ group feels unpleasant for a ‘fa-
voured’ group member, then workers from the ‘favoured’ group 
may demand a higher wage from the employer to tolerate a work 
environment that has a mixed population across favoured and 
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disfavoured groups. They may also avoid working with such 
people, making the team function less efficiently.
If the firm must pay a higher wage or must ‘work around’ 
any problems in team working, then this drives up the cost of 
production and so puts the firm at a competitive disadvantage 
compared to the alternative of avoiding hiring a mixed work-
force. Equally, this effect could lead to segregated workforces 
even within the same employer. For example, a firm that paints 
houses might construct each crew from a single sub-group. Of 
course, this in itself may not create a wage gap: we need an ad-
ditional effect on top of segregation to create lower pay for some 
sub-groups compared to others. For example, two crews may 
contain exclusively members of a single nationality (one Polish, 
one Spanish), but both groups could be paid the same wage for 
the same work. A second implication of this theory, however, is 
that consumers might be willing to pay more for products pro-
duced by firms that employ certain types of workers if consum-
ers, too, value interacting only with certain sub-populations. For 
example, customers may have a preference for buying products 
produced only by local workers. If there is a price premium for 
hiring from certain groups, this may result in firms’ discriminat-
ing or paying more for a favoured group of individuals where 
the price premium drives up margins despite the higher cost of 
hiring. 
As this source of discrimination is associated potential-
ly with higher profitability, normal competitive mechanisms 
in the market need not overturn it. Indeed, discrimination and 
competitive advantage go together in this second theory of dis-
crimination. Equally, discrimination is not necessarily bad: if all 
people prefer to associate with their own sub-group then per-
haps apartheid makes everyone happier and is consistent with 
maximising societal welfare. Hence, we have the evolutionary 
theory suggesting that discrimination is bad but should not be 
a direct policy concern and a taste-based theory suggesting that 
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discrimination should persist but is not necessarily detrimental 
to social welfare.
A third, contrasting, theory (see Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992) assumes that employers that cannot observe all the char-
acteristics of employees that may lead to high productivity. If 
they cannot readily judge who will be productive once hired, 
employers may resort to looking for observable ‘signs’ that are 
not important to productivity in themselves, but may indicate 
that a worker will be very productive once hired. For example, 
suppose that productivity in a particular role is correlated with 
some characteristic that is easy to observe but is not directly re-
lated to productivity itself such as height, gender, ethnicity, or 
disability. Suppose further that it is costly to find out whether 
a particular applicant is truly more able to perform the job. For 
example, this might require employing the worker for a period 
of time, observing productivity, and then undertaking a costly 
firing process if the worker did not turn out well. In such a case, 
the employer may hire only those with the observed ‘signal of 
success’. This can result in hiring only tall people or only people 
of a certain gender or ethnicity or without disability. It is a ratio-
nal response of employers if they believe that there is a strong 
enough correlation between the observed signal and success as 
an employee (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973; Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992). 
The implication of this ‘signalling’ theory is potentially 
quite damaging for disabled workers. If, for example, all firms 
screen in this way, then no disabled workers will be hired at all. 
As a result of facing no opportunity or incentive to obtain the 
skills they need to be productive, disabled individuals may not 
invest in skills in the first place: the investment would never pay 
off so it is rational for them to decline to invest. The resulting true 
difference in qualifications between disabled and non-disabled 
workers confirms the original discriminatory beliefs since all 
observed disabled workers will in reality now be relatively un-
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skilled compared to non-disabled workers. In other words, a 
perceived difference can lead to an actual difference in produc-
tivity as the disabled become discouraged so that the beliefs can 
be self-reinforcing. This final theory suggests that discrimination 
is a problem and also is persistent: it creates a disincentive to 
become productive and so potentially reduces the overall social 
welfare of society (and in particular the disabled workers).
Empirical work: is there wage discrimination against those 
with disabilities, and how much discrimination exists?
In data-based work, Metts (2004: 32) shows that lack of la-
bour force opportunities for those with disabilities could result 
in a loss of 1.71-2.23 trillion USD to global GDP. The magnitude 
of this figure is partly due to the loss per worker, but also is the 
result of the large number of workers in this group. Indeed, 
Jones (2016) shows that, for OECD countries alone, one in eight 
working age people is disabled. 
More sophisticated studies use the Blinder-Oaxaca decom-
position, explained below, to obtain a more precise estimate of 
the source of wage differentials. This technique was used in the 
Johnson and Lambrinos (1985) study, cited above, to show that 
in the USA and before the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was passed, 
wage discrimination accounted for about one third of the differ-
ence in wages between disabled and non-disabled males. 
Baldwin and Johnson (1994) traced the evolution of wage 
discrimination facing disabled males between 1972 and 1984 in 
the US and found little change over this time, with about 40% of 
the total differential in wages traceable to wage discrimination. 
Later work by Jones and Latreille (2010) made the further point 
that where regulations require employers to make reasonable 
accommodation for disabled employees, a fraction of the dis-
criminatory behaviour is traceable to effectively “charging” 
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disabled employees for the additional cost of these accommo-
dations.
These figures were repeated in broad strokes in a first study 
of the UK by Kidd et al. (2000). These authors used data from 
1996 to observe substantial differentials in wages and employ-
ment opportunities across disabled and non-disabled groups. 
One half of the total difference was due to differences in pro-
ductivity whereas the remaining portion could be attributed to 
discrimination. 
The effectiveness of legislation attempting to address wage 
differentials has also been investigated in structured data work. 
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) enhanced the 
protections of the earlier Rehabilitation Act in the US. Repeat-
ing their earlier analysis, Baldwin and Johnson (2000) used data 
from the 1990 Survey of Income and Program Participation to 
show a persistent and substantial unexplained wage difference 
compared to non-disabled workers. It also showed a notably 
lower probability of employment. Using data from 1986-1995 
that spanned the implementation of the new legislation, DeLeire 
(2000) show that disabled worker participation fell throughout 
the period, even though wages tended to remain stable. Later 
work by the same author (DeLeire, 2001) showed that the pas-
sage of the ADA did not reduce the estimate of the amount of 
the wage differential attributable to discrimination, although the 
amount of this discrimination cost was low at about 5-8% of the 
total wage differential. 
Finally, Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) found that employ-
ment of young disabled people aged 21-39 declined in absolute 
and relative terms with respect to the non-disabled, whereas 
for older people this did not change substantially. Longhi et al. 
(2012) conducted a similar more granular study, finding that the 
wage gap for those who suffer physical disability was smaller 
than for those who suffer mental disability. Finally, the effects of 
gender-based discrimination added to disability discrimination 
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can make the difference in wages more significant: Baldwin and 
Johnson (1995) and Jones et al. (2006) found that discrimination 
against disabled women was more significant than for men in 
the US and UK, respectively in their study periods. 
Overall, then, legislation appears to have had a modest ef-
fect on wage gaps over the short term. There also appears to be 
a decline in the gap over the longer term, at least for certain sub-
groups. 
Dissecting the Wage Gap: the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is a statistically based 
technique to study the composition of a wage differential. By 
splitting a data sample into two groups, in our case the disabled 
and the non-disabled, it divides any observed wage differential 
into components of productivity differences and potential dis-
crimination. 
More precisely, suppose that we correlate the wage of each 
individual with various individual characteristics, such as their 
disability, gender, education level or any other observable char-
acteristic that the researcher finds relevant. Then, a similar cor-
relation between wages and these characteristics across groups 
could potentially indicate a lack of discrimination. For example, 
if education is correlated with wages in a similar way across 
disabled and non-disabled groups, then one could take this as 
evidence that there is little discrimination: disabled and non-dis-
abled workers with similar educational backgrounds seem to 
be treated similarly by employers, at least as far as wages are 
concerned. Another way to think of this is that an investment 
in education by a disabled worker ‘pays off’ in a similar way to 
an investment by a non-disabled worker. On the other hand, if 
a given amount of education has a much larger impact on wag-
es for a non-disabled group than for a disabled group, then we 
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might take this as evidence of discrimination. In other words, if 
for some reason the same educational investment does not ‘pay 
off well’ for a disabled worker, then we might conclude that this 
is due to discrimination in the employment at the end of the ed-
ucational period. 
Hence, the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition breaks down the 
average wage gap across all disabled and non-disabled groups 
into two components. The first one includes all differences in 
education (implicitly assuming a similar effect of education on 
wages for both groups), while the second component represents 
the difference in impact of education on wages between a dis-
abled person and a non-disabled person. The first component is 
interpreted as the difference in wages due to a true difference in 
productivity, attributable to obtaining a higher or lower educa-
tional qualification (for example, a university degree or a high 
school degree). The second component is generally interpreted 
as the magnitude of the wage discrimination faced by workers. 
Hence, the first component measures the benefit of becoming 
more productive, while the second component is the difference 
in wages not attributable to productivity. This second compo-
nent can be thought of as “discrimination” since paying different 
wages for the same productivity and for the same task would 
normally not be an optimal choice for employers or workers in 
any economy where workers can move relatively easily across 
jobs and wages are posted. 
We need to exercise caution in this interpretation: the only 
thing that the decomposition can detect is the wage differential 
that is attributable to specific ‘explanations’ and then a second 
‘unexplained’ differential. This second component cannot be at-
tributed to any particular difference among the worker groups, 
such as education, but potentially also other factors that could 
be controlled for by the researcher such as age, region, sex, or 
other characteristics that were not measured. It could be due to 
discrimination, but equally could be due to a characteristic that 
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we have simply not observed. Hence, to draw a conclusion of 
discrimination, we must make a further assumption that the un-
explained difference is due to discrimination, even though we 
cannot show directly that discrimination is the culprit. Anoth-
er way to put this is that we assume that our specification was 
correct, and took into account all relevant factors. Returning to 
our example, more factors than just education can affect wages 
and productivity and so the decomposition would often include 
a wide set of worker characteristics. 
There is further debate concerning this technique that has 
to do with technical – but often important – niceties. For exam-
ple, if we analyse the wages only of those who are employed, 
we exclude from our analysis those who were discouraged. The 
total participation of a group will affect employment and invest-
ment decisions, so omitting the effect of non-participation on the 
activities of those who are active participants in the job market 
can be misleading. This defect can be corrected, at least in part, 
by including a second step in the analysis that describes the deci-
sion to participate in the job market at all. Usually, this is done by 
adding an equation that says that participation is more likely as 
the wage increases above a specified minimum that one would 
normally expect an individual with a given qualification or char-
acteristic to demand in order to search for a job at all. With this 
second element in the model describing the decision to look for 
a job, we have both the wage behaviour and the decision to work 
included in the analysis.
An application of the decomposition: is there wage discrimina-
tion against disabled males in the UK?
As an example of this analysis, we use the Blinder-Oaxaca 
technique to study up to date data drawn from the Understand-
ing Society dataset, which is part of the “British Household Panel 
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Survey” project (University of Essex, 2018). This is a representa-
tive longitudinal survey of the British Population that has been 
ongoing annually since 2009, which systematically traces chang-
es in the British population. Unfortunately, not all years have 
phrased their questions on disability in the same way, introduc-
ing some ambiguity in interpretation across time. Hence, this 
study will be based on the years 2009-2010, where a consistent 
terminology was used. Furthermore, the British Government 
enacted the Equality Act in late 2010, which should have affect-
ed behaviour. To keep a constant institutional environment, we 
use only the information collected before this passage. Clearly, 
behaviour may have changed in anticipation of the law, which 
may affect our results. Furthermore, comparing these results to 
later years could be informative as to the effect of the new law 
even though we do not attempt this extension. Finally, in order 
to reduce the heterogeneity of the population so as not to confuse 
the effects due to disability with those of other characteristics 
such as gender, we limit our study to males of standard work-
ing age (23-64 years old). Those with low work hours, those on 
long term sickness leave (and so unable to work), and the self-
employed are eliminated in order to avoid difficulty in compara-
bility across the sample.
With these restrictions in mind, we proceed with the analy-
sis. We classify the data into those with and without a disability 
by signalling the difference using a ‘dummy variable’. This is an 
indicator that takes a value 1 or 0 and allows us to classify the 
data into two distinct groups. We compare these groups to eval-
uate the wage gap, stratifying the sample by occupation so as to 
compare ‘like for like’ jobs. Furthermore, we compare those at 
the same age and job tenure so as not to confound the effects of 
being in a job longer with those of being disabled. For example, 
if we found a difference in wages but this was because most dis-
abled people were simply newer hires than non-disabled people, 
then we could wrongly attribute this difference to discrimination 
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instead of tenure. We also divide up the data by region of the UK, 
marital status of the employee, and some other demographic in-
formation to allow us to compare – to the extent possible – ‘like 
for like’ across disabled and non-disabled populations. The final 
sample contains 7088 observations, divided into 2087 disabled 
and 5001 non-disabled wage observations, respectively. 
We performed a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition on this data 
and analysed both cases with and without taking into account 
the effect of being employed at all. In our main specification, 
however, we find that the portion of the wage gap attributable 
to different endowments of characteristics (such as education) 
amounts to about a 4% differential, whereas the effect of the dis-
abled earning less for a given set of characteristics (possibly due 
to discrimination) amounts to about 3% as a maximum. Hence, 
of the total wage gap of 7%, about 40% may be due to discrimina-
tion in our analysis. The disabled appear to be less educated, in 
fact, compared to the non-disabled in the data as well as having 
a somewhat lower payoff to the education they receive. 
Conclusions
In this work, we have reviewed the explanations for why 
we should observe discrimination in the workplace. These vary 
widely from the relatively benign view that discrimination 
should disappear under evolutionary pressures to the view that 
discrimination may be positive for social welfare if it allows peo-
ple to enjoy the benefits of associating with whom they choose, 
to the view that there can be important negative social welfare 
consequences as the disabled become discouraged from achiev-
ing. Empirically, wage discrimination appears to exist for the 
disabled. As the disabled form a very large group, this adds up 
to a significant sum even if on an individual level the amount of 
discrimination may not be very large. Recent work has used the 
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Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to diagnose the degree to which 
discrimination rather than true differences in productivity can 
explain observed wage differentials. This paper explained the 
technique and applied it to recent data from the UK, finding that 
among males in ‘regular’ employment, between 14% and 40% 
of wage differentials could be attributable to discrimination de-
pending on whether unemployment as a labour market outcome 
is taken into account or not, respectively.
The technique is not by any means perfect. This method 
of diagnosing discrimination is not direct: we can explain away 
some wage differentials due to true differences in productivity 
across individuals. The unexplained portion is attributable to 
discrimination but could also be due to model mis-specification. 
Hence, our estimate of discrimination is potentially more severe 
than actual discrimination in the workplace. At the same time, 
we have to be aware that true differences in productivity can well 
result from discrimination in the workplace in a sort of vicious 
circle. Where workers perceive the payoff to an educational – or 
other – investment in their own productivity to be low, they will 
decline to invest, resulting in true (and explained in our analysis) 
differences in productivity for which a lower wage is justified. 
In this sense, the decomposition that we use underestimates the 
pernicious effect of discrimination on disfavoured groups.
Continued work on the methodology for dissecting the 
causes of wage differentials needs, then, to be honed in order 
for us to see the true extent of discrimination. Importantly, given 
the results to date on the effectiveness of legislation to correct 
discrimination in the workplace, further and more precise work 
is needed to better design legislation to address discrimination 
where it is both found and found to be a negative effect on social 
welfare. 
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8. Health and welfare decision-making 
 in mental capacity law
Jaime Lindsey 
Introduction
This essay explores the use of mental capacity law to em-
power and protect disabled people. The intervention of law in 
disabled peoples’ lives has been a persistent feature through-
out the years, and the intrusion and surveillance of the lives of 
disabled people continues today. However, in recent times, a 
greater focus has been placed on the empowerment of disabled 
people. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD), to which the UK is a signatory, sets 
out various rights for disabled people including equal recogni-
tion before the law (article 12), freedom from exploitation, vio-
lence and abuse (article 16), and the right to live independently 
and be included in the community (article 19). The change that 
has emerged under the influence of the CRPD has been to move 
away from substituted decision-making for people found to lack 
the mental capacity to make decisions, towards supported deci-
sion-making. This means that the person lacking capacity should 
not have decisions imposed on them in their best interests but 
should instead be given the support to make their own deci-
sion. How supported decision-making would be implemented 
in practice is not made clear within the CRPD. However, these 
issues are being discussed in socio-legal and disability scholar-
ship (Arstein-Kerslake and Flynn, 2017; Harding and Tascioglu, 
2017; Harding and Tascioglu, 2018). Despite the positive devel-
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opments resulting from the CRPD, substituted decision-making 
remains in English law and disabled people still routinely have 
their decisions overridden. 
This chapter considers one area of English law, the Men-
tal Capacity Act 2005 (MCA), which applies to people who are 
deemed unable to make decisions for themselves. I outline how 
mental capacity law applies to the lives of disabled people, ar-
guing that they are still often paternalistically prevented from 
making their own health and welfare decisions in the name of 
protection. In particular, I consider the way that the MCA has 
failed to promote decision-making by disabled people over their 
own health and wellbeing. Many scholars have argued that it 
is important to protect people from non-autonomous decisions 
about their health and welfare, particularly where those deci-
sions lead to exploitation or abuse (Herring, 2016; Kong, 2017). 
While I am instinctively sympathetic to this view and the need 
for protection, I suggest this should be done through support 
and empowerment rather than by overriding the choices of indi-
viduals. The essay starts with an accessible overview of mental 
capacity law for those who are not familiar with it. It then pro-
ceeds to a discussion of three important areas within the mental 
capacity law framework: decisions about healthcare, decisions 
about welfare and participation in decision-making. 
Overview of mental capacity law
Mental capacity law is an area of the civil law of England 
and Wales. It provides a legislative definition of when people 
lack the mental capacity to make decisions for themselves. As-
sessing whether or not a person has mental capacity means con-
sidering whether they have the necessary mental functioning, 
according to the criteria under the MCA, to make a particular 
decision about a particular matter at a particular time. Where 
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individuals are found to lack the capacity to make decisions, 
section 4 MCA requires that decisions are made on their behalf 
in their best interests. Yet before a best interests decision can be 
made, it is important to first establish that the person lacks the 
mental capacity to make that decision. 
Whether or not a person has the mental capacity to make 
a decision is determined by reference to section 2 and section 3 
MCA. Section 2(1) MCA states that:
a person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if at the material time he is 
unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter because of an 
impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain.
This means that the person must have some form of impair-
ment in their ability to make decisions, whether that be perma-
nent or temporary, lifelong or momentary. It is this feature of the 
law that is generally viewed as meaning that it predominantly 
applies to disabled people, more particularly those with cogni-
tive or mental health difficulties such as a learning disability or 
severe depression (Ruck Keene et al., 2017). However, the legisla-
tion does not single out disabled people. In fact, many cases re-
late to people with other categories of impairment, such as those 
in a minimally conscious state or with impaired mental function-
ing as a result of their own actions.1 The starting point, though, 
is the need for an impairment or disturbance in the functioning 
of the mind or brain and, therefore, in practice at least, the vast 
majority of cases in this context relate to adults with learning 
disabilities or mental health difficulties. 
The second part of the test for mental capacity comes under 
section 3 MCA. This test sets out that a person is unable to make 
1 See In re L (Vulnerable Adults with Capacity: Court’s Jurisdiction) [2012] 
EWCA Civ 253, Aintree University Hospitals Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 
67, In re M (An Adult) (Capacity: Consent to Sexual Relations) [2014] EWCA Civ 37, 
Kings College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v C [2015] EWCOP 80.
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a decision if they are unable to understand the information rele-
vant to the decision,2 unable to retain it3 or unable to use or weigh 
it to make the decision.4 There is a further requirement that the 
individual must be able to communicate their decision5 and have 
an appreciation of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of 
the decision.6 This is commonly referred to as a ‘functional test’ 
and looks at how the individual with the impairment actually 
makes the decision in question. For example, in cases concerning 
consent to medical treatment, the individual would have to un-
derstand information about the proposed treatment, such as the 
risks and alternatives. The more complex the decision, the higher 
the threshold for functional understanding.
These two tests together form the basis of decisions about 
whether an individual has mental capacity. The tests work to 
identify who has the ability to make their own decisions and 
whose decisions can be overridden in their best interests. The 
law takes a very clear stance that adults who have the requisite 
mental capacity to make the particular decision are allowed (and 
facilitated in many instances) to do so, even if that decision is 
deemed unwise.7 In contrast, for people who are found to lack 
the mental capacity to make decisions, they face the concerning 
prospect of having medical treatment forced against their wish-
es,8 being deprived of their liberty9 or being kept apart from their 
2 S 3 (1) (a) MCA.
3 S 3(1) (b) MCA.
4 S 3(1) (c) MCA.
5 S 3(1) (d) MCA.
6 s 3 (4) MCA
7 St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1999] Fam 26, Newcastle upon Tyne 
Hospitals Foundation Trust v LM [2014] EWCOP 454.
8 For example, as happened in A NHS Trust v K [2012] EWCOP 2922, 
Mental Health Trust v DD [2015] EWCOP 4, A University Hospital NHS Trust v CA 
[2016] EWCOP 51.
9 For example, see RB v Brighton and Hove Council [2014] EWCA Civ 561, N 
v A Local Authority [2016] EWCOP 47.
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intimate partner or spouse.10 As explored in more detail in the 
following section, the decisions that can be made under the MCA 
are wide-ranging. It is for this reason that an understanding of 
mental capacity law is so important; it can impact on everyone’s 
life at some point and intersects with many different areas of law 
and policy. A full analysis of every type of decision covered by 
the MCA is not possible here. Instead, I focus on decisions relat-
ing to health and welfare. This means decisions about medical 
treatment and general day to day life, such as where to live and 
who to see.
Decisions about healthcare
Healthcare decisions might include a person deciding that 
they wish to have a particular treatment or, more commonly, 
that they do not wish to undergo a particular medical treat-
ment. For example, in Wye Valley,11 Mr B, a 73-year-old man 
with a severely infected leg, refused to give consent to medi-
cal treatment which would have involved amputating his foot 
to save his life. Mr B had a history of paranoid schizophrenia, 
schizo-affective disorder, and diabetes, and he also had periph-
eral neuropathy which caused the problems in his feet. The 
healthcare professionals agreed that without the operation he 
would likely die but with it he would probably survive for a 
few years.12 The issue under the MCA concerned whether or 
not treatment was in Mr B’s best interests as he had been found 
to lack the mental capacity to make the decision himself. Sec-
tion 1(5) MCA states that “[a]n act done, or decision made, un-
10 For example, see The London Borough of Tower Hamlets v TB and SA [2014] 
EWCOP 53.
11 Wye Valley NHS Trust v B [2015] EWCOP 60.
12 Para 1. 
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der this Act for or on behalf of a person who lacks capacity 
must be done, or made, in his best interests.” This means that 
where a person is found to lack capacity, decisions can only 
be made on their behalf that are in their best interests. Factors 
that can be taken into account under the best interests test in-
clude all of the relevant circumstances such as “the person’s 
past and present wishes and feelings”,13 “the beliefs and values 
that would be likely to influence his decision if he had capaci-
ty”14 and “the other factors that he would be likely to consider 
if he were able to do so”.15 Therefore a person’s best interests go 
beyond solely their medical interests to include wider factors. 
For example, for many Jehovah Witnesses, their religious belief 
system means that they do not accept blood transfusions, even 
where it is medically necessary to save their life.16 These wider 
factors include the person’s wishes and their particular belief 
system, albeit a person’s wishes are not determinative of their 
best interests. This means that where a person lacks the mental 
capacity to make a decision, the court can order that treatment 
is carried out, even against the patient’s will, if the treatment is 
found to be in their best interests. This does not mean that the 
court will always order treatment against a person’s wishes, 
but in many cases they do.17
The Wye Valley case mentioned above went to the Court of 
Protection (CoP) for a decision about whether the doctors could 
proceed with the amputation. Cases should typically only go to 
court where there is some dispute or where it is a particularly 
13 S4(6)(a) MCA.
14 S4(6)(b) MCA.
15 S4(6)(c) MCA.
16 See for example Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals Foundation Trust v LM 
[2014] EWCOP 454.
17 As in the following cases, A NHS Trust v K [2012] EWCOP 2922, Mental 
Health Trust v DD [2015] EWCOP 4, A University Hospital NHS Trust v CA [2016] 
EWCOP 51.
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serious decision18 and therefore the vast majority of decisions 
about mental capacity will inevitably be made in the communi-
ty. In Wye Valley the court held that even though Mr B lacked the 
mental capacity to make the decision about his foot amputation, 
it was not in his best interests to have the amputation against 
his will. Therefore even though it was in Mr B’s medical best in-
terests to have the treatment, wider factors were taken into ac-
count, particularly Mr B’s expressed wishes and the impact of 
forcing treatment on a person against their will. The decision, 
that treatment could not be given to Mr B against his wishes, 
reinforces the importance of respecting someone’s clearly ex-
pressed views, even against medical advice. In this respect, pa-
tient autonomy appears to have prevailed over paternalism. The 
judge in Wye Valley stated that “[t]here is a difference between 
fighting on someone’s behalf and just fighting them. Enforcing 
treatment in this case would surely be the latter.”19 I agree with 
this analysis, and being able to make our own decisions about 
medical treatment is something that most of us take for granted. 
In fact, the MCA provides important and valuable protections 
for adults who want to make decisions for themselves. The MCA 
is underpinned by values of empowerment and clearly states at 
the start that “[a] person is not to be treated as unable to make a 
decision merely because he makes an unwise decision”.20 How-
ever, the interpretation and application of the MCA in practice 
can work against and restrict disabled people from making their 
own medical treatment decisions. This can be seen in the many 
more cases where medical treatment has been forced on adults 
against their wishes.21
18 Department for Constitutional Affairs. 2007. The Mental Capacity Act 
2005: Code of Practice. The Stationery Office: London, chapter eight. 
19 Para 45. 
20 S(1)(4) MCA.
21 At n 8.
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Decisions about welfare
Decisions can be made under the MCA about a person’s 
welfare as well as for healthcare treatment. Welfare decisions are 
some of the most varied under the MCA but often centre on is-
sues such as decisions about contact with family members or inti-
mate partners, decisions about where to live and decisions about 
day to day care (such as washing, cooking, help with shopping 
etc). This highlights the breadth and impact of the MCA. Welfare 
cases also include decisions about sexual relations, marriage and 
divorce. Under the MCA, if a person is found to lack capacity 
to marry, divorce or engage in sexual relations, a decision can-
not be made on their behalf in their best interests.22 Therefore 
any findings of incapacity in respect of these areas mean the 
individual in question is prevented from having any intimate 
relationships. This is understandable as it would seem inappro-
priate for a court to, for example, consent to sexual relations on 
someone’s behalf. However, there are problems with the current 
legal approach to these capacity domains, which have been con-
sidered in more detail elsewhere (Clough, 2014; Lindsey, 2016). 
Interestingly, and perhaps a feature of the nature of these dis-
putes, many of the cases that reach the CoP in this area involve 
allegations of abuse. That is, the nature of the capacity decision 
may concern sexual relations or care or contact, but the underly-
ing factual element of the case is often that there are allegations 
of abuse against the subject of the proceedings (Lindsey, 2019b). 
If abuse cases dominate welfare decisions in this area, then that 
may help to explain the paternalism within mental capacity law 
as there is a perceived need to protect victims of abuse. 
An example of a case in this category is WBC v Z.23 The 
case concerned a 20 year old woman, Ms Z, described as having 
22 S27 MCA. 
23 [2016] EWCOP 4.
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Asperger’s and a borderline learning disability. The local au-
thority brought the case to the CoP primarily for decisions as to 
whether Ms Z had capacity to decide on where to live, her care 
and her contact with others. Ms Z lived at home with her mother 
but wanted to live independently. She did not have a job but 
was undertaking music and performance exams. Ms Z was de-
scribed as taking “many risks in the past in the way she has lived 
her life”24 and “some of that risk-taking has probably caused her 
harm”.25 The local authority therefore appeared to be concerned 
about sexual exploitation and Z’s inability to keep herself safe 
from harm. Despite psychiatric evidence to the contrary, the 
CoP held that Ms Z did have the mental capacity to make the 
decisions in question. This meant that Z was not subject to any 
restrictions on her care, residence or contact with others, which 
would have been imposed had she been found to lack capac-
ity in those domains. However, she was likely still the subject 
of safeguarding investigations and, hopefully, ongoing support 
from the local authority. Whilst this is a relatively typical factual 
scenario in the welfare category, many cases have different out-
comes and lead to the individual’s decisions being overridden 
against their wishes. 
Another similar welfare case is Manchester City Council v 
LC.26 The case concerned a 23 year old woman, Ms LC, described 
as having significant learning disabilities and Autism Spectrum 
Disorder. The case at the CoP had a lengthy history which I will 
not go into here. However, in the judgment Ms LC is described 
as having an “obsessional interest which was sexual in motiva-
tion in relation to men. This it requires to be said, in unambigu-
ous terms, is a feature of her Autism.”27 Again, the case appears 
24 Para 2.
25 Para 2.
26 [2018] EWCOP 30.
27 Para 3. 
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to have been brought by the local authority because of these 
concerns about sexual harm and exploitation, highlighting that 
allegations of abuse are at the heart of many of the welfare cas-
es under the MCA. An earlier decision of the judge in the case, 
Jackson J, found that Ms LC had capacity to engage in sexual 
relations, marry and make decisions in relation to contraception. 
However, he also found that Ms LC lacked capacity to conduct 
the proceedings, make decisions on her contact with men, make 
decisions about care and residence, make decisions as to whether 
to enter or terminate a tenancy and decide whether or not she 
should access mobile phones or social networking sites.28 The 
range and specificity of capacity domains covered in this case 
reflects the breadth of the MCA’s welfare jurisdiction and the ex-
tent to which it can lead to control being exerted by professionals 
over the lives of disabled people. It also highlights a common 
outcome in mental capacity law welfare cases – that individuals 
are often found to have the capacity to make decisions about sex-
ual relations and marriage, but are found to lack capacity in oth-
er areas, such as capacity to decide on contact with others. This 
means that the individual’s relationships can still be monitored 
and restricted by professionals, even though they have capacity 
to engage in sexual relations.
This tension within the law is problematic for disability 
rights. On the one hand, a person is found to have sufficient un-
derstanding of what sexual and marital relationships involve 
such that they should be able to pursue intimate relationships 
like any other adult in society. On the other, that same person 
can be found to lack the capacity to decide on contact with other 
people, such that their relationships (sexual or otherwise) with 
particular individuals can be monitored and, ultimately, pro-
28 In the hearing that underpinned this judgment, there were no formal 
findings regarding LC’s capacity. However, the decision is included here to 
highlight the findings because the previous judgments were unreported. 
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hibited. Tensions such as these highlight that the welfare juris-
diction of the CoP can be regarded as being highly restrictive 
of individual decision-making. Even in cases where a person is 
found to have the mental capacity to make particular decisions, 
their incapacity in other areas can lead to their decisions being 
constrained by others. 
Participation in decision-making 
The final issue within the MCA decision-making frame-
work that I discuss here is participation. This typically means 
some level of involvement in the decision-making process. Par-
ticipation in this context might include being involved in and 
consulted on the decision in question from an early stage, be-
ing asked to give evidence either to a professional or the court, 
writing a statement or attending court and speaking to the judge 
directly. Participation by the person who will be affected by the 
capacity decision is essential. The long held view of disability 
rights activists has been that there should be “nothing about us 
without us” (Charlton, 1998). Yet, in many ways, this does not 
seem to have been the experience of disabled people under the 
jurisdiction of the MCA. For example, a recent report on pro-
posed changes to the MCA commissioned by a Disabled Peoples’ 
Organisation, Inclusion London, found that disabled people do 
value the right “to have decision-making autonomy” and advo-
cacy is a key element of that right (Loomes, 2019:3). Yet there 
was a stark contrast in their findings between disabled people 
who responded to the research and non-disabled respondents. 
For example:
For Disabled respondents, the right to be supported to make their own 
decisions is unequivocal. Their responses demonstrate a strong attach-
ment to this right […].
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The contrast presented in the responses of non-Disabled supporters is of 
concern. In particular, the degree to which they represent equivocation 
regarding the rights of individuals to access decision-making autonomy 
[…]. (Loomes, 2019: 10-11)
Therefore if disabled people, who are most often impact-
ed by the MCA, view participation in decision-making as a 
right to which they have a strong attachment, then there is a 
strong case for participation by the subject of mental capacity 
law proceedings (typically referred to as ”P”). However, if their 
non-disabled supporters are less attuned to this right, it may 
lead to a failure to facilitate participation in practice. This is 
confirmed by evidence from two recent studies regarding par-
ticipation in the CoP, which suggest that P rarely participates 
(Series, Fennell and Doughty, 2017; Lindsey, 2019). This lack of 
participation often comes as a surprise to people. Partly, I think, 
because in most other areas of law the person affected by the 
proceedings does routinely participate. In criminal law, for ex-
ample, it is extremely rare for the Defendant to be absent from 
proceedings as it their participation is seen to be fundamentally 
linked to their right to a fair trial (Lindsey, 2019). Similarly, in 
family law proceedings there has been an increasing movement 
towards participation across the board (Brammer and Cooper, 
2011). Yet, within the CoP, P almost never gives witness evi-
dence in proceedings.
Furthermore, P rarely participates in other more informal 
ways, such as by attending court. P’s participation is primarily 
secured through having legal representation, albeit this does not 
always take place (Green, 2016). While having a legal represent-
ative is extremely important, and litigants have suffered in other 
areas of law where legal aid has been cut, it misses a fundamen-
tal part of justice: the need for the judge to see the person about 
whom they are making a decision. These cases, as highlighted 
above, involve life and death medical treatment decisions, the 
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ability to deprive someone of their liberty and the possibility of 
preventing a person from having sexual (or any form of) contact 
with their husband or wife. If any area of law requires the judge 
to face the person who will be affected by their decision, I sug-
gest it is mental capacity law. This is particularly so given the 
serious consequences of decisions that a person lacks capacity. 
Elsewhere I have suggested ways that participation in CoP 
cases might be improved (Lindsey, 2019). These include legal 
changes such as amending the CoP procedure rules to include 
a presumption that P gives evidence in cases that reach the 
court. Additionally, greater funding and availability of special 
measures would be an important step forward in facilitating 
participation. Special measures include things such as allowing 
P to attend court before any hearing through a familiarisation 
visit or allowing P to give evidence remotely via video link. Of 
course, a broader change is needed in social attitudes to fully 
incorporate disabled people into society and ensure that they are 
able to participate in decisions that fundamentally have the po-
tential to change the course of their lives. However, at the very 
least, I suggest the law has a duty to facilitate their participation. 
Concluding Remarks
This chapter has provided an overview of mental capacity 
law in England and given an insight into how health and wel-
fare cases are dealt with in the CoP. As has been emphasised 
throughout, many health and welfare CoP cases involve adults 
with learning disabilities and mental health difficulties, despite 
there being no specific medical criteria in that regard under the 
MCA. The essay has aimed to highlight the jurisdiction of the 
MCA and how it applies to disabled people. That is not to sug-
gest that decisions should never be made on a person’s behalf. 
There may be instances where there is necessary, for example 
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where they are minimally conscious. However, I have highlight-
ed some of the challenges with a paternalistic approach that al-
lows the decisions of adults to be overridden.
Empowering individuals affected by mental capacity law to 
make their own decisions may not be easy. Legal change is grad-
ually taking place, particularly with the impact of the CRPD. 
However, attitudinal change towards disability is also required. 
To some extent this means that professionals, whether social 
workers, doctors, nurses, police, will need to get used to provid-
ing support and allowing “unwise” decisions to be made. That 
does not mean that people should be left unsupported and un-
safe, but that attempts should be made to engage with and iden-
tify the support needs of that individual rather than forcing them 
down a particular route through substituted decision-making. 
While many of us take the advice of others when making health 
and welfare decisions, we do so in the expectation that when 
something is important to us, or does not fit with our values, we 
can say no and pursue our own life goals. The aim of this chapter 
has been to highlight that this is not always the case for people 
subject to the MCA. 
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9. Questioning the patient participation 
 imperative
Ewen Speed, Susan McPherson and Peter Beresford
Introduction
In the respective worlds of healthcare research and health-
care provision, an insistence on Patient and Public Involvement 
(PPI) is ubiquitous. Numerous national policy documents in the 
last ten to fifteen years have stated and restated the legal obli-
gation for health and local authority commissioning bodies and 
service providers to involve patients and members of the public 
in the design and delivery of care. This is now commonly re-
ferred to as PPI and encompasses the involvement of family, car-
ers and anyone who might use health and social care services, 
and public health services. The 2007 Local Government and Pub-
lic Involvement in Health Act (n.p.) established a legal obliga-
tion for every local authority to make “contractual arrangements 
for the purpose of ensuring that there are means by which [PPI] 
can be carried on in the area”. This included the requirement for 
“promoting, and supporting, the involvement of people in the 
commissioning, provision and scrutiny of local care services”. 
Similarly, the National Health Service (NHS) constitution sets 
out PPI as a right of patients to be involved in decisions about 
their own care as well as in the design and delivery of services, 
and is at the core of key health legislation (Department of Health, 
2007; HM Government, 1983, 2005). In this vein, the 2010 White 
Paper Liberating the NHS (Lansley, 2010), the policy document 
that underpinned the 2012 Health and Social Care Act, estab-
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lished HealthWatch, a ‘consumer champion’ with a statutory re-
mit to ensure PPI occurs locally and nationally.
As such, in a myriad of ways, throughout the UK health-
care system, across NHS bodies and others, such as the National 
Institute of Health and Care Excellence (NICE), PPI has been in-
corporated in a formal way into structures and decision making 
processes. The patient and public participation policy for NHS 
England states that PPI should be incorporated into aspects of 
governance, clinical strategy and management (NHS England, 
2017). For example, Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) 
must now have PPI members acting as full members. Similarly, 
NHS Trusts usually have PPI groups who are involved in board 
level work and feed into service development at various levels of 
the organisation. 
In the context of healthcare research, this PPI imperative 
is evidenced in the requirement that anyone applying for Na-
tional Institute of Health Research (NIHR) funding is required 
to demonstrate, in their application, that their proposed project 
meets a set of stated PPI criteria, which are purportedly designed 
to ensure that patient and carer voices are included and consult-
ed in any funded research project. The NIHR is the state-funded 
body which commissions health-related research. Across the nu-
merous NIHR funding panels, there were 50 lay members dur-
ing 2016/17 and 187 lay individuals were involved in reviewing 
applications (NIHR, 2017). Similarly, all NICE Guideline Com-
mittees have a minimum of two lay members who can “provide 
a lay point of view”; NICE also has a “Citizens Council” of 30 
members to give views on “moral or ethical questions important 
to NICE” (NICE, 2013, n.p.). In addition, some medical publica-
tions, such as the British Medical Journal (BMJ) now require all 
submitting authors to report on the extent of PPI in all articles 
submitted for publication (Wicks et al., 2018). 
On the face of it, this expansion of patient and public voice 
appears to be a positive development. However, this expansion 
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is not universally endorsed or applauded and there are a num-
ber of reasons why. In this chapter we address some of the main 
components of a critique of PPI which concern the nature of the 
political imperative for PPI; the potential for tokenism; and the 
tendency of PPI in its dominant technical manifestations to exac-
erbate rather than reduce the marginalisation of disadvantaged 
groups in society.
Questioning the participation imperative
Underpinning the drive for PPI is a prevailing orthodoxy 
that encumbers western democracies, all typically seen to be la-
bouring under a democratic deficit (Norris, 2011; Madden and 
Speed, 2017). Purportedly, as the rise of PPI shows, there is a 
perception that an increase in levels of public participation in 
public life and decision-making will improve the public services 
that are available. This begs a question (perhaps best left unan-
swered) as to whether increased suffrage in the UK has led to 
more representative democracy. The act of giving someone a 
voice (or a vote) is not the same thing as acting upon what that 
voice says. 
The embedding of PPI in the UK healthcare context has to be 
regarded as part of a wider ‘participatory shift’ in policy which 
encourages citizens to participate in democratic decision-making 
by actively contributing as partners, collaborators and consultees 
in political processes (Petersen and Lupton, 1996). This crosses 
over into a wider political context (national and internation-
al), marked by shifts toward models of new public governance 
which push involvement toward a more consumerist model, “in 
which the relationship is between the layperson and a particular 
service or organisation” (Taylor, 2007: 100-101). This move is of-
ten legitimated by concomitant shifts which regard “people as 
citizens with rights to receive public services and responsibilities 
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to be involved in their development and accountability” (ibid.). 
This ‘rights and responsibilities’ trope is redolent of New Labour 
social policy. Frequently, this appeal to public participation is 
dressed up in rhetoric around increased accountability, and, af-
ter Hirschman (1970), questions of ‘voice’ and ‘choice’. That is to 
say, the appeal to PPI is often couched in assertions that this will 
make ‘wasteful’ professionals more accountable to the taxpayers 
who are making the provision of the service possible. This false 
equivalence between publics and paymasters is one that more 
ultimately appears to suit politicians looking for a stick to hit the 
professions with, than it does any members of the public (see 
Speed, 2018). 
This would suggest that a powerful critique of PPI as policy is 
that it functions to mobilise patients (or more specifically, patient 
expectations) as a means of constraining the professions. In this 
respect, PPI functions as a means of moderating the power of pro-
fessionals in the dynamic between government and doctors. Salter 
(2004) identifies a triangle of mutual benefit which acts to offset the 
expectations of constituent actors (e.g. the government, the med-
ical profession and the public). The public expectation that gov-
ernment provide a population-level of healthcare provision is met 
through a mutually beneficial contract between government and 
the professions, whereby the professions are granted autonomy 
in return for providing population healthcare. In turn this keeps 
the public happy. Recent changes in policy, such as payment by 
results, and the push towards patient-centred medicine, have cor-
responded with an attempt by government to inveigle its way into 
the perceived trusted relation between the public and the medical 
profession. This can be evidenced in the dominance of New Public 
Management-derived command and control metrics, coupled to a 
rhetoric around wasteful professions. These were developed from 
the 1980s as an approach to running public service organisations 
based on a commitment to private sector ideology, premised on 
the idea of making public service more ‘business-like’.
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These dynamics between professionals, the public and the 
state have a complex history in the UK relating to the status of 
medicine as a state function (versus medicine as a private func-
tion) and the role of medical compulsion, for example state vac-
cination programmes (see Durbach, 2005). Up to and even after 
the 1858 Medical Act, which outlawed unqualified doctors, med-
ical professionals competed for their livelihood with heterodox 
practitioners such as herbalists. The public were (and to some 
extent still are) amenable to a variety of theories about health 
and illness and tended to distrust state intervention. The British 
Medical Association (BMA) became increasingly protectionist in 
the early twentieth century in a drive to reduce the influence of 
heterodox practitioners (denigrated as ‘quacks’) and to draw a 
boundary around what constituted acceptable medicine. This 
involved, among other strategies, public education on scientific 
principles (Weatherall, 1996). At that time, doctors and the pub-
lic alike distrusted any proposals for state-funded health pro-
grammes as the idea was associated with military-style dictator-
ship designed to curb public freedoms; a hangover from British 
military medical compulsions imposed on soldiers conscripted 
during World War One. A proposal for a fully-funded state ser-
vice put forward by the Minister for Health in 1920 was round-
ly mocked and dismissed by professionals and media alike (see 
The Times, 24 November 1920). But when the BMA realised that 
state-funded programmes would employ many of its members 
and provide a good source of work for BMA members to the 
exclusion of the herbalists, they were more enthusiastic. This 
meant that the BMA relinquished its opposition to a state-fund-
ed service for the treatment of sexually transmitted diseases, and 
later to maternity and infant health centres, which emerged in 
Labour-run councils in the 1930s (Evans, 1992). A growing and 
gradual acceptance of the need for a role for the state in terms of 
the provision of medical care was evidenced in the 1948 estab-
lishment of the National Health Service; but tensions between 
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this triumvirate (the individual, the state and the medical pro-
fession) over who had responsibility for what, in terms of our 
bodies (and minds – for example, psychiatry) has remained. As 
in any triumvirate, the risk for the public and patients is that 
rather than having an equal share of power, their voice is used 
as a pawn in a bilateral power struggle between the two more 
powerful organisations.
Tokenism
This leads us to the issue of tokenism, where people are 
typically offered a say in proceedings, but where their voice 
is not necessarily listened to. Issues of power dynamics and 
identity are at the heart of recent criticism that PPI has tend-
ed to be tokenistic and has failed to allow full democratic en-
gagement of service users (Madden and Speed, 2017; Abahney 
et al., 2018). 
In spite of a comprehensive strategy for involvement of lay 
people in NIHR processes (NIHR, 2017), the net result of these 
policies means that the role of lay people remains largely circum-
scribed to what are deemed to be lay matters. Similarly, the role 
of lay persons on NICE committees tends to be focused on lay 
issues. NICE offers a number of clinical guidelines, comprised 
of current best international evidence for the treatment of spe-
cific conditions. These guidelines are intermittently updated, to 
take account of new or emergent evidence. This was the case for 
NICE depression guidelines in 2018. In terms of lay involvement 
in the drafting of the new guidelines, the role of lay persons 
was described as “providing advice on outcomes most relevant 
to service users and carers, helping to ensure that the evidence 
addressed their views and preferences, highlighting sensitive is-
sues and terminology relevant to the guideline, and bringing ser-
vice user research to the attention of the Guideline Committee” 
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(NICE, 2018, n.p.). The task of systematically identifying, assess-
ing and synthesising ‘scientific’ evidence for NICE guidelines 
falls to guideline developers who work in teams with significant 
resources and skills allocated to the task; this information is then 
fed into the guideline committees. This sits in stark contrast to 
the notion that two or three lay individuals on a committee be-
come alone responsible for drawing alternative forms of expe-
riential knowledge to the attention of the rest of the committee. 
There is a clear hierarchy in terms of types of knowledge and 
differential functions and roles of committee members. Where 
publishing requirements are concerned, as in the example of the 
BMJ noted earlier, the author requirement is merely to make a 
statement about PPI, not to have given it serious consideration or 
actually undertaken any. A statement could simply read ‘there 
were no patients or members of the public involved in producing 
this article’.
Tokenism can play out particularly in the context of PPI in 
mental healthcare. For example, Hodge (2005) examined a small-
scale implementation of top-down PPI policy by analysing the 
discourse of members of a mental health service user forum in an 
English city. The case study examined the extent to which it was 
possible for patient contributions to forum discussions to have 
equal value in the context of an existing power differential. While 
the forum membership represented a range of service users, the 
forum itself was instigated by and supported by the more pow-
erful mental health agency. Because professionals were present, 
typically the participants were construed as having less ‘com-
petence’ in relation to the professional experts. This highlights 
something that service users identify as a key issue, and draws 
attention to the difference between PPI as a system-led policy 
and a grassroots user empowerment movement driven by and 
from within the community. A review of PPI practices in men-
tal healthcare (Storm and Edwards, 2012) found barriers to PPI 
were characterised by concerns about capacity and severity of 
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illness, and questions around particular prejudices of staff about 
the capacity of patients identified as psychotic or aggressive to 
be involved in care decisions.
Issues of power differentials are reiterated by McDaid 
(2009), examining service user participation in advisory com-
mittees in Ireland. She highlighted the inequality intrinsic in 
professional-service user relationships and noted that structural 
disadvantages need to be addressed to facilitate more meaning-
ful participation; participation will not of its own accord break 
down structural inequality and may in fact reinforce it. Token-
ism in PPI might therefore be seen as a symptom of the under-
lying political imperative which is more concerned with limiting 
the power of professionals than increasing the power of patients 
and the public. It might also be seen as a potential cause of those 
instances where PPI tends to mirror and even exacerbate existing 
structural inequalities.
Mirroring marginalisation
As noted earlier, asking whether democracy has become 
more representative as a result of PPI offers only a limited per-
spective on the field. Another critical question is about what im-
pact this increased representation has on people experiencing 
inequality and disadvantage. For example, have increased op-
portunities for voice functioned to move people out of a margin-
al position, where they are more empowered and more able to 
participate in civil society? 
In 2018, the NIHR published a review of progress in their 
efforts to develop and implement public involvement in research 
(Staniszewska et al., 2018). This review identified a number of bar-
riers and enablers to progress including attitudes, resources, infra-
structure, training and support and leadership. In terms of ensur-
ing the integrity of ongoing PPI processes, the review identified 
9. questioning the patient participation imperative 177
the importance of evidence to underpin practice and continuous 
improvement. Co-production was also identified as a concept cen-
tral to strengthening public involvement. What is missing from all 
of these barriers or enablers is any nascent or extant social context 
for how we might think about questions of participation.
The evidence suggests that attempts to involve people in 
policy and practice are more likely to mirror the exclusions of 
traditional politics and policy processes than overcome them. 
Shaping Our Lives, a ‘user-led organisation’ (ULO) undertook a 
Department of Health-funded research and development project 
called ‘Beyond the Usual Suspects’. This project found that there 
were five key groups that tended to be seen by service users as 
excluded and marginalised by schemes to involve patients and 
service users. Such groups were excluded according to:
• Equality issues: on the basis of gender, sexuality, eth-
nicity, class, culture, belief, age, disability and so on;
• Where they live: if they are homeless, travellers, in pris-
on, in welfare institutions, refugees and so on;
• Communicating differently: if they do not speak the 
prevailing language, it is not their first language, they 
are deaf and used sign language, and so on;.
• The nature of their impairments: if these are seen as too 
complex or severe to mean they could or would want 
to contribute;
• Where they are seen as unwanted voices: if they do not 
necessarily say what authorities wanted to hear, are 
seen as a problem, disruptive, and so on. These include 
neuro-diverse people and people affected by dementia. 
Key routes to challenging these exclusions include reach-
ing out to involve people, rather than expecting them to come 
to you, developing more accessible and inclusive approaches to 
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involvement and outreach work with conventional and other 
community leaders (Beresford, 2013). 
These issues point to a need to consider the interplay be-
tween health and participation in social life. We know that a 
long-term condition mediates the ability of people to meaning-
fully participate in social life because of the barriers they are like-
ly to face, so for example, limiting their ability to undertake paid 
employment (Bambra, 2011). We also know this difficulty can 
extend to their family or carers. We further know that there is a 
social class gradient for health and illness (Arber, 1987) and that 
people who are from more disadvantaged backgrounds have 
higher rates of mortality and morbidity, and that they frequently 
die at a younger age. We also know there is an inverse care law 
(Hart, 1971), where those most in need of care are least likely to 
receive it whilst those with least need of healthcare tend to use 
services more. 
In the context of PPI in healthcare services and research, it 
would seem obvious that these relationships between social con-
text and health will also apply to the ability to take part in PPI. 
We might therefore ask, how does PPI help marginalised and ex-
cluded groups who are bearing the brunt of myriad, health, cul-
tural and economic inequalities? Any period of illness, whether 
it is chronic or acute, life-limiting or a temporary inconvenience, 
has a very real impact upon a person’s ability to participate. 
These participation imperatives seldom acknowledge this issue 
or put in place arrangements to ensure necessary physical, com-
munication, or cultural access. PPI is geared towards those who 
are already in the system, and therefore, it might be argued, is 
actively failing to engage those groups in society that it should. 
Another important and neglected component of this partic-
ipatory ‘zeitgeist’ is the question of stigma. This is a crucial issue 
in understanding barriers to participation, but yet again, it does 
not appear as an explicit feature of much of the participatory im-
perative. This line of argument suggests two outcomes. Firstly, 
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that participation, as it is considered in terms of healthcare, is 
conceived of too narrowly, with the net effect that many people 
who should be included continue to be excluded. This is con-
nected to the second point, that this continued exclusion under-
lines the deficiencies in this existing model, and highlights the 
need to identify alternative ways of thinking about participation 
that will address these failings. And, it should be borne in mind, 
that such reconsideration may include the need to broaden how 
participation is considered and operationalised. 
In this context, it is imperative that participation addresses 
its own democratic deficit. Drawing from the work of Dean (2017, 
2018, 2019), we identify a need to consider underlying processes 
of sociality and negotiability in participatory practices. Sociality 
relates to the extent that participation is seen to be either ago-
nistic or solidaristic. Agonistic participation is “conflictual with 
individuals and groups predominantly concerned with promot-
ing and defending their own interests and values against other 
participants” (Dean, 2017:4). Solidaristic participation is where, 
“participants view themselves as interdependent members of a 
social collective and participation is oriented towards collective 
ends and the common good” (Dean, 2017:5). In the context of 
inverse care laws and social class gradients, it is imperative that 
any participatory practices address the solidaristic component, 
enabling questions of social justice to be interpolated into the de-
bate, and moving beyond narrow questions of self-interest and 
ongoing exclusions. 
In terms of questions of negotiability, this relates to how 
the conditions of participation must be determined by the partic-
ipants themselves, as part of the practice of participation. In pre-
vailing participatory processes, issues of who participates and 
how they do so “are determined outside of the space (perhaps 
by the commissioning organisation, perhaps by circumstance) 
and imposed upon the participants, who thus have little scope to 
determine the conditions of their participation” (Dean, 2017:5). 
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In turn, this also serves to further push the wider processes and 
problems of exclusion and social justice into the background. 
Alternative paradigms for participation
For some time there has tended to be a conflation of PPI 
and user-led research or user-led movements as if the two were 
essentially the same. In fact, user-led movements have differ-
ent origins and different, conflicting ideological relations. PPI, 
as implied earlier, derived from an essentially consumerist/
managerialist ideology seeking to balance out the power of 
professionals and inject market forces into welfare services. In 
contrast, user-led movements have been essentially committed 
to empowerment and democratisation derived from grassroots 
movements. With the continuing impetus and impact of neo-
liberal social policy both in the UK and globally and its asso-
ciation with the regressive restructuring and cutting of welfare 
services and benefits, it has become increasingly difficult to hold 
on to such ambiguity. Instead, a growing rift has shown itself 
between reactionary state and liberatory service user intentions 
for democratisation of health and social care services (Stewart, 
2018; Rose et al., 2018; Beresford, 2019).
The limitations of a technocratic and tokenistic ‘PPI’ have 
become increasingly evident during the period of austerity pol-
icy and ensuing welfare reforms in the UK. It has become evi-
dent that formalised arrangements for PPI no longer offer hope 
for marginalised groups and that PPI as a policy is ideological 
rather than a genuine attempt to reduce inequalities. There have 
been increasing problems with the financial sustainability of 
user organisations, with closures and decline in numbers ow-
ing to reduction in funding of these organisations. Policies have 
increasingly employed discourse that attempts to make welfare 
recipients responsible for their own care (for example ‘self-care’, 
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‘recovery’, ‘peer support’) while in practice subverting empow-
erment and co-opting concepts of empowerment to support the 
ideological tenets of neoliberal individualism and managerial-
ism.
This is reflected in the growing concerns expressed by ser-
vice user movements and organisations as neoliberalism calls 
into question their activities and even existence, and in their in-
creasing preparedness to articulate their distinct concerns and 
objectives. Thus while experiencing much suffering in recent 
years, service users and their organisations have extended both 
their critiques and their action in relation to health, social care 
and other policies and services (Beresford, 2019).
This increasing sense of disempowerment, disillusionment 
with PPI, and further marginalisation has led to what might be 
seen as a renewal in marginalised groups’ activities to challenge 
exclusion and to campaign for more inclusion. The demands for 
more say and control in and over their lives from disabled peo-
ple, service user movements and organisations has emerged in 
parallel to the development of PPI discourse and critiques of it. 
This arguably offers an alternative paradigm in which participa-
tion comes from a grassroots movement rather than a tokenistic 
policy imperative (see Windle and Chibulka, 1981). These de-
mands have focused on campaigning for wider involvement (for 
example, Shaping Our Lives); greater involvement in profession-
al and occupational training (for example, ‘PowerUs’ in social 
work education); and involvement in health-related research and 
knowledge production (Askheim et al., 2017; Beresford, 2018).
While there have been overlaps, here the call has primarily 
been for ‘say’ and ‘control’, rather than just ‘involvement’ or ‘en-
gagement’. This has been reflected in the language used, which 
has primarily been framed in terms of service users being in 
control, for example, ‘survivor controlled research’, ‘user-led re-
search’ and ‘emancipatory disability research’, with the constit-
uencies previously positioned on the receiving end of research 
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now explicitly identified as leading or shaping it. Now its pur-
pose is redefined to privilege the individual empowerment of 
such constituencies, as well as the need for broader political and 
social change to challenge the barriers they face – rather than the 
mere accumulation of data. This purpose is also to be achieved 
by a changed ethics of research which treats the research partic-
ipant and their experiential knowledge as having equal value to 
and validity as the researcher (Faulkner, 2010; 2018). 
A further development in this domain has been that of 
‘Mad Studies’. This term represents an emerging academic field 
concerned with mental health in which there is an explicit di-
vorce from the biomedical model – enabling other disciplines to 
have influence. There is an explicit value placed on first person 
knowledge, giving individuals the right to speak about them-
selves and their own context when discussing research and 
knowledge production. Survivors’ first-hand knowledge has 
equal value with scientific knowledge (Le Francois et al., 2013). 
One form of knowledge is not privileged over other forms, rath-
er all forms of knowledge are considered in terms of what they 
might contribute to more progressive understandings of mad-
ness. 
These developments represent both strategies and objec-
tives far removed from the narrow abstracted focus of a tech-
nocratic PPI, raising further questions about and offering some 
prospect on the role of service users, even in difficult times – in 
turn seeking to point out how we need to consider renewing both 
debates and developments around involvement in inclusive and 
anti-discriminatory ways.
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10. The need for inter-professional working 
 between teachers, health and social care 
 professionals
Francine Bailey
I have been working for eight years with teenagers who 
have been out of school long-term with extreme anxiety. The vol-
ume of young people being referred out of mainstream schools to 
alternative education provision with anxiety has reached shock-
ing proportions. The Guardian recently ran a front page article on 
the crisis point of Special Educational Needs provision for young 
people in this country, stating that “Children with special educa-
tional needs and disabilities (SEND) are being failed by a system 
‘on the verge of crisis’ as demand for specialist support soars and 
threatens to bankrupt local authorities” (Weale and McIntyre, 
2018, n.p.). I believe that this crisis was caused by the decision 18 
years ago to close special needs departments and special needs 
schools, and to focus on ‘inclusion’, without any teacher training 
on how to fully understand the health and behaviour issues of 
young people with SEN. 
As a teacher, between 2002 and 2007, I witnessed the col-
lapse of a secondary school in Sheffield that had an incredible 
reputation for working with young people with SEN. It had a 
highly successful special needs department, in which the young 
people felt safe, and wanted to be in school. The exceptional staff 
who led this department ran training events across the country 
on how to work with Special Needs. Teachers went to the Special 
Needs Classrooms, to work with the small groups in each Spe-
cial Needs class, with their Teaching Assistants (TAs) who were 
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with them all the time, and who they knew really well and trust-
ed. The national curriculum could be bypassed for these classes, 
and lessons could be designed utterly to suit the needs of the 
young people in the room. The art classes were highly kinaes-
thetic; we made life-sized cardboard sculptures of guitars, cars 
and microphones, and role-played a ‘Feeder gig’ and the ‘Grease 
Lightning’ driving scene. All the young people in the room, with 
a huge variety of Special Learning Needs and Statements of Ed-
ucation, were completely engaged. 
A Statement of Education is:
a document which sets out a child’s SEN and any additional help that 
the child should receive. The aim of the Statement is to make sure that the 
child gets the right support to enable them to make progress in school. A 
Statement is normally made when all the educational provision required 
to meet a child’s needs cannot reasonably be met by the resources within 
a child’s school at School Action or School Action Plus (known as Early 
Years Action or Early Years Action Plus in Early Years Settings).
Most children with SEN should have their needs met within a main-
stream school. Before a Statement will be considered, additional help may 
be provided to the child at School Action. If the child still does not seem 
to be making enough progress then the school may seek advice from ex-
ternal professionals at School Action Plus. If this additional help is still 
not enough then the child’s school or parents can apply to the LEA for 
a Statutory Assessment of the child’s SEN in order to try and obtain a 
Statement of SEN. (Douglas Silas Solicitors, 2018, n.p.).
However, after the Government’s Inclusion Policy was 
made compulsory, this Special Needs Department had to shut. A 
1997 Green Paper entitled “Excellence For All Children: Meeting 
Special Educational Needs”, stated “an increasing proportion 
of those children with statements of SEN who would current-
ly be placed in special schools will be educated in mainstream 
schools” (n.p.). This led to the Special Educational Needs and 
Disability Act (May 2001), which made inclusion mandatory, 
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but without the provision of compulsory SEN training for main-
stream classroom teachers. This had a catastrophic impact on 
my school, which had 600 of its 1000 pupils on the SEN regis-
ter. The young people with Statements of Education were dis-
persed across the school, without their TAs, and bedlam ensued. 
These young people no longer felt safe. Many stopped coming 
to school, became involved with anti-social behaviour outside 
school, and had ongoing problems with the police. Those that 
stayed in school could not cope in classrooms of 30 children, 
so poor behaviour escalated, and the three to five statemented 
students in each class would then soak up the attention of the 
teacher, affecting the learning of the other 25-27 students in the 
room. The school steadily fell into decline, many teachers went 
on long-term sick leave with stress or resigned, and the school 
eventually went into special measures.
Other commentators share this view. In April 2004, the Tele-
graph’s Education Correspondent, Liz Lightfoot, wrote:
The education of all children is being harmed by the Government’s 
‘disastrous’ policy of closing special schools and sending pupils with 
learning difficulties and unruly behaviour into mainstream classes. 
The second biggest teacher’s union called for an end to the closure of 
special schools saying the ‘one size fits all’ model of inclusion did not 
serve the needs of some of the most vulnerable children and disrupted 
the education of others. David Blunkett brought in the inclusion policy 
when he was Education Secretary in 1997. He said at the time it was 
inspired by the experience of feeling ‘separated out’ from society at a 
boarding school for the blind where he was denied the opportunity to 
gain national qualifications. Mavis Garnett, from Kirklees, comment-
ed that “however admirable in principle, the reality of inclusion was 
unworkable. The special needs assistant who signs for the hearing im-
paired pupil gets in the way of the large screen computer provided for 
the visually impaired while trying to avoid the open route way required 
by the physically disabled while not obstructing the language special-
ist” (Lightfoot, 2004, n.p.).
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18 years on, I am fully seeing the effects of this disastrous 
decision on a national level, with thousands of young people 
across the country with SEND not feeling safe or understood in 
school, and so falling out of the mainstream school system. The 
only special schools that still exist have huge waiting lists, and 
are often not geared up to cope with autism and young people 
with anxiety. Autism Hubs are beginning to be implemented 
across the country. In Essex:
Essex Local Authority has worked in partnership with a network of pri-
mary and secondary mainstream schools to develop specialist autism 
support centres. There is a primary and a secondary school with this pro-
vision in each of the four Essex quadrants. While many pupils with au-
tism already attend and succeed in their local mainstream schools, there 
are others with more complex needs, including high levels of anxiety, 
who require further specialist support.
The new centres aim to enable those young people who are of mainstream 
ability but may have high levels of anxiety as a result of their autism, 
to access mainstream schooling and spend most of their time in classes 
alongside their peers. Admissions will be managed by the council’s SEN 
Statutory Assessment Service, working in partnership with the schools. 
All of the pupils admitted will have an Education, Health and Care plan. 
(Essex County Council, 2017, n.p.)
However, these centres cannot be accessed by young 
people who have already become too anxious to set foot in 
a busy playground, and barely touch the surface of the vast 
numbers of young people who are out of mainstream educa-
tion as they ‘do not fit’ the current education system. Many 
young people with SEND do well in mainstream schools, as 
they are academically able enough to cope, and the levels of 
support provided suit their needs, but many other young peo-
ple with SEND struggle academically and ‘do not fit’ the cur-
rent system. I am now retraining as an occupational therapist, 
as I can no longer see how I can fully help young people with 
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special mental health needs, when I have absolutely no train-
ing in mental health. 
My teacher training, 19 years ago, did not mention SEN. It 
skirted across the variety of learning styles, such as kinaesthetic 
and visual, but was very much subject-specific. During a first 
year Occupational Therapy BSc lecture on inter-professional 
working, a speech therapist was interviewed on the theme of 
inter-professional working. She felt strongly that there is a need 
for teachers to be trained alongside health practitioners; in other 
words, to be trained inter-professionally. This struck me as 
absolutely the best way forward. As a teacher, I never had any 
training on how to understand or to work with special needs. 
In my subsequent experience as a teacher, such training would 
have been invaluable.
It is a relief to talk to people currently in teacher training, 
who, as from this year, will have to cover special education needs 
in some depth, attend a placement in a special needs school, and 
write an assignment on a special health or learning need of their 
choice. These changes have been introduced thanks to Stephen 
Munday, who was commissioned by the Secretary of State for 
Education to develop a framework of core content for Initial 
Teacher Training (ITT) in England, following Sir Andrew Car-
ter’s report on ITT published in January 2015. This report high-
lighted that there were “significant gaps in a range of courses in 
important areas such as […] special educational needs and dis-
abilities” (Carter, 2015:6). In May 2016, the Independent reported 
that:
In response to a question posed during Prime Minister’s Questions, 
Chancellor George Osborne confirmed the Government’s intentions to 
make autism a mandatory training subject for teachers in England. ”My 
right hon. Friend has stressed the importance of ensuring that teachers 
are properly trained to support young people with special educational 
needs and specifically autism. As a result, the chairman will include rec-
ommendations in the report on how core teacher training should cover 
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special educational needs. He said: “The Education Secretary shares her 
concern and has personally raised the issue with the chair of the initial 
teacher training review, Stephen Munday”. (Pells, 2016, n.p.).
This has now led to the core content for this year’s PGCE 
students finally including provision for new teachers to be 
trained how to adapt their teaching strategies “to ensure that 
pupils with SEND (including, but not limited to, autism, dys-
lexia, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), sensory 
impairment or speech, and language and communication needs 
(SLCN)) can access and progress within the curriculum”. Fur-
thermore, providers are required to “ensure that SEND training 
is integrated across the ITT programme” (Department for Edu-
cation, 2016: 17).
Another exciting step towards achieving the goal of teach-
ers, health and social care professionals working effectively to-
gether is in the ground-breaking work of Peter Fonaghy, the chief 
executive of the Anna Freud National Centre for Children and 
Families (AFNCCF), who is in the process of setting up a new 
school in Norwich. “The proposed Your Place academy in Nor-
wich has had input from leading psychiatrists and psychologists 
and aims to create a template that could be copied elsewhere” 
(Weale & McIntyre, 2018, n.p.). According to the Guardian, in this 
school teachers and healthcare professionals will work side by 
side. It aims to be the “UK’s first school for children who have 
experienced early-life trauma such as neglect or abuse and are 
currently being failed by the education system. The short-stay 
school would provide children aged four to seven with therapy 
and education to prepare them to re-join mainstream schooling”. 
The article also emphasises that: 
As well as helping troubled children and their families by preventing 
exclusions, the Your Place team estimates it can deliver £8.7m of savings 
within five years. If one were opened in each of the 152 local education 
authorities in England and Wales, this would translate to £1.3bn over 
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the same period. The benefit over the longer term would be far greater as 
the figures do not take account of potential costs such as demands on the 
health, welfare and criminal justice systems. (Weale & McIntyre, 2018, 
n.p.).
As this report suggests, there are high social and economic, 
as well as personal and educational, costs to the failure to ade-
quately provide for children with SEND. How has the situation 
ended up this bad? There have been attempts to make the policy 
of inclusion work, but for various reasons, these have not been 
successful. For example, in 2014, a significant change in SEND 
provision was made that had the potential to provide greater lev-
els of support to young people with SEND via inter-professional 
working. In September 2014, as part of the Children and Fami-
lies Act, Statements of Special Educational Needs were replaced 
by Education, Health and Care (EHC) Plans in England. These 
plans aimed to improve: 
joint work across education, health and social care services and agencies 
with an assessment coordinator taking the lead; participation in deci-
sion-making by children, young people and their families; the focus on 
outcomes; its scope by covering children from 0-25, including colleges, 
academies and free schools; the distinction between statutory (must) and 
non-statutory (should) duties on schools, local authorities and joint com-
missioning. (HemiHelp, 2014, n.p.).
Yet although young people now need EHC Plans to access 
special support in schools, in reality there is hardly any commu-
nication between the education, health and social care profes-
sionals involved in each young person’s support. 
In theory, the annual reviews of each young person’s EHC 
Plan are an ideal opportunity to bring education, health and 
social care professionals together. However, there is often con-
fusion from the Education Commissioners over who to invite, 
with the result that these reviews are often education-heavy, and 
health and social care professionals are not even invited. I have 
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been to many reviews where social workers, doctors and even 
surgeons have been present; these have been highly successful 
reviews, and because the student has had adequate support from 
all the organisations involved, they have been able to progress 
well back into education. But when families who do not have a 
social worker, or the student’s anxieties are so severe that they 
struggle to attend their medical appointments, reviews are less 
successful. 
The Government renamed the student’s SEND documents 
as EHC Plans, rather than Statements of Education, to reflect the 
belief that there should be an equal weighting between the edu-
cation, health and care support of these young people. Howev-
er, often the healthcare or social care thirds of the EHC Plan are 
completely missing. This must change in order for the needs of 
all young people out of mainstream education to be fully met. It 
is vital that education, health and social care professionals work 
inter-professionally. The government spent time and money 
changing the Education Statement to an EHC Plan. I believe this 
is actually a good idea, but only if education, health and social 
care professionals are able to work inter-professionally. Other-
wise it is simply a money-saving exercise with no real intention 
to fully help the young people it is supposed to support. My per-
sonal experience bears this out. At two recent annual reviews I 
attended, there was no representation from health or social care 
professionals. When this was queried, both of the different com-
missioners involved said, with varying words, “This is an Edu-
cation Review, I know it’s called an Education Health Care Plan 
Review, but it’s about Education”. 
The cases that I have witnessed are extremely distressing. 
One student who became a school refuser due to anxiety, and so 
was referred to a special needs school, became so school-phobic 
that he could not set foot in the school building. After months 
of not getting beyond the school car park, he was allotted an 
outreach support worker from the school to try and engage him 
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to be able to go into the school building. However, funding for 
this support stopped, and the student’s confidence in leaving his 
house with anyone at all diminished to the extent that he be-
came fully agoraphobic. Any trips out of his house, even to the 
shops, would trigger weeks of insomnia. He was out of school 
for nearly two years before he was referred to an organisation 
that could teach him in his own home, for as long as was neces-
sary, to try and engage him to connect with the world around 
him, without fear of funding cuts. His mother tried to get him 
counselling through Child and Adolescent Mental Health Ser-
vices (CAMHS), but funding restraints meant that he had only 
two outreach visits. As he was unable to leave his room for either 
of these visits, he was discharged. Because he was nearly 18 years 
old by this point, he was supposed to be referred to the Mental 
Health team at Adult Social Services. However, as this student 
has a diagnosis of autism, there is confusion as to whether he 
should be referred to the Learning Disability or Mental Health 
team, so the referrals keep bouncing from one department to an-
other. Meanwhile, this young man is unable to leave the house, 
and his mental health is deteriorating. A few months ago he 
could build himself up to a cinema visit, but now even that is 
impossible, as his anxiety about noise and crowds has worsened. 
He cannot even attend doctor’s appointments. An unconsidered 
impact of his agoraphobia is that as he never leaves the house, 
he never wears shoes, so is also beginning to develop foot pain. 
At this student’s annual review, there were no represen-
tatives from health or social care. A specialist employment and 
skills adviser was invited to the Review, but it became appar-
ent that this young man would not be able to engage with any 
work or college placements until his anxiety had been worked 
through. The only partners of the EHC Plan who would be able 
to tackle this aspect of his problems, the health and social care 
thirds, were completely absent from the Review. This case viv-
idly illustrates how the potential of EHC Plans is lost through 
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lack of inter-professional working, and lack of understanding 
from high up the system as to who should be responsible and 
involved with the process. In this student’s case, the social care 
team did not show awareness of the urgency of the case, as he 
was shunted between different parts of the system. In part this 
is because they did not have access to all the information about 
his case, perhaps because of lack of involvement with his an-
nual reviews. Serious problems are caused by the inability of 
different organisations involved in the care of an individual to 
access relevant information. The only way to remedy this lack 
of engagement would be to refer this student to the Vulnerable 
Person Panel which includes members from statutory organi-
sations and non-statutory organisations providing support to 
individuals and their families. Once an individual has been re-
ferred to a Vulnerable Person Panel, personal information can 
be shared for the purposes of early intervention to provide sup-
port to individuals, to prevent crime and disorder or anti-so-
cial behaviour, and for safeguarding and promoting welfare 
of adults at risk of abuse and harm (Nottinghamshire Coun-
ty Council, n.d.). Richmond’s Vulnerable Adult Multi-Agency 
Panel states:
We have formed the Vulnerable Adult Multi-Agency Panel in partner-
ship with other organisations to consider cases of adults who remain at 
high risk of harm despite previous intervention efforts.
The panel includes representation from Richmond Adult Social, Hous-
ing and Mental Health Services as well as the Metropolitan Police and 
London Fire Brigade.
The purpose of the panel is to ensure that multi-agency communication 
and information sharing takes place on a regular basis.
One of the key changes in the Care Act with regard to safeguarding is to 
give consideration to ‘Self-Neglect’ as a form of adult abuse or neglect.
The role of the panel is to discuss all available options for increasing the 
safety of the adult at risk and to develop a co-ordinated action plan (Rich-
mond Council, 2019, n.p.).
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One of the warning signs that indicates self-neglect is 
non-attendance to vital health appointments – clearly relevant in 
the case discussed above.
In the past, these panels were only used for crime preven-
tion, but their remit has been widened to include people in the 
care system, and those at risk of social isolation and poor men-
tal health. The Vulnerable Person’s Panel has a legally binding 
information-sharing agreement, and so has a much higher status 
than an EHC Plan review. All partners involved in an individu-
al’s care are legally obligated to attend this panel. Is legally bind-
ing partners to attend meetings the only way to get organisa-
tions to work inter-professionally? This is perhaps the only way 
to ensure that all partners are able to discuss the mental health 
concerns of an individual, and so create the meaningful changes 
that will positively alter a person’s life – with the support that 
should have been provided in the first place by the EHC Plan.
Why do these failures in the system occur? Again, the case 
described above provides some clues. For this young man, and 
for others, there is the expectation that a young person with au-
tism will learn how to cope with their autism through their edu-
cation support, and often therapy is not even suggested. Health-
care professionals can give young people with autism strategies 
on how to cope with daily life. However, until now, teachers 
have rarely been trained in how to work with autism, and such 
training was not mandatory. It has been entirely up to their em-
ployer to decide whether to implement relevant training or not. 
But at an annual review, a teacher is not allowed to ask for their 
student to be referred for therapy, as it is not in their remit. So if 
no healthcare professional, who does have the remit to refer the 
student for therapy, is invited to that Review, how is that student 
supposed to move forwards? 
Politicians who regularly rewrite education policies only 
ever seem to consider short-term money-saving goals. They 
consistently fail to comprehend the impact that these new pol-
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icies have on the lives of people in the long term. Funding that 
is taken away from education at the beginning of a child’s life 
then has to be spent ten times over later on – on more expensive 
alternative education provision, on health needs generated by 
inadequate provision for a student’s multiple needs, and even 
on prisons provision for the young people that have been failed 
by inadequate education systems. Young people excluded from 
mainstream education feel excluded from society, and this has 
a huge impact on their mental health and wellbeing, and their 
ability to function in life first as children and then as adults.
Teachers are trained as teachers; healthcare professionals as 
healthcare professionals; and social workers as social workers. 
There is currently little or no inter-professional working between 
the three. If the government is so focused on cutting costs that it 
implements an EHC Plan instead of a Statement of Special Edu-
cational Needs, then the three professions need to begin training 
alongside each other to have any chance of making this system 
work, and to stop failing thousands of young people across the 
country who are now at risk of being isolated from society, as 
well as from school.
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11.	 Utopia,	dystopia,	and	human	flourishing
Sean Seeger
Utopia
Within	western	 literary	and	 intellectual	history,	 there	 is	a	
rich	tradition	of	thought	concerned	with	imagining	alternate	so-
cieties.	This	tradition	encompasses	many	strands	and	crosscur-
rents,	some	of	them	in	tension	with	one	another.	With	footholds	
in	literature,	philosophy,	religious	discourse,	political	economy,	
and	social	theory,	it	is	a	lineage	which	can	be	hard	to	define	and	
which	sometimes	threatens	to	disappear	before	one’s	gaze	into	
the	thicket	of	intellectual	currents	which	surround	it.	Despite	its	
composite	nature,	however,	and	despite	some	of	the	difficulties	
raised	by	scholars	regarding	definition,	texts	in	this	line	are	gen-
erally	known	as	 ‘utopias’.	Perhaps	unsurprisingly	given	 its	di-
verse	origins,	the	utopian	genre	encompasses	a	very	broad	range	
of	 texts,	written	 from	 an	 array	 of	 often	 incompatible	 perspec-
tives.	Insofar	as	a	common	identity	can	be	established,	though,	
one	 thing	 that	 unites	 such	 texts	 is	 their	 attempt	 to	 envisage	 a	
form	of	society	which	is	an	improvement	on	the	one	inhabited	by	
the	author.
The	utopian	genre	has	roots	in	the	ancient	world,	most	no-
tably	in	Plato’s	Republic (380	BCE),	a	philosophical	dialogue	that	
outlines	what	its	author	saw	as	the	form	of	society	most	likely	
to	afford	the	good	life	 for	human	beings.	 In	the	case	of	Plato’s	
idealised	republic,	 this	 is	a	 society	 ruled	by	an	elite	class	edu-
cated	 in	 philosophy	 and	 able	 to	 access	 a	 form	of	 higher	 truth	
unavailable	to	the	majority	of	the	citizenry.	It	was	partly	in	re-
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sponse to the Republic	 that	 the	 early	 modern	 English	 writer	
Thomas	More	was	to	compose	his	own	philosophical	dialogue,	
Utopia,	first	published	 in	Latin	 in	1516	and	 translated	 into	En-
glish	in	1561.	The	word	‘utopia’	was	in	fact	coined	by	More	in	
this	work,	and	constitutes	a	deliberate	play	on	words,	meaning	
both	‘no	place’	as	a	result	of	its	Greek	derivation	(“ou-topos-ia”) 
and	‘good	place’	(“eu-topos-ia”)	through	being	indistinguishable	
from	 the	word	 ‘Eutopia’	when	 spoken	 aloud.	 The	 ambiguous	
status	of	utopia	implied	by	this	wordplay	has,	as	we	shall	see,	
remained	a	key	tenet	of	the	genre	ever	since.	Scholars	of	More’s	
work	have	debated,	and	continue	to	debate,	his	intent	in	signal-
ling	both	the	desirability	and	the	impossibility	of	an	ostensibly	
ideal	political	state.	In	More’s	narrative,	this	takes	the	form	of	the	
society	of	Utopia,	an	island-dwelling	community	located	in	the	
Americas.	The	functioning	of	Utopia	is	conveyed	to	More	–	who	
himself	appears	 in	the	narrative	in	the	guise	of	a	 literary	char-
acter	also	named	More	–	by	an	inhabitant	of	the	island,	Raphael	
Hythloday,	whose	name	constitutes	another	pun,	which	can	be	
translated	from	the	Greek	as	either	‘nonsense	pedlar’	or	‘expert	
in	nonsense’,	thereby	casting	further	doubt	on	how	we	ought	to	
take	the	account	that	follows.
The	society	of	Utopia	represents	a	very	significant	depar-
ture	from	the	laws	and	institutions	of	the	still	broadly	feudal	so-
ciety	in	which	More	himself	was	living.	Key	features	of	Utopia	
include	 the	 absence	 of	 private	 property,	 universal	 healthcare,	
euthanasia	 on	 demand,	 universal	 education,	 lifelong	 learning,	
a	 comparatively	 short	working	day,	 a	 comparatively	generous	
allowance	 for	 leisure	 time,	 legal	 divorce,	 and	 religious	 tolera-
tion	of	all	variants	of	monotheism.	It	is	worth	emphasising	that	
these	 radical	 innovations,	many	 of	which	 remain	 a	 dream	 for	
much	of	the	world’s	population	today,	flow	from	the	pen	of	an	
inhabitant	of	the	court	of	King	Henry	VIII.	Even	if	More’s	Utopia 
were	 intended	 as	 nothing	more	 than	 a	 thought	 experiment	 or	
diverting	fantasy,	it	would	remain	an	exemplary	instance	of	the	
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modern	habit	of	imagining	alternate	societies,	and	of	provoking	
speculation	about	how	our	practices	and	 institutions	might	be	
transformed.	 Framed	 in	 this	 way,	More’s	 various	 attempts	 to	
qualify,	minimise,	and	even	undermine	the	vision	conveyed	in	
Utopia	could	be	seen	as	a	strategy	for	blunting	the	edges	of	the	
challenge	his	book	indirectly	posed	to	the	status	quo.	While	it	is	
highly	unlikely	that	More	harboured	anything	like	revolutionary	
sentiments,	 it	 seems	 equally	 unlikely	 that	 he	 could	 have	 been	
unaware	of	some	of	the	more	far-reaching	implications	of	Hyth-
loday’s	 ‘nonsense’.	Whatever	More’s	intentions	in	writing	Uto-
pia,	by	describing	a	conceivable	type	of	society	which	differed	in	
essential	ways	from	the	feudal	regimes	familiar	to	Europeans	of	
the	time,	he	made	a	decisive	contribution	to	the	modern	social	
imaginary,	enabling	others	to	follow	in	his	footsteps	and	engage	
in	further	such	experiments.
	While	generally	foregoing	the	layers	of	irony	and	misdirec-
tion	built	into	Utopia,	subsequent	utopias	have	retained	the	basic	
structure	and	orientation	of	that	earlier	work:	to	offer	something	
like	 a	 ‘guided	 tour’	 of	 a	 society	which	 is,	 at	 least	 in	principle,	
an	improvement	on	the	author’s	own.	This	improvement	can,	in	
turn,	take	many	forms	and	vary	greatly	in	the	extent	to	which	it	
requires	a	departure	from	the	world	as	it	stands.	Since	the	early	
sixteenth	century,	the	content of	utopia	–	the	nature	of	the	desir-
able	change	it	anticipates	–	has	likewise	undergone	many	chang-
es,	corresponding	to	wider	social	and	cultural	developments.	In	
order	to	give	a	sense	of	the	varieties	of	modern	utopia,	and	of	the	
diverse	conceptions	of	human	flourishing	it	has	espoused	at	dif-
ferent	times,	it	may	be	helpful	to	offer	a	brief	overview	of	some	
of	the	competing	visions	advanced	by	writers	in	this	tradition.
While	some	utopias	take	as	their	starting	point	the	abolition	
of	the	entire	existing	world	order	–	as	in	the	classless,	stateless	
global	communism	envisaged	by	Karl	Marx	and	Friedrich	Engels 
in The Communist Manifesto (1848)	 –	 others	 have	 a	more	 local,	
small-scale	 focus	 –	 as	 in	Henry	David	 Thoreau’s	 impassioned	
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call	for	a	return	to	a	life	of	simplicity	and	self-reliance	in	Walden 
(1854).	Likewise,	just	as	some	utopias	enthusiastically	pursue	the	
advancement	of	science	and	technology	–	as	in	H.	G.	Wells’s	A 
Modern Utopia (1905)	–	others	are	built	on	a	rejection	of	industri-
alism,	often	 accompanied	by	 a	partial	 reversion	 to	premodern	
values	–	as	in	William	Morris’s	News from Nowhere (1890).	While	
some	utopias	subordinate	all	concerns	to	ensuring	stability	and	
predictability	–	as	in	the	‘scientific’	utopia	of	behaviourist	psy-
chologist	 B.	 F.	 Skinner’s	Walden Two (1948)	 –	 others	 enthrone	
aesthetic	beauty	as	 the	highest	good	–	as	 in	Oscar	Wilde’s The 
Soul of Man Under Socialism (1891),	 which	 looks	 toward	 a	 lei-
sured	society	where	 individuals	cultivate	 themselves	as	works	
of	art.	Whereas	some	utopias	are	militantly	secular,	envisioning	
the	abolition	of	religion	–	as	in	Auguste	Comte’s	The Catechism of 
Positive Religion (1842)	–	others	assign	religious	experience	and	
ritual	a	central	role	–	as	in	Aldous	Huxley’s	Island (1962),	which	
depicts	an	 isolated	utopian	community	whose	ethos	draws	on	
various	Eastern	religions.	Just	as	some	utopias	are	pacifist	–	as	in	
the	nonviolent	matriarchal	society	depicted	in	Charlotte	Perkins 
Gilman’s	Herland (1915)	–	so	others	are	more	militaristic	–	as	in	
the	 case	of	More’s	Utopia	 itself	 (1516).	While	 some	utopias	 re-
gard	the	natural	world	as	an	obstacle	to	be	overcome	in	the	pur-
suit	of	material	progress	–	as	in	the	industrial	socialist	utopia	of	
Edward	Bellamy’s	Looking Backward	 (1888)	–	others	 take	ecolo-
gy	as	their	primary	concern	–	as	in	Ernest	Callenbach’s	Ecotopia 
(1975),	which	depicts	 a	 community	 that	 cares	 for	 the	 environ-
ment	through	the	responsible,	selective	use	of	modern	technol-
ogy.	Lastly,	while	some	utopias	anticipate	the	end	of	homopho-
bia	and	the	liberation	of	gay	people	–	as	in	Edward	Carpenter’s	
four-volume	utopian	poem,	Towards Democracy	 (1905)	 –	others	
call	for	the	abolition	of	gender	itself	in	the	pursuit	of	equality	–	as	
in	Laboria	Cuboniks’	The Xenofeminist Manifesto (2018).
As	can	be	gleaned	 from	the	 foregoing	 list,	 the	nineteenth	
century	was	a	particularly	rich	period	in	the	history	of	the	uto-
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pian	genre.	This	trend	began	to	slow	during	the	early	years	of	
the	 twentieth	 century,	 however,	 before	 giving	 way	 to	 a	 quite	
different	and	potentially	antithetical	kind	of	writing	during	the	
1920s	and	1930s.	The	consensus	among	academic	commentators	
on	utopia	is	that	this	pattern	is	best	accounted	for	by	the	impact	
of	new	political	ideologies,	in	particular	those	of	the	Bolsheviks	
in	Russia	and	the	Nazis	in	Germany.	The	utopian	ideology	and	
rhetoric	of	both	parties	 served	 to	encourage	 the	view	 that	any	
alternative	to	the	liberal-democratic	mainstream	was	liable	to	de-
volve	into	a	form	of	dangerous	extremism,	with	potentially	di-
sastrous	consequences	for	society.	This	view	appeared	to	many	
observers	 to	 be	 vindicated	when	 the	 scale	 and	 severity	 of	 the	
atrocities	 committed	under	Hitler	 and	 Stalin	 began	 to	 become	
apparent	throughout	the	later	1940s	and	1950s.	It	was	to	receive	
further	support	in	the	wake	of	events	such	as	the	widely	publi-
cised	and	debated	trial	of	Adolf	Eichmann	in	1961,	which	pro-
voked	deep	reflection	on	the	significance	of	the	Holocaust,	and	
the	publication	of	Aleksandr	Solzhenitsyn’s	influential	study,	The 
Gulag Archipelago (1973–1976),	which	detailed	many	aspects	 of	
life	under	Stalinism,	including	the	immense	Soviet	gulag	system	
of	forced	labour	camps.	Taken	altogether,	these	revelations	about	
the	Stalinist	and	Nazi	regimes,	combined	with	an	awareness	of	
comparable	atrocities	committed	in	China	under	the	Communist	
Party	and	in	Cambodia	under	the	Khmer	Rouge	later	in	the	cen-
tury,	led	many	to	recoil	from	utopian	thinking	of	any	kind,	and	
to	 instinctively	associate	utopianism	with	some	of	 the	greatest	
crimes	of	the	modern	period.
Dystopia
The	course	of	events	in	the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	century	
led	 to	 a	 re-evaluation	 of	 the	utopian	 genre,	 often	 to	 the	detri-
ment	of	the	latter.	Many	modern	utopias	look	very	different	in	
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the	wake	of	 the	Holocaust	and	the	gulag,	sometimes	revealing	
sinister	 aspects	 which	 had	 previously	 remained	 invisible.	 To	
take	just	a	handful	of	representative	examples,	it	is	hard	for	con-
temporary	readers	to	ignore	the	role	of	slavery	in	More’s	Utopia, 
scientism	in	Comte’s	The Catechism of Positive Religion,	racism	in	
Gilman’s	Herland,	and	the	potential	for	dehumanisation	in	Skin-
ner’s	 Walden Two.	 More	 generally,	 the	 uniquely	 modern	 phe-
nomenon	of	 totalitarianism	has	 led	critics	 to	detect	a	 tendency	
toward	authoritarianism	in	many	classic	utopias.	Here	a	single	
observation	may	stand	in	for	many.	While	anticipating	in	some	
ways	 the	social	democratic	welfare	states	of	 the	mid-twentieth	
century,	More’s	Utopia	also	bears	an	uncomfortable	resemblance	
to	modern	totalitarian	regimes.	Allowance	for	personal	freedom	
is	 negligible	 in	 Utopia,	 privacy	 is	 non-existent,	 and	 citizens’	
movements	are	closely	monitored,	with	even	a	stroll	in	the	coun-
tryside	requiring	the	permission	of	a	local	magistrate.
One	 conclusion	 that	 some	 commentators	 on	 utopia	 have	
drawn	from	resemblances	of	this	sort	is	that	utopias	are	inherent-
ly authoritarian	owing	to	their	need	to	plan	and	regulate	seem-
ingly	every	aspect	of	social	life.	On	this	view,	there	is	bound	to	
be	a	conflict	between	utopian	planning	and	individual	autono-
my.	 If	 the	 realisation	of	utopia	 requires	all	participants	 to	 live	
according	to	a	precisely	defined	template	–	namely,	the	template	
prescribed	by	the	utopia	itself	–	then	it	would	seem	that	many	
familiar	 forms	 of	 freedom,	 including	 the	 freedom	 to	 express	
oneself	and	criticise	the	existing	order,	must	be	sacrificed.	This	
curtailment	of	freedom	would	clearly	require	the	exercise	of	ex-
tensive	disciplinary	techniques	in	order	to	prevent	any	deviation	
from	state-sanctioned	ways	of	 thinking	and	acting.	Real-world	
examples	 of	 this	 highly	 oppressive	 combination	 of	 unchecked	
state	power	and	pervasive	disciplinary	mechanisms	abound.
Given	 these	misgivings	 about	 utopia	 as	 a	 social	 and	 po-
litical	form,	it	is	hardly	surprising	that	the	early	decades	of	the	
twentieth	century	would	give	rise	to	a	kind	of	writing	in	which	
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the	shortcomings	of	utopia	take	centre	stage.	Whereas	the	pre-
cise	origins	of	utopia	are	more	debatable,	having	in	some	cases	
been	traced	as	far	back	as	the	Hebrew	Bible,	the	birth	of	the	dysto-
pia	can	be	determined	with	more	confidence.	The	1920s,	30s,	and	
40s	saw	the	publication	of	three	seminal	dystopian	novels	which	
were	to	define	the	parameters	of	the	genre	down	to	the	present	
day.	Each	of	these	responds,	albeit	in	very	different	ways,	to	the	
history	of	utopia	which	we	have	been	tracing.
Although	dystopia	as	a	literary	phenomenon	was	unknown	
before	these	decades,	the	term	itself	had	in	fact	been	coined	fifty	
years	earlier.	Addressing	the	British	House	of	Commons	in	1868,	
the	philosopher	and	Liberal	politician	John	Stuart	Mill	labelled	
the	members	of	 the	 incumbent	Conservative	government	 ‘dys-
topians’,	or	 ‘caco-topians’	on	account	of	 their	unsuccessful	po-
litical	and	economic	policies	in	Ireland.	Mill’s	own	side	in	these	
debates	having	previously	been	branded	unrealistic	‘utopians’,	
Mill	employed	the	 term	‘dys-topians’	 to	signal	 the	harm	liable	
to	 be	 done	 if	 the	 government	 continued	 to	 pursue	 its	 current	
course.	 Like	 More’s	 ‘utopia’,	 Mill’s	 ‘dystopia’	 and	 ‘cacotopia’	
were	of	Greek	derivation:	 ‘dys’	 from	the	Greek	“dus”	meaning	
bad,	diseased,	or	dysfunctional,	and	‘caco’	 from	“kakos” mean-
ing	wretched,	 hideous,	 or	 vile.	Although	 ‘cacotopia’	 seems	 to	
have	left	almost	no	impression	on	the	English	language,	by	the	
end	of	 the	nineteenth	 century	 ‘dystopia’	 had	begun	 to	 appear	
sporadically	in	books,	journals,	and	newspapers.	The	word	ap-
pears	 to	have	become	 somewhat	more	widespread	during	 the	
1920s	and	30s,	but	it	was	not	until	the	1950s,	with	the	deepening	
awareness	of	Nazi	and	Soviet	atrocities,	signalled	by	the	publi-
cation	of	books	 like	 the	political	philosopher	Hannah	Arendt’s	
ground-breaking	study The Origins of Totalitarianism	(1951),	that	
‘dystopia’	became	an	everyday	term	for	any	radically	dysfunc-
tional	society.	Nevertheless,	despite	the	term	not	yet	having	en-
tered	more	general	circulation,	and	despite	the	fact	that	none	of	
the	authors	themselves	was	to	apply	it	to	their	own	work,	it	was	
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during	the	late	1890s,	1900s,	and	1910s	that	recognisably	dystopi-
an	fiction	was	first	to	appear.	Among	the	notable	initial	contribu-
tions	to	the	genre	we	may	count	H.	G.	Wells’s	The Time Machine 
(1895),	Jack	London’s	The Iron Heel	(1908),	and	E.	M.	Forster’s	The 
Machine Stops (1909).
Wells’s	 novella	 The Time Machine has	 generally	 been	 in-
terpreted	 as	 a	 comment	 on	 the	 social	 divisions	 of	 Victorian	
England.	In	Wells’s	story,	the	scientist	protagonist	is	transported	
to	the	year	802,701,	where	he	discovers	that	humanity	has	split	
into	two	distinct	species	incapable	of	breeding	with	one	another:	
the	childlike,	surface-dwelling	Eloi	and	the	bestial,	subterranean	
Morlocks.	Although	 the	 device	 of	 time	 travel	 is	 a	 contrivance	
which	distinguishes	Wells’s	story	from	the	more	realistic	focus	
of	later	dystopias,	the	innovation	of	using	literature	to	freely	ex-
trapolate	from	current	social	trends	–	in	this	case	the	widening	
gulf	between	the	upper	and	lower	classes	that	Wells	observed	in	
the	England	of	his	day	–	was	to	provide	a	key	component	of	the	
emerging	genre.
London’s	The Iron Heel	is	written	from	the	point	of	view	of	a	
scholar	in	the	year	2600,	though	the	events	it	describes	take	place	
during	the	years	1912-1932.	Eschewing	the	more	speculative	el-
ements	typical	of	Wells’s	fiction,	London	takes	as	his	focus	a	de-
velopment	which	diverges	only	to	a	comparatively	slight	degree	
from	actual	history:	the	rise	of	a	monopoly	of	trusts	–	known	in	
the	narrative	as	the	Oligarchy	–	which	comes	to	dominate	Ameri-
can	society.	Like	Wells’s	The Time Machine, The Iron Heel	imagina-
tively	extends	various	existing	social	tendencies	from	London’s	
own	time,	including	worsening	inequality,	concerted	anti-union	
activity,	and	the	rise	of	monopolies.	Although	it	has	tended	to	
occupy	a	more	marginal	position	 in	histories	of	 the	dystopian	
genre,	there	is	a	case	to	be	made	for	seeing	The Iron Heel as the 
first	dystopian	novel.
Forster’s	The Machine Stops is	both	a	dystopia	and	an	 im-
portant	early	work	of	twentieth-century	science	fiction.	This	re-
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markably	prescient	story	describes	a	society	in	the	distant	future	
in	which	humanity	has	become	so	dependent	on	technology	that	
it	has	lost	the	skills	to	perform	even	the	most	rudimentary	tasks	
without	 the	mediation	of	machines.	 In	 this	 future,	 people	 live	
underground	in	isolated	cells	and	all	needs	are	administered	by	
an	omnipotent	computer	known	as	the	Machine.	Direct	human	
interaction	has	virtually	disappeared,	with	most	contact	taking	
place	via	a	combination	of	an	early	version	of	instant	messaging	
and	video	conferencing.	Forster’s	dystopian	story	constitutes	a	
third	important	episode	in	the	history	of	the	genre.	Its	main	in-
novation	is	to	address	the	dystopian	potential	of	modern	tech-
nology.	In	the	wake	of	the	Victorian	era’s	faith	in	scientific	and	
technological	progress,	Forster	encourages	his	readers	to	consid-
er	how	the	displacement	of	human	activity	by	machines	could	
give	rise	to	both	social	alienation	and	individual	powerlessness.
Wells,	 London,	 and	 Forster,	 then,	 each	 helped	 to	 define	
what	has	since	come	to	be	known	as	dystopian	fiction.	Histories	
of	 the	dystopian	genre	proper	nevertheless	often	begin	with	a	
text	from	the	1920s,	one	which	responds	in	a	very	direct	way	to	
events	taking	place	in	Soviet	Russia	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Octo-
ber	Revolution	of	1917,	namely	Yevgeny	Zamyatin’s	pioneering	
novel We (1924).	Like	Forster’s	The Machine Stops, We is	both	a	
dystopia	and	a	classic	work	of	science	fiction.	Zamyatin’s	novel,	
believed	 to	be	 the	first	work	of	 literature	 to	be	banned	by	 the	
Soviet	 censorship	board,	 extrapolates	 from	 the	 reality	of	 revo-
lutionary	Russia	to	a	future	in	which	a	successor	regime	to	the	
Soviet	Union	has	conquered	the	world.	The	story	takes	places	in	
the	totalitarian	One	State,	a	society	in	which	citizens	are	assigned	
numbers	rather	than	names,	and	mathematics	has	been	elevated	
to	a	virtually	religious	status.
Zamyatin’s	We is	the	first	work	of	modern	fiction	to	depict	
an	attempt	to	engineer	a	‘perfect’	society	–	that	is,	a	society	which	
is	not	just	an	improvement	on	the	present	in	some	respect	or	oth-
er	but	actually	unimprovable.	 It	 is	also,	as	 the	 tone	and	style	of	
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the	book	make	clear,	a	satire	on	the	idea	of	such	a	society,	with	
Zamyatin	suggestively	employing	mathematics	as	a	vehicle	for	
imagining	what	such	static	‘perfection’	might	consist	in.	The	ide-
ology	of	OneState	effectively	translates	the	whole	of	reality	into	
an	immense	equation,	encompassing	not	just	the	natural	world	
but	the	social	domain	as	well,	with	the	consequence	that	human	
experience	 becomes	 monotonously	 standardised.	 Under	 this	
regime,	any	element	which	cannot	be	 rationally	 integrated	be-
comes	an	unlawful	anomaly,	meaning	that	all	manner	of	familiar	
human	experiences,	including	love,	are	outlawed.	At	the	end	of	
the	novel,	a	technique	is	even	introduced	for	surgically	removing	
the	faculty	of	imagination,	closing	off	the	possibility	of	dreaming	
of	alternatives	to	the	established	order.
	 The	satirical	intent	of	We connects	it	with	More’s	Utopia, 
which	had	already	raised	questions	about	the	viability	of	utopia	
at	the	very	outset	of	the	genre.	It	also	looks	forward	to	Aldous	
Huxley’s	Brave New World (1932)	in	the	following	decade.	Brave 
New World may	be	 thought	 of,	 like	We,	 as	 a	 form	of	 ‘dystopi-
an	utopia’,	meaning	 it	 portrays	 a	 society	where	 an	 attempt	 to	
‘perfect’	 human	 life	 has	 profoundly	 oppressive	 consequences.	
One	thing	that	sets	Huxley’s	novel	apart	from	earlier	dystopias,	
such	as	London’s	The Iron Heel,	and	many	later	ones,	including	
George	Orwell’s	Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949),	is	the	fact	that	the	
inhabitants	of	 the	World	State	are	controlled	and	manipulated	
not	through	violence,	imprisonment,	torture,	or	brute	force,	but	
through	the	systematic	application	of	softer	kinds	of	power	and	
a	form	of	hedonistic	consumerism.
In	 Brave New World,	 human	 beings	 are	 genetically	 engi-
neered	 for	 specific	 occupations,	with	 intelligence	 levels	 raised	
or	 lowered	on	demand,	 in	 order	 to	prevent	 anyone	 from	 feel-
ing	dissatisfied	with	their	position	in	society.	Promiscuous	sex	is	
universally	mandated,	while	monogamy	is	regarded	as	a	form	of	
social	deviance.	Mass	consumption	is	likewise	obligatory,	with	
sleep	conditioning	and	state	propaganda	used	to	discourage	fru-
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gality	or	attempts	to	repair	broken	goods.	All	citizens	are	addict-
ed	to	a	state-sponsored	drug	called	Soma,	which	allows	them	to	
enter	a	blissful,	euphoric	state	at	the	onset	of	troubling	thoughts	
or	emotions,	and	spend	much	of	their	free	time	distracted	by	lu-
rid,	sensationalist	mass	entertainment.	All	material	needs	are	au-
tomatically	met	and	medical	science	has	advanced	considerably	
beyond	the	present,	meaning	there	is	no	poverty,	crime,	disease,	
or	poor	health.	At	the	same	time,	there	is	also	no	room	for	origi-
nal	thought	or	personal	initiative	of	any	kind,	and	the	life	of	each	
citizen	follows	a	predetermined	format	and	pathway.	On	a	col-
lective	level,	meanwhile,	the	sole	purpose	of	society	is	to	ensure	
that	the	productive	mechanism	that	underpins	the	World	State	
continues	to	function.	In	sum,	Brave New World projects	a	‘utopia’	
in	which	material	abundance	has	been	secured	and	many	of	the	
major	barriers	to	human	flourishing	have	been	overcome,	yet	the	
result	is	a	way	of	life	which	is	existentially	and	spiritually	empty.
	 The	1940s	saw	the	publication	of	George	Orwell’s	Nine-
teen Eighty-Four,	a	novel	which,	as	its	author	acknowledged,	was	
deeply	 indebted	 to	Zamyatin’s	We	 and	which,	 like	 that	 earlier	
text,	was	intended	as	a	comment	on	the	nature	of	totalitarianism.	
Whereas	Huxley’s	Brave New World had	envisaged	the	elimina-
tion	of	human	freedom	in	the	context	of	a	superficially	alluring	
consumer	paradise,	Orwell’s	novel	extrapolates	from	the	totali-
tarian	regimes	of	the	30s	and	40s,	in	particular	that	of	Soviet	Rus-
sia,	to	imagine	how	an	even	more	fully	realised	and	unopposed	
form	of	totalitarianism	might	function.	All	of	the	most	readily	re-
called	features	of	Nineteen Eighty-Four	–	Big	Brother,	Newspeak,	
doublethink,	 thoughtcrime,	 telescreens,	 the	 memory	 hole,	 the	
two-minutes	hate	–	have	since	become	familiar,	and	in	some	cas-
es	almost	clichéd,	tropes	in	contemporary	culture.	This	assumed	
familiarity	with	Nineteen Eighty-Four	on	the	part	of	many	readers	
has,	however,	led	to	neglect	of	an	important	innovation	made	by	
Orwell,	one	which	arguably	represents	a	departure	from	earlier	
texts	in	both	the	utopian	and	dystopian	genres.
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This	is	that	the	government	of	Oceania,	the	fictional	super-
state	in	which	Orwell’s	novel	takes	place,	has	not	set	out	to	design	
a	‘perfect’	world,	as	in	the	cases	of	the	architects	of	Zamyatin’s 
One	State	 and	Huxley’s	World	State.	Rather,	 their	 aims	are	 to	
maintain	their	grip	on	power,	keep	the	rival	superpowers	at	bay,	
and	ensure	that	no	dissent	arises	within	their	territories.	These	
are	decidedly	pragmatic	ends,	lacking	the	drive	toward	perfec-
tion	voiced	by	Zamyatin’s	Benefactor	and	Huxley’s	World	Con-
troller.	There	is	no	pretence	in	Oceania	that	heaven	on	earth	has	
either	been	achieved	or	 lies	 just	around	the	corner.	 In	place	of	
the	promise	of	utopia,	cynical	and	often	self-contradictory	justi-
fications	having	to	do	with	national	security	and	the	war	effort	
are	offered	for	the	state’s	use	of	mass	imprisonment,	ubiquitous	
surveillance,	and	the	torture	and	execution	of	alleged	dissidents.	
Whereas	 Zamyatin	 and	Huxley	 had	 both	 satirised	 the	 idea	 of	
designing	 a	 society	 of	 static	 perfection,	Orwell	 used	 his	 novel	
to	imagine	the	means	by	which	a	totalitarian	government	could	
keep	itself	in	power	indefinitely	and	the	effects	of	this	on	those	
subjected	to	it.	Allowing	for	this	crucial	difference,	however,	all	
three	writers	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 having	 helped	 to	 turn	 twentieth-
century	 literature	away	 from	visions	of	 a	better	world	and	 to-
ward	cautionary	tales	of	where	we	may	find	ourselves	if	we	take	
the	wrong	path.
Human flourishing
With	the	fall	of	the	Berlin	Wall	in	1989	and	the	collapse	of	
the	Soviet	Union	in	1991,	many	commentators	were	quick	to	see	
these	events	as	hailing	the	‘end	of	utopia’.	Utopia	had,	of	course,	
already	 been	 undermined	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 many	 by	 events	 in	
Germany,	Russia,	China,	Cambodia,	and	other	countries	where	
promethean	projects	 to	abolish	 the	past	and	establish	a	 funda-
mentally	new	social	order	had	proven	to	be	catastrophically	de-
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structive.	The	failure	of	the	Soviet	Union,	often	regarded	as	the	
largest	utopian	 social	 experiment	 ever	 conducted,	 signalled	 to	
observers	that	utopia	was,	at	best,	a	pipe	dream	and,	at	worst,	an	
attempt	to	violently	force	reality	into	a	shape	it	could	never	take.	
It	was	in	this	cultural	climate	that	the	political	scientist	Francis	
Fukuyama	was	to	announce	‘the	end	of	history’	in	his	bestselling	
book,	The End of History and the Last Man	 (1992),	 by	which	he	
meant	the	end	of	the	ideological	conflicts	that	had	characterised	
the	modern	period,	and	the	beginning	of	a	new	epoch	in	which	
global	capitalism,	having	defeated	all	its	opponents,	would	reign	
unchallenged	for	the	foreseeable	future.	For	Fukuyama,	the	only	
practicable	utopia	had	already	been	realised	during	the	1980s	via	
a	 combination	 of	 free	markets,	 globalisation,	 and	 information	
technology.	In	this	context,	the	need	for	further	utopian	specula-
tion was suspended.
Today,	 however,	 in	 the	 early	 decades	 of	 the	 twenty-first	
century,	utopia	has	once	again	become	a	live	topic	of	conversa-
tion.	After	several	decades	spent	in	a	state	of	near	oblivion,	the	
category	of	utopia	has	 recently	 re-emerged	 in	academic,	polit-
ical,	 and	popular	discourse.	The	 reasons	 for	 this	 are	no	doubt	
overdetermined,	with	roots	that	may	reach	all	the	way	back	to	
More’s	Utopia	and	to	the	birth	of	modern	social	thought	in	the	
fifteenth	and	sixteenth	centuries.	Several	 reasonably	 clear	 con-
tributing	factors	behind	this	 ‘utopian	turn’	can	nevertheless	be	
identified.	The	first	is	a	growing	sense	of	dissatisfaction	with	the	
world	as	 it	 is,	combined	with	an	often	acute	anxiety	about	 the	
possible	 futures	 it	would	 seem	 to	 imply.	Whereas	 the	utopian	
thought	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 tended	 to	 centre	 on	 images	
of	 earthly	paradises,	 those	 seeking	 to	 revive	 interest	 in	utopia	
today	tend	to	write	out	of	a	desire	to	avoid	the	kind	of	scenari-
os	described	in	the	twentieth-century	dystopian	tradition,	from	
Huxley’s	Brave New World and	Orwell’s	Nineteen Eighty-Four to 
J.G.	Ballard’s	The Drowned World (1962)	and	Margaret	Atwood’s	
The Handmaid’s Tale (1985).
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The	case	for	the	relevance	of	utopia	today	has	been	forceful-
ly	made	in	recent	years	by	the	social	theorist	Ruth	Levitas,	who	
has	emphasised	the	connection	between	the	ecological	crisis	and	
utopia.	As	she	argues	in	her	book	Utopia as Method (2013), what is 
impossible	today	–	and	hence	‘utopian’	in	the	pejorative	sense	of	
the	word	–	is	to	act	as	if	our	current	unsustainable	and	unequal	
social	arrangements	can	continue.	What	are	needed	now,	Levi-
tas	contends,	are	alternatives	to	the	fossil	fuel-based	societies	to	
which	modernisation	has	given	rise.	To	attempt	to	imagine	such	
alternatives,	however,	is	necessarily	to	engage	in	utopian	spec-
ulation.	Perhaps	there	are	lessons	to	be	drawn	here	from	works	
such	as	Callenbach’s	Ecotopia,	with	its	suggestive	account	of	how	
modernity	might	be	‘greened’,	or	Thoreau’s	Walden,	with	its	por-
trayal	of	a	life	lived	closer	to	nature.
A	second	reason	for	the	resurgence	of	interest	in	utopia	is	
the	increasingly	dystopian	condition	of	life	under	late	capitalism.	
As	numerous	critics	have	argued,	under	neoliberal	capitalism	a	
growing	 number	 of	 people’s	material	 needs	 are	 going	 unmet,	
with	affordances	such	as	employment	and	housing	becoming	in-
creasingly	precarious.	This	sharp	decline	in	living	conditions	has	
been	accompanied	by	the	rise	of	what	the	cultural	theorist	Mark	
Fisher	has	termed	‘capitalist	realism’,	an	ideology	which,	as	he	
explores	in	his	book	Capitalist Realism	(2009),	serves	to	render	al-
ternatives	 to	 capitalism	unthinkable,	 and	which	has	 helped	 to	
normalise	conditions	of	extreme	inequality	and	artificial	scarcity.
	Another	dimension	of	today’s	utopian	discourse	is	that	of	
queer	politics.	In	his	important	study,	Cruising Utopia: The Then 
and There of Queer Futurity (2009),	 José	 Esteban	Muñoz	makes	
a	 case	 for	viewing	contemporary	queer	politics	as	 intrinsically	
utopian.	Just	as,	for	Levitas,	to	imagine	a	green	alternative	to	ex-
tractive	capitalism	involves	drawing	on	the	resources	of	utopi-
an	thought,	so	for	queer	commentators	like	Muñoz,	imagining	a	
world	 in	which	heteronormativity	no	longer	structures	human	
relations	 is	 an	 equally	utopian	gesture.	As	Muñoz	 suggests,	 it	
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may	be	that	in	attempting	to	think	queer	futurity,	utopian	litera-
ture	and	art	constitute	a	necessary	supplement	to	more	conven-
tional	modes	of	social	analysis.
Utopias,	as	we	have	seen,	are	attempts	to	imagine	societies	
which	are	 improvements	on	the	ones	we	find	ourselves	 inhab-
iting.	 In	 the	wake	of	 the	 failures	 of	 each	of	 the	major	utopian	
ventures	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 utopia	 was	 declared	 dead.	
Since	then,	however,	Fukuyama’s	prediction	of	the	end	of	histo-
ry	has	been	falsified.	The	prevailing	social	and	economic	system	
of	global	 capitalism,	which	Fukuyama	 saw	as	 the	 culmination	
of	human	progress,	now	poses	a	threat,	not	just	to	human	flour-
ishing,	but	to	the	existence	of	civilisation	itself.	The	ideological	
straightjacket	 of	 capitalist	 realism	 has	 made	 it	 hard	 for	 us	 to	
think	coherently	about	alternative	forms	of	collective	life.	Yet	we	
must	learn	to	do	so	if	we	are	to	avoid	the	dystopian	outcomes	at-
tendant	upon	the	ecological	crisis,	spiralling	inequality,	and	the	
resurgence	of	familiar	forms	of	hatred	and	tribalism.	One	thing	
this	will	require	is	careful	consideration	of	what	utopia	may	still	
have	to	offer	us	today.
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